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matic and Hydraulic Components - Service Arm System. Complex 39"
for thQ J. F. Konnedy Space Center of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. ThL, work was administered under tha
Technical Direction of the Design Engineering Directorate, Machan-
ie_1 Sy_(_,l_ Division. of the J. F. Kennody Spree Cuntor with Mr.
Jamos R. Me,Boo noting os pr,)jt,c'lmnnagur,
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ABSTRACT
This raport daneribes the effort accomplished, both analytieoI
and experimental, under Contract NASI0_5935 to determine tim mini-
mum cleanliness IQvnln required for the pneumatic and hydraulic
systems on th_ Launch Complex 39 Servi_e Arms, The st,My __nL:om-
passed an in-depth system review, a critical analysis of compo1.,ul S
with respect to contamination, a literature industry near_h t_*
compile pertinent data and experience, and a test propram I:o ¢lem-
onstrate component fullctio_la__ COlllp]iaI_ce versus COlll_im[1]nli¢)I_,
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I, INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of the study conducted under this contract
was to determine, by analysis and testing, the minimum Jew, Is of
cleanliness that would permit the Launch Complex 39 Service Arm
Control SyBtenm to meet all functional and rellahility require-
ments,
The cleanliness levels specified f_ the servie_ arm systems
were originally based upon the best Judgment of the system deslgn-
ors, and ",s a result of subsequent launch operat_on_ uxperJuncL_
all indieatlons were that they wer,_ unnecessarily strlnpunl. C.n-
sidcrabl.e expense is involved in cleaning system (,ompon(n_ts Ic,
these levels, in addition to other indirect costs associated willl
logistics, inspection, maintenance, and delays in test ol)eratlons.
It WaS therefore desirable to reduce these costs if posslb]u.
The objectives of this program were accomplished in four phases:
(I) an in-depth review of the system, (2) a critical analysls of
components with respect to contamination, (3) a ]] teraturu/indus-
try search to compile pertinent data and experience, and (4) a
test program to demonstrate component compliance versus contami-
nation. This final report describes the work performed in each
phase of the program, together with all findings, test data, and
conel us ions.
p: The secondary purpose of the study was to derive basic data
contributing to the general body of information on part cleanli-
ness requirements. In addition to the data contained in this fi-
nal report, a separate handbook was prepared as part of the con-
tract requirements. The Contamination Control Handbook for Ground
Fluid Systems, Martin Marietta report number MCR-69-485, was pre-
pared as a guideline of contamination control practices for those
persons engaged in the design of aerospace ground hydraulic and
pneumatic systems.
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A. CONCLUSIONS
At tilecompletion of the s_ucly for clL'anlinvBs l.vw,l.rvqul_ru-
musts, the follnwin_ eonclunlon was [m'mulatudl
I) Cleaniln_,ss l_,vols on _hv service arm systems can l_e
reduc_,d wi_h no degradation In pvri'ormancv. Tht, pro-
posed lew.ls are dc,scrlb(,dIn dvtall In Chapter II,
B, 1;
2) The data coliocLvd durtn?, the study wa_ docum_,ntv(I ,
ill the |:o['m O[ a contzllllillatton CollLl'(_] handbook a,_
a _uide for future design and opt, ration o[ hydraullu
and pneumatic systems.
The study was conducted ir_three p_ases and the conclusion is
based upon the results obtained. The primary =e_ults of each
phase of the study are disct_aed below.
A thorough evalua_.ion of the system and its components was
conducted to determine the system criticality cud component st, n-
: sitivity to contamination. Although many compon_,nts art, critical
to the service arm per.formance, they are relatiw,|y hIS_'nSitlW'
to contamination. Fifteen spec£_ recommendations concerning
the service arm system and components are discussed In further
detail in Sectlon B, Recommendations.
: A contamination test was conducted on 17 service arm tempo-
": nests that were determined to be sensitive to contamf.atio..
Contamination, in excess of the recommended clemlliness levvls,
i! was purposely injected lute the system to measure compone_t pc'r-
ITormance in a highly contaminated system. The test componL, nts
were procured in a commercial clean condition. All of the com-
ponents, except one, opermted properly throughout all tests with
no degradation caused by contamination. The 75M08829 prussurc
regulator proved to be extremely sensitive to contamination. The
cleanltnt, ss levels recommended in this study have one reservation;
four regulators in the service arm systems must be protected by
additional filtration.
II-2 MCR-69-484
Th(' literature search revealed that many systems, similar to
the, service, arm systems, at(, buillg successfully operated on less
strin_c, nt cl¢,anlinL'ss levels. Lc,s_ stringent cleanliness levels
shouhl produL._ sul_stantlal cost savings in futurr_ procurc, m_,it and
op,,ratlon o[ the service arm systems. Ch,aning costs for the
st,trice arm compon_,nts range up to 1897. of th_ base component
costs, Tht, rula×ud cl,,allJ|nc,ss ][,vc,ls Ill S[,['tloD B. ] ar(, less
st_]_]gunt than the prust,nt ]_,vu]s and approach commercial _lean-
liness levels which _hould offer a reduction in ch, aning costs,
More significant savings should be realized in procurement, lo-
);istles, quality control, and Launch op(,ratio_]s.
B. RI,;COMMENDATION S
The investlga_lon and analysis of the service arm systems
revealed several arc,as, related to ¢:ontamination control, that
require spuciflc attention. The following reconmi.l_dations are
related to specific problem areas on items that would _,nhance
contamination control on the Saturn V service arm systems.
I. Relaxed Cleanliness Levels
It is recommended that the service arm component and system
: cleanliness levels be relaxed to the following lew_Is. The pre-
,_ sent levels specified are also shown for comparison.
a. Hydraulic Systems
; I) Component Cleanliness Level
Particle Size
: (Microns) 0-5 5-15 15-25 25-50 50-100 Over i00
*Quantity per ft'_: Unlimited 48,000 8,500 1,500 250 50
of significant
surface area
*Based upon a minimum of 200 milliliters of rinse fluid per square foot of
significant surface area.
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2) Systum CluanJint,s_ Luw, l (L_,w,l 8 of NAS-1638)
PnrLJch, Size
(mlcvons) 0-5 5-I 5 1.5-25 25-50 50-100 Ovur JG0
Quantity l,,'rI00 Unlhuited (_4,000 Ii,400 2,025 360 h4
Ill] of [luld
3) l':xLstlnpSure/c,, At,! {'rltur/n for llydr;_uliuCompo-
nL,nt_ (ABMA -SPF,C- L0425040)
P.r t [c ].e S [_,e
(microns) 0-5 25-50 50-100 Ovt,r 100 i,'] ht,r r;
i
(dU;UltLtyper Llnl[in[Led 5110 bO 0 10
100 ,.1 sample
b. Pnt'uilla L1¢ SyH tellla
1) COnllmnunt Cluanlinuss Lew, ls
Particlt, Size
(microns) 0-300 300-500 500-I000 Ow, r lO00
i, i
*Quantity per It Unlimitudl 10 2 None
" of significant
sur [act' area
J
Fiber Lungth .....
"_ (microns) 0-750 750-2000 2000-_000 Over 6000
.. IQuantity per It:: Unlimited[ 20 2 None
.... ol significant
SLII" lace a l't'a
*Based upon a minimum of 200 mill.tilters of rinse fluid per square
foot o[ significant surface area.
(Total filterable solids limitation, 0.25 mg/ft:'.
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2) System Cleanliness Level
Particle Size
(microns) 0-340 340-500 540-1440 Over 104(]
Quantity per Unlimited* 14 2 None
140 grams of gas
r ....
Fiber Length
(mlcronN) 0-750 750-2000 2000-6004 Ow, r 6000
quantity per I00 UnlLmlted* 20 2 Non,.,
t{l:ams of j_;lq
*Total [tlterab]_. solJ.tlu limitation, 0,30 mR/tO0 t,rams of gas
3) Exl.sting Service Arm Criteria for Pneumnttt' Compol)unts
(hSFC-SPEC-14MOI67], Level IV)
Par tic It, Size
(microns) 0-50 51-[z,0 141-230 231-320 321-410 411-544 501+
i
Per ft"_ of No Limttl" 40 10 3 2 1 U
, Signif leant
: surface area
" Fiber Length
i (microns) 0-50 51-500 501.-1004 1401.+
Per ft_ No Limit_ 14 i 4
': Significant
surface area
ITotal filterable solids limitation, 1.4 mg/ft :!
2. Filtration for Critical Components
The 75MO8829 pressure regulator failed during tht, contamina-
tion tests. This regulator is highly sensitive to contamination
due to a very small (4.161 in. diameter) poppet seat. The fall-
urc mode is erosion of tile main poppet seat, as a result of the
high w. locities across the small seat area. This failure mode
would also ;)pply to all regulators in the service arm systems
that have a similar configuration; namely, the small scat area
with attendant high w, locitles. The problem may be solved by
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eliminating those regulators or by protection by moanB of filtra-
tion. It is recommended that the problem be corrected by filtra_
tlon. A careful analysis of the service arm systems revealed
that the majority of these regulators are adequately prot_ctt_d by
I0 micron (nominal) filtration Just upBtream of the regulators;
however, four regulators require additional filtration, It is
recommended that 10°micron dual-element filters be placed Just
upstre,am of the, following eomponontsl
75MO8830o2 A5657-4, -5, -O, -7
3_ A Closed Hydraulic ges_rvoir
Th_ hydraulic charging unit (HCU) rt,s_,rvolr is vt,nt¢,d to aL-
mosphL_,re,with no adequate means for prt,ventlt_gth_ t._tranc__, o1
moisture and salt-laden air. Moistur¢_ is a significant and cot_-
tributlng factor to problems that were, id_ntiflt_d with fungus and
corrosion in the hydraulic system. It is rucommend_d that the,
vent to atmosphere be e11mlnated and that a positiw_ pressure, ili-
trogen system, with reliL,f capability, be incorporatL,d into thL'
HCU reservoir.
4. Further Study to Eliminate Fungus Contamination
A hydraulic sample taken from mobile launcher no. I HCU r_,st,r-
volr contained one to two handfuls of a gummy contamination b_st
described as having the appearance of strawberry Jam. A biolo-
gical analysis, conducted in the Martin Marietta SpacL_ Biomedical
Research Laboratory, concluded that the contamination was fungi.
Two other contamination samples, taken on different mobile
' launchers, indicated the presence of viable organisms in other
_, portions of the hydraulic system. Fungus in a hydraulic system
_._ can clog filters, and produce component and system failures.
A review of the literature and industry provided no indica-
tion of any effort directed towards the elimination of fungi in
HIL-H-5606 hydraulic oil. Further study is recommended in this
area of technology to combat fungi formations in hydraulic oil.
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' 5._ Hydraulic and Pneumatic Syst0m 'Protecti0_n during Inactive
P_,rlods
I
Thu servlc,, arm pm_umat_c systems are pressurized only during
t.u._t op.rntions and in thl, l_unch countdown. No attempt is made.
to m_il.cain a positiw, pressure on the,system during the long
lnt_,rw_l_ bt, twt_un launches, The hydraulic system i_ drainad
bacl_ to the ri,s_,rw_tr after each launch.
it in rucomme.dud _hat a small ponit_ivo pressure be main-
L_linc, d oil t:ll_, n_'rvtc_., arm pnc_umntic nynt_,ms to prevent th. on-
tinnc_, of moisture, ¢ll]d atmo_iph_u'ic contamination, wlth tin att_.:n-
,hint corrosion problem_. It In further recommended that a blan-
k,,t of oil. be, nlal.ill;_lln_.,d /;n the, hydraulic i_y_t_,m, El.nnte, lll_,rs in
_i hydr;iu]lc t4ytlt_ln WiJ.1 dt'y out, luak, and d¢,ti,riora._ Jrom al;l_
II; noL bitinl_.utc, d with oil.
I____.I,'iltra_lon for ltydraulic Fluid Fill
ThL, hydraulic oil us_,d to Jill or resupply Lhe HCU reservoir
is not liltv_-ud. Considering the particulate contamination
qllowable in the,MIL-II-5606 ell specification, large quantities
el p;Irticulate can be I.ntroduced into the,IICU reservoir.
Filters [n the hydraulic system downstream of the reservoir
will remove particles larger than 25 microns, and approximately
_: 987, ol; those particles in the range of i0 to 25 microns. The
[liters will not remove the small particles which produce silt-
lag, compom,nt wear, and erosion. It is recommended that the
hydraulic oil introduced into the HCU reservoir be filtered to
3 microns absolute.
7. Change to NIL-H-6083 Hydraulic Oil
The service arm hydraulic system uses MIL-H-5606 hydraulic
' oil. The literature search rew_aled that industry experience
has shown MIL-H-6083 to be superior to MIL-H-5606 hydraulic oil
and that it has two distinct advantages: (i) MIL-H-6083 contains
a rust prew, ntative as an additiv,:; (2) conglomeration of fine
particles will not occur in MIL-H-6083 as they will in MIL-H-
..o06hydraulic o11 The properties of MIL-H-6083 are very slmi-
far to MiL-H-5606, and no compatibility problems exist. Residual
bIIL-H-5606 hydraulic oil does not haw, to be completely drained
from a system prior to adding MIL-H-6083 oil.
O0000001-TSClO
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8, Bubble Poiut T[_st on Filters
When performing a compon_,nt analysis on the filters on the
system, it was found that a bubble, point test is not conducted
on the maj_,rity of the filter clad.meatsafter the final cleaning
operation, Our experience has shown that eh:_mont d_:gradation
can occur durlng th_ cleaning% operation, it is r_co|nm_nd_d that
a Imbl_l._' point test I_, perl!nrm,,d aft_,r final cl_,aning of the-, _.,lo-
n]_,[_t to w:rify the, in_eg_'ILy of ill{' filter elemunt and its Stflt¢'d
Filtration h,w,l. I_ In al_m mandatory to p_rform a huhblr_ potn_
tu_l. nfLo,], an ol(:'m_,nt has h_,_,n in so_.vi(:_, e|oanodp and 1,n bo-
o, AddJtional Sanlpll.n_i]-r._'_,dm',,,,_
'. ']_hl_ _ll'rVl.C_ ill'llI pll_illllill_[(' SyH[,(.'llll-I llru nO_ nornllll_y nampl_.!d
lot i,¢llitillll_lla[.[Oll. _o lll_]_II_'lill ('o/_,llLgLlll_'U oI [h(, _yl-lt¢,l|l, _t _I
r_,¢on111_elld(,dtlla_ I_11_?_lu!rvLk'_, arm pll_,tlllla_le Nyll[_(q11N bt-! aamplud al_
p_,riodLc _nl_,rva_ a_ part o1: a _Landard p_°ocudure,
There is no procodnre or requirement _o take contamination
samplus duri.n_., thu Inn!; intervall; betwuen launches m: during a
down-mode op_,raLion. It is r_,commundud that procedurus b_, in-
' stJtul.ud tO tal¢u Ballil}It,_ at thr_.t,- _o sLx-month in_,rval,_.
I0. Contractor Equ_ipment Interfaces
I£ the cleanliness luv_,ls on the survicu arm systems are re-
Jaxcd, it is necessary to _,ither ruvi_e the' interface spucifica-
tl_ms for contractor equipment, or to provide ath_quate filtra-
: tion just prior to the int_,r_ac_,,
I'
ii. Standardization of Component Specifications
A total of eight different cleanliness level specifications
are identified on the service arm component specifications, In-
stances were found where fluid sampling criteria had been speci-
fied for component cleanliness levels, Several component speci-
ficetions applied optional cleanliness levels of widely differ-
ing criteria to the same component, This situation is a con-
tributing factor to problems in attaining and maintaining a
workable cleanliness program. It is recommended that a single
cleanliness specification be referenced on all component speci-
fications, system enginet,ring, and applicable procedures.
!
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12. Q_a!ity Control on System Bample B
l)uring our investigation of the::service arm sampling proc_,-
dur_,s, there, was llO ovidoJl_'e of quality control as nppllod to
Jill,results of tilt.conkamlnaLion _ampl_s. No apparent action
won taken on numerous system samples that did not moot specifi-
cation. Once, a rvalIntlc eluanlim, ss levo! ass been spuclfi_,d
for a syst_,m, it l.s n_.eu_nary to _ake eorr_,ctl.vo action if /:he
samplv_ do not moot .pvct.l;lcatlon. Tht/_ action 1. r_:quirud to
prew, nt system dogradakion or Huhsequent failure. It is reeom-
mt, n(h,d l hnt. quality Control monitor the result.a of the syst_,m
_mmp I(_f_.
_3 Al:mm__!rl S Pr(_tocl;l,on for gloc__II_eal Equ.£pmont
Corrosion of qumpon(,nL vlvct_'lcal pa_'_t_ is oat, of tlu_ nloHt
prvdominont: c;_la,Horlu_ oI; l:ali,_rv ill tilt:survlcc arm sysLums.
The vi_,cgrica} portion oi Lhe components is not provided with
positive protuctlon against atmospheric moisturu and salt. The,
_-lervic.e arm conm)lv._ do IlOt {'O[)lLLli[I _lI_ inerL gaseous purge, and
inspection r(.vvaled Chat tile console doors art, often left opc,n
b_.twven launches. The least expensive method of prew_nting cor-
roslon, caused by atmospheric moisture, is to maintain a dry
gaseous positiw, pressure (O.5-1n. water gage) within the service
arm consoles. This can be accomplished with dry nitrogen or air,
but a comprt,ssor-dry alr system would probably b_, more economical
, than nitrogL'n.
>
14, Consolidated NASA Cleanliness Spec£ficatlon
Operational p_,rsonnel reported that a multitude of cleanli-
. hess specifications exi.nt._ for the different systems on the Saturn
V complex, Different specifications also exist for the same sys-
tem because of diffcrent design responsibilities. Most companies
in the aerospace industry have consolidated all of their clean-
ing critcria into one specification to eliminate confusion and
reduce total costs. The Saturn V contamination control program
would bu greatly enhanced if a single consolidated cleanliness
specification were prepared for all systems, An extension of
this cleanliness specification would also include consolidated
criteria for all of the NASA centers.
I,
I
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15, Oonsolidated_Sam,pllnk Procedure
The requirement to take a system sample, and the governing
criteria for each sample, are specified in (_ach respective opera-
tional test procedure. There is no composite correlation ok the
samples taken on the Saturn V launch stand, and as a result there
is no consistent approach to sampling or sampling criteria. A
standard sampling procedure should be established to coordinate
all of the samples taken on Complex 39. This procedure would
combine all sampling information and criteria into one central
document and would eliminate confusion among different groups.
The procedure should list fluid commodity, sample port location,
the procedure used when taking the sample, and the criteria for
the sample.
i
-.- i
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ii If_]IL_ SYSTEMS AN_A_YSI_
A. SERVICE ARM DESCRIPTION
Launch Complex 39 has nine service arms on oach launch umbili-
cal tower (LUT). The primary function of the service arms is to
provide personnel and astronaut access, fluid commodity load!ug
and unloading, electrical powers environmental control, and check-
out of the Saturn V vehicle. After the Saturn V veq_iclo arrives
at the launch pad, the service arms are e×tended to the v_,_lllc'le
and various checkout functions are perform_d to ensure the Jntug-
rity of the systems. Prior to launch, the servlcc, umbillcals are
connected to the vehicle to perform _oadln_, access, and vheckout.
After all functions are complete the service arms dlsc,onnect all
umbilical carriers and couplings from the vehicle, withdraw the
umbilical lines, and then retract the ann back to the LUT where
the arm is locked into place. Four of the service arms are with- l
drawn prior to liftoff, and five at or directly after lifter1:
(Fig. IZl-I and Table llI-i).
Table III-I Service Arm Retract Times
Arm i (S-IC aft) 0 hr 0 rain 30 sec
Arm 2 (S-IC forward) 0 hr 0 rain 16.2 sec
Arm 3 (S-If aft) ii hr 30 rain 0 set"
Arm 4 (S-If intermediate) Ida.off
Arm 5 (S-II forward) Liftoff
_i Arm 6 (S-IVB aft) Liftoff
I _;
:._; Arm 7 (S-IVB forward) Liftoff
<.i Arm 8 (service module) Liftoff
Arm 9 (command module) 0 hr 43 rain 0 sec
i ,
This study concerns the hydraulic (I_IL-H-5606) and pneumatic
(nitrogen-helium) control systems that perform the following basic
functions on the service arabs:
I) Carrier kickoff;
2) Carrier withdraw/reconnect ;
3) Coupling kickoff/withdraw;
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4) Line tray wlthdrawal;
5) Service arm extend/retract (a.tomatic);
6) Service arm extmnd/ratract (manual);
7) Latchback mechanism;
8) Water quaneh system actuation;
9) Platform extend/retract ;
1(.)) Environmental chamber operation.
B, DETAILED ANALha_IS
When specifying a cleanliness level for a !arge and complex
syst{:m such as the serv1<e arms, it is not possible to merely as-
sign a level by associal ion to other systems. Thls task must
first address itself t,, the function of the system, the critical-
ity asslgn_,d to each function of the system, and a review of the
backup or redundancy configurations. In addition, the selection
of a system cleanliness level depends greatly upon orifice sizes,
level and adequacy of filtration, sampling procedures, system
sample results, the maintenance provisions used to prevent clean-
liness degradation, and finally a careful review of each critical
component in the system.
, As the initial phase of this contract, a detailed analysis
o[ all service arm fluid systems was performed with the primary
objective of identifying those components, both hydraulic and
pneumatic, that perform critical system functions. At the inl-
tiation of tile contract, a decision was made to use the updated
configuration of the service arms, effectivity AS-503. Table
111-2 lists the basic documentation (and the applicable revisions)
. that describe the baseline for this study.
During the initial phase of the systems analysis, 47 basic
operational functions were identified among the nine service arms.
It also became apparent that many of these functions appeared in
identical configurations on more than one service arm, including
identical component item-find numbers. The logical decision was
made, therefore, to consolidate the 47 functions into a set of
indivldual or repetitive systems, resulting in a significant sim-
plification of the analysis task. This activity was subsequently
accomplished, with the result that a commouality set of 23 system
functions was identified (Table III-3).
00000001-TSD03
MCR-69_484 111-3
L
Tabl_ III-2 Baseline Documentation
__ i i
Schemat ic Revision
Number Title Number .
76KO20}O Hydraulic Charging Unit Revision A
76K02011 S-IC Intartank Arm Revision A
76K02012 S-IC Forward Arm Revision A
7bK02013 S-II Af_ Arm Revlr,ion A
76K02014 S-II Intermedlato Arm Revision A k
76K02015 S-If Forward A)'m Revision A
76K02016 S-IVB Aft ArT. Revision A
76K02017 S-IVB Forward Arm Revision A
76K02018 Service Modulu Arm Revision A
76K04767 Apollo Access Arm Revision B
76K03445 Environmental Chamber New
76K00190 Item Find List, Arm 9 Revision B
75MOBS]8 Item Find List, Arms i-8 R.evision E
76K02001 Service Arm Component Settings Revision H
Technical Pub] icat ].on
,... Manual No. Title Date
TM439 Pressure Regulators ii Dec 67
~
'TM440 So]enold Valves 13 Dec 67
TM441 Cylinders 15 Dec 67
TM442 Pilot Operated Valves 20 Dee 67
TM443 Miscellaneous Components 22 Dec 67
TM500 Hydraulic Charging Unit 30 Jun 67
TM501 S-IC Intertank Arm 15 Jan 68
TM502 S-IC Forward Arm 2 Feb 68
TM503 S-II Aft Arm 3 May 68
TM504 S-II Intermediate Arm 30 Aug 68
TM505 S-II Forward Arm 15 Jul 68
TM506 S-IVB Aft Arm 15 Feb 68
"M507 S-IVB Forward Arm 26 Jul 68
• TM508 Service Module Arm 16 Aug 68
TM509 Apollo Access Arm i0 Nov 67
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Table 111-3 Servlc_ Arm Functions
i
System Description Arm Usage
i i L .
Co_]tro] Console {._I 1,2
Control Console ._#i 4,5,6,7,8
Control Console {.q. 9
Control Console {_2 4,5,6,7,8
Manil_l Console 3
Water Quench and Latchback i_2,4,5,6,7,8
Latchback Cylindov 3
Water Quoncl_ :,rid Latchback 9
Carrier R(:,co.ne(t 4
Platform Extt_nd/Retract 5,6,7
Garr|t,r K[c[¢ol[ 2
Carrier Ktck,,ff 4,5,0,7
Carrier Kickofi 8
Carrier WILhdrawal/Reconnect 1
Carrier Withdrawal 4,5,6,7
LEH WiChdrawal Cylinder 7
Carrier Kickoff 8
Coupling Kickoff/Withdrawal 4
Tray Withdrawal 2
Tray Withdrawal b
Tray Withdrawal 7
Environmental Chamber 9
llydraulic Charging Unit --
• Schematics of the above fluid systems are presented in Fig-
ures 111-2 through 111-23. With all service arm systems now re-
duced to their basic elements, a detailed study of each isolated
system schematic was conducted in conjunction with applicable op-
erational data in order to gain a thorough understanding of the
design philosophy and technique. This effort revealed the fact
that the set of commonality systems was comprised of nearly ii00
nonduplicating item-find numbers. It was also obvious that many
of these were nonfunctional, performed maintenance duties, or
were otherwise not critical to a successful launch.
The major effort in the analysis of the service arm systems
was an item-by-item examination of each component in each system.
For this purpose, charts were prepared for each component showing
the item-find number, nomenclature, all possible modes of failure,
the system effect of each failure mode, and a classification
breakdown of the importance of a failure to the launch. For the
purposes of this study, the following failure-effect categories
were considered:
=Jm
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.. 1) Loss of life or mission failure;
", 2) Launch delay of any duration;
3) Systum malfunction or data loss (used during _ount-
dowl] alld latlnc]l, btlt not critical to launch success);
4) Local information less o_ malntensnce function (not
roqnired durin_ countdown and launch);
5) Nonftlncth_lla[ (no contribtttion, sttch as tt,st polls,
[llterfaco l_ttlngs, t_tc.)
The above off,*rt differed i[rom tht_ usual iRtt.rprotat[,_il ,,f a
failure analysis in that, ill ]inu with the pro_ram objtwI [vus,
only e[fectS arlsing l[rOillcont:alnlnat[oll probIunls wt,rt! vonsl.(It,rod,
I: The. followlnF ground rules were fotl.owod when duturmlnlnv fnII-
" ure modes and establl, shinB fat.htru ofl?ecttt:
i) The worst possible moment of failure In point of
time was considered;
2) Tile functioning of any particular subsystem was con-
s]dered to be essential_ even though a redundant
capability exists;
3) Redundancy of components was not considered, since
parallel components can be equally susceptible to
:. contamination;
4) Failure by contamination only was considered -- not
_ '..' mechanical, electrical, structural, environmental,
• '
' or operator error (Example: broken springs_ incor-
rect procedures, etc.) ;
5) Only one failure was assumed to occur at any given
t ime ;
..,:, 6) Header supplies were assumed to be available at the
_ . _ proper pressures and flowrates at all times;
: ' 7) Contractor furnished equipment was not evaluated in
the study.
The results of the above categorization were compared to
those obtained by The Boeing Company in "Failure Effects Analy-
sis", their document number D5-16494-7. The Boeing analysis
was, of course, conducted under different ground rules; in that
work, failure due to contamination was not the only failure mode
considered, and failures in redundant areas were considered to
have no effect. These facts resulted in our analysis showing
considerably more Category A and B components than did theirs.
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In add|ibm, Martin Marietta made no attempt to differentiate be-
tween a launch delay and a launch scrub, as did Boeing. However,
For the vast majority of components, our estimation of failure
modes _nd effects was consistently in agreement with that of Boeing.
As a rf_sl,11 of this effort, 329 individual item-find numbers
out of the original total of approximately II00 were retained for
furtl,or consideration; 135 in Category A (loss of life or mission
fal]uro) and 194 in Category B (launch delay of any duration).
Convc,rsiun of this total to a part number arrangement dlsclosed
that 79 different component_ manufactured by 27 vendors wore rep-
resented. The categorized llst of these 79 components is included
In this report as Appendix A. It was from this llst of Category
A and B component_ that tlle final selection was made::of the com-
ponents to be used In tile test phase of tills program. No further
consideration was glv¢,n to those components class|fled as Gate-
gory C, D, and E since these: components were not critical to the
system operat]on and generally consisted of |land valves, fittings,
and other components that were not critical from a contamination
viewpoint. The criteria used for further evaluation of these
components Is described in chapter IV, Component Analysis.
lu the course of the above system studies, several general
areas arose that were fc[t to be deserving of discussion. These
w£_re :
I) Cleanliness speci6icat ions ;
I_ . 2) Filtration;
i 3) General system problems;
4) Sampling procedures ;
* 5) System orifices; and
", 6) Service arm cylinders.
. . A discussion of each of these subjects follows.
I, C] ean liness Specifications
During this study it was found that there are a multitude of
cleanliness specifications being used to specify fluid, component,
and system cleanliness levels on the service arms. Eight dif-
ferent cleanliness specifications have been identified for hy-
draulic and gaseous nitrogen applications, generated by four dif-
ferent government agencies, and ranging in age from April 1960
Io March [968, a span of eight years. These specifications are
listed in Table III-4.
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Table III-4 Govern.lent Cluanllness Spec!f1_'al-iCms
Specification Number Flu/d Issuing Ag_ncy
I. KSC-C-123 Fluids NASA Kennedy
2. IOM01621 [_neumatlc NASA Mal;lhal I
3, 1.O425040 ll,,drnull.c Army Ord;lllancu
4. MSFC-SPEC-164 Iblf,ilmnt:ic NASA Mnrsllnl]
5. MSFC-PROC- 166 Hydrnnl. _c NASA Marshall
f_. MSFC-SPEC-23/i N'i.l-rl,t_un NASA Marsh;ll I
7. 75MO94h7 llydraul |<' NASA Marnh;lll
: S. MIL-II-',MI(_II llydr;ilil Ir ,ill NAV-WEILq
Of this Llltnl, the KSC-C-I. 23 and [OMOlfl2l specifications tlr_
;ipp;iriull ly [dent [cal in all l;espect_, but +, al.1 ot:llol._t _p_._c|.fy dlf"
I'urunl crll;url.a {evuls. Spcciflcat:Ions 2, 3, 0 and 8 are ref-
ute,need In the scope oI! work for l_hls contract I the otller four
;Irl' 11o£. Iiisl_nnces were found where! sy_ttem fluid sanlpliilg cri-
lur[a had been specified for COmllonunt. cleanliness levels. Sev-
er;if conlponent specil:ications applied optional c].eali[ng proce-
dures of widely differing criteria to tile same component. De-
tailed criteria fllr these ,_Ipecji:ications are contained in Table
IV-I.
Tills situation is a signfflcant and contributing factor to
problems In atta[nhlg and maintaining a workable cle:':,iiiness
program. Undoubtedly, several of these e_ght specifications were
prepared for a specific requirement some time ago, then applied
". intact to the service arm systems whose functional requirements
, : and component configurations may bear little or no resemblance
ii to those for which the specification was originally prepared.
Such a large variety of specifications must inevitably lead to
. confusion by compounding communications problems between those
persons who are responsible for actual cleanliness determinations.
•. The use of a single, comprehensive specification is recommended
to eliminate confusion and unify the requirements for all aspects
of the cleanliness program. Further, this single specification
should then be referenced on all component procurement drawings
and all system installation drawlnKs and operating or maintenance
procedures.
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iOperational persoml¢,] (The BoeiI1g Company) w_rt. eontactg:d
duri.ng the course of this study regarding eloanlin_.l_ apociftca-
tion_, aampllng technlql,es, contamination control, etc. OnL:
signif|callt area of discussion Celltered arollnd cleanl|ne.ss sput'I-
ficatlons. T|loy rapt,rind that a multitude ,If sp(_,cil[jcat.l_,_ns
exlst fat7 the dlfferenl- systems on Saturil V; and that for the
same piece of pipe and conmlodtty, different specifications exist
for each system on the tower. This comment would indicate the
taped for a sin_;lo c.onsolldated eleaBliness specific, atiot_ for nil
Systems on Saturn V. Most companies ill the aerospace industry
have consolidated nil of their cleaning eriterla isle one speei-
fl('ati.on to (,ltmzl.nal:,, ,',.rufus.Ion and redtteo caStS. Tile optimum
rtolullon would b(, a t_in};le t, on_lidnLed clpan]_l.llut_H Bpo.t'l[ication
" for. all NASA eenter_, The above recommendatl.oll present_ a for-
m.ldal_I(, t'(im:dlnal, l.,ul Innk, but it In not JmposnJbl(._, The tml
vt, turn 8hot|Id rp,41lll., in /i nt_U/t.l?J.cant el*St r_,dltct:I, on,
It: should bu II('_U(| tl)¢It: a consolidat_iuu of clut|nlllg l)rocodurun
will genural.ly incur an initial ¢o_t to enghle(_ring and sometlme,t (
in procurement, Engiueering must be revised to maintain couft_,u-
ration control, Manufacturers will prob,,bly request additional
price Increases in hardware to change their engineering,, and ctt_an-
ing processes it'. the criteria is actually revised, If the cri-
teria Js less stringent, a substantial east savings should be
real Ized. Tile CoLa] impact of tile change must be evaluated; but
initial costs are generally offset by significant savings ill op-
erations, procurement, launch stand operation_ and logistics.
i 2,....Filtration
Adequate filtration is one of the best means of maintaining
system clean[iness and protecting critical components In tile sys-
' tem.
The method of filtration employed on the service arms is shown
in Figure III-24. The hydraulic supply in the hydraulic charging
unit tHOU) has a 144-micron sump filter that filters all hydrau-
IIL fluid used in the service arms. The low pressure pump just
downstream of this filter is a gear-type pump and the 144-mlcron
filter is adequate. Tile vendor for this pump maintains that the
pump will operate satisfactorily at Level 9 of NAS 1638 (commer-
cial cleanliness). The high pressure pump inlet, and the pump
bypass back to the reservoir, are individually filtered to I0 mi-
crons nominal. The hydraulic supply to the service arm consoles
is also filtered to I0 microns. The hydraulic return drain to
the HCU reservoir is filtered to I0 microns by means of a large
depth-type filter. Filters are located within the service arm
systems to protect critical components.
:7
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Filters for the service arm pneumatic system are located at
the console inlets on each level. All pnaumatle _upplla_, with
the exception of the 125 psi nitrogen system, are filtered to lO
microns nominal. The 125 psi nitrogen system does not contain
any crJtical components and no additional filtration Is recnm-
m_nded. Numerous samples taken in the pneumatic headers to the
s_rvice arms indicate no particla_ over 140 microns, with only
on_ to five. partlcl_m in the range of 50 to 140 micrnns, fire,Ill
filters aln, contil|.llud wtthl.n the pnoumllt:|c r+ytltomts l_o prn_evt l.n-
dlvldual e_mlponontt+,
Th¢! tlaloril:y of |lip l;].ltur_ ill [:lit, Hy_ltom are Of ill+' t_[Iw, lo
uloulenL [ll-l. lno t.ypo l.nl]tal, lod In hard l+l.ptng ilmtallati,ma,
T,ho;Io 1"11I.l,r o I ollivnl-+ _rt, dJ f!fi['n I t to 111+1[nl./t tn /llld I Ill, iIVI+I Olll
will gellt-'rally L'OcOtVo +-'onlatnlnatIollE L'I+IIIIt-ht! a[Alliil-lphl,l't'ItlllOl-II+I
,povial. protect ion {.s pr<wldc, d dnrtlD; checkout, Wu rocoml,vll<l
that dual-t!l, oni_nL el,_ 'l'-¢ypo f l.ltvra be t, tulal.dvrod for I'litll;+_ , <lu-
mil,n applicat lon_.
In our exput'tenco, dual clement Ill.tiers have bepn 17ouml I.
oft=or sew;Pal advantages, alld t:hu liter'attire ruvIt,wod subt;t:mll t-
ates this pusition. A typical hydraulic system dual element 1711-
tur consists o17 a 15-micron (absolute) primary element backed tip
by a 3-micron (absolute) secondary element that: can effectively
control stlti.ng contamination. FilLers are pruporttonal devices
and most manufacturer's define nominal rating as the ability t-o
trap 98% of particles of the rated size or larger. Absolute
ratings are generally Interpreted at IOOZ; however, the pusslb!l-
ity exists of passing fiber-type contaminants longer in dimension
than the absolute rating, but smaller in diameter. With a dual
element device, increased turbulence and double filtration efl!ec-
Lively increases filtration reliability. Except in extraordinary
circumstances, the secondary element need never be changed; the
primary element can be readily changed without mechanically dis-
turbing the system or exposing the system to external contaminants.
This is the primary advantage of the device. These advantages
accrue with little additional expense.
Under circumstances where co:_tinuous high Elowrates are in-
volved, the dual element-type filter would be more effective when
used for critical component protection_ with a much coarser fil-
ter used off the header supply. However, in the service arm sys-
tems, supply flowrates are relatively small and infrequent, and
maintenance would probably not be excesslve if the device were
used off the header as a blanket system protector.
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{;omD_uwnl.sthai- aru })_rlfuuLarly 8enHitlw _.to conl_amhlation
should be protected by filtration just upstream of the component,
TI- ¢:hoc,,mp,melltdoes not see large quantities of fluid, al) In-
tu_;r;llfilter sur_,un (Fi_, III-25) contained within the component
may b,, uonsldorod, ]integral screvns should have ample area and
_iul-f.lc|entstructural l_aL_ktlpto pre_vent loading, Z,P buildup, and
,.mhsc,q.ent rupture of the screen. Fitting,-type screens (Figl_rQ
III-25) ar.o.m,t reromm,,ndod0 Dnrlng, the L'ontamlnatlon tests con-
d_wl:_,d,m tills contrast, all Of the flttilW,"type screr:llSfailed,
Tlwst,, ,'_croon_ do noC uont_iJn lluffl[ciCqlt zlroa alld often will r.p_
t.r. and proceod down the ny,_uum, with the possihillty of a major
c,,nlam|na¢[,m failure downstream, Anoth¢]_ disadvantage of _heso
14L'I'OI-!IIII_FI tllllt:IlllllIlTllIa[oporlltionfll;hl,y11170FIWqOF 111_lInt/_inodr
I..' I liillll,d,
'I'llumalo_ll:y _d Ilw fllt'urtlvonl_l[lwd l.nl.h,,svrv|-u.0arm tlys-
1011m are manufa¢l;tlrod by _'lilid Dynami.¢li. A htihll]o pill.tit (::ost: foi'
tu,rll t,'at I_ul i,f the f lltral ll!ll I<,vl,I lvi llol.'flll.'lll[!d aCl:.or Lhey ilrl!
lnauiildcl.ill't!d. The flit;urn are Ihvn clvaliOd by aiiot'liel:' vurldol',
bul ol'v nltl; bubbly llill, nt ful#l;:e,d oft;t!l: clt, anin}4. Our _Jiipul:lunc_
Ilai_ ,_ill_lwn thai It Is ile,'tu_lsat'y t;o perl;orln a bnhhiv poinl_ Let#l:
al'lt;r all',' t'leall|llt; opvrotl.n alld prilti: to u_ayt; ill orde[" I:o vet'[-
Iv Ihc, lutelU'ity o| the |'liter and its 8ta_ud rtltrai_ion 1.cwel.,
Als., tt- tH lil:/ild!lt,.lry Lo pul't'ol:nt a bubl_i.e point test after an
t, lt,liit, u{ has be,ell ill l:let'vit'e, c:[ean_,d, aild is buillg pt'aced back tn
svrvlc'e. We l.'ecolillllund that the ab.ve practices be instituted for
[ lit. serf i_c,t, ai'm H)'SI't, IIIS.
IL
"flit: IICU reservoir is filh, d with MIL-ll-5600 hydraulic fhiid
I l'_qlldrllnls by liwallsof a hand pump, The oli is introduced into
the HCU retnrn |ine downstream of tilefilter'; thus no filtration
: of the oil is accomplished upon resupply or initial fill of the
h\'draulit' reservoir.
Considering the volume el the reservoir and the particulate
contamination allowable in the MIL-H-5606 oil specification, the
quantities of particulate that could be introduced into the res-
ervoir in a single fill operation are given in Table 111-5.
Table III-5 Potential Reservoir Fill Contamination
Part Jcle Size
Raul4e (M[C tons) 0"5 5-15 15-25 25"50 50-100
Number of
Particles Unlimited 47,2001000 I 81900,000 4, 7201000 4721000
u ,,
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None of the particles smaller than i0 microns will be removed by
the service arm hydraulic system filtmrs. Martin Marietta recom-
me:ads that all hydraulic oil introduced into the HCU reservoir be
ftltervd to 3 microns,
Contamination tents wera conducted on critical service compo-
nents as the last phase in this contract. The major conclusion
r_aehod in those tests was that the 75M08829 pressure regulator i.s
_-_tio! The failttr_ mode was erosionhIFd_ly sensitivo to utmtam_,., .._,
oF tim main p,,pget stum _oat, as a result of the high velocities
acro_s the small re;at. Tlrls conclusion would also apply to all
r_gul ators In the m_rvi_o arm _lysLovll_that hav_ a similar config-
ttratl.on, namely, th_ _ma|], m_at area with attendant high veloci-
t|Oil,
To a|lovlat_! t l_[_ condition, thuse regulators may either be
r_placo, d or prot._c[ed l_y adequate fl.l.tration Just upstream o_ the
componunt. Wu ruu,tt_ond that the prohlem be corrected by filtra-
floe. A careful analysis of the service arm systems _evealed
that the maJorlt'y t,f th_su regulators were located in close prox-
imity to the Filters at the inlet; of the consoles and were the
first e,mponents downstream of these filters. These regulators
will bu adt,quately protected by the 10-micron filters. The fol-
lowing regulators are sol protected by adequate filtration.
.SpecI fIcat ion Locat ion
75M08830-2 A5657-4, -5, -6, -7
Martin Marietta recotmnends that 10-micron absolute dual-ele-
ment I'i[ters be installed just prior to the above regulators.
This recommendation is made even if the relaxed cleanliness lev-
els, described in this report_ are not implemented. The present
cleanliness levels of the service arm system (reference Tables
III-7 and III-8) are dirty enough to warrant this recommendation.
This study did not include an investigation of the contractor
equipment that interfaces with the service arm systems. If the
" relaxed cleanliness levels described in this report are implement-
ed_ the contractor interface specifications should either be re-
vised or adequate filtration should be required in order to pro-
tect their equipment.
.3_,_ General System Problems
The previous discussion on filtration concerned particulates
as a detrimental form of contamination. Another important con-
sideration in hydraulic and pneumatic systems ks the elimination
00000001-TSD12
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of moisture. In the service arm system, the reservoir of the l_y-
draulic charging unit is vented to atmosphere, wlt.h_no adequate
means for preventing the entrance of moisture and salt-laden air.
This is felt to be a significant contributing factor to problems
that were identified with fungi in the system and corrosion in
accumulators and cylinders.
A contaminated hydraulic oil sample was taken from the hydrau-
lic charging unit on mobila launcher No. I in January 1969. The
sample contained approximately one to two handfuls of a gummy con-
tamination best described as having the a@pe_rance of "strawberry
Jam" of a thick, gummy nature.___ chemical analysis was conducted
by NASA and the contamination was reported to be a cellulose fi-
ber,. but it was not determined whether it was organic or synthetic.
There was a small trace of calcium, zinc, and iron.
Since the analysis indicated a fibrous material, the hydraulic
system and reservoir mist filter were inspected to determine if
any system degradation had p_oduced a "fibrous" material. The in-
spection did not reveal any degradation or any other contamination
in the reservoir vent system or on the hydraulic system filter.
After reviewing the results of the chemical analysis, it ap-
peared that the chemical analysis could be supplemented by a bio-
logical analysis, and such an analysis of the contamination was
conducted in the Space Biomedical Research Laboratory of Martin
• Marietta. The analysis concluded that:
_ii '_icros_opic examination of the contaminated hydrau-
lic oil sample revealed the presence of branched fila-
ments (Fig. 111-26) characteristic of fungi mycelium.
An attempt was made to demonstrate the presence of via-
_ ble fungi. Standard bacteriological culture media
(Sabouraud's dextrose agar, trypticase soy agar and nu-
trient agar) were inoculated with samples of contaminated
oil. After 48 hours incubation at 32°C, typical fungal
colonies were evident. Thus, using preliminary data as
a basis, it is believed that the oil contaminant is a
fungus."
Additional tests were performed on the fungi culture. We
were unable to produce a culture in clean MIL-H-5606 hydraulic
oil, but were able to produce a culture in plain tap water under
the oil. There are four distinct classes of fungi; this particu-
lar fungi was isolated to the Fungi-lmperfectii class. Lack of
information on structure and presence of fruiting bodies prevented
an accurate classification within its individual class without
further tests which were beyond the scope of this contract.
O0000001-TRI:nl
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Two other contamination samples tenatively indicate tile pres-
ence of viable organisms in other portions of the hydraulic sys-
tom - on dlffermlt mobile launchers. A 0.25-inch clogged hydr_qu-
lic line was reported on service arm 6, mobile launcher #2 on 12
July 1968. Tile substance in this line was reported to be a "black
gunmly mass". Failure analysis conducted by kho NASA Mnter|als
Analysls Branch reported that the material consisted of stainless
steel corrosion products (Fe,.0; and Cr.,;O,.:).The deserlptton of a
"h}.ack gummy mass -- or sludge" related very closely t.o a viable
bto-organism which a biological analysis may have w, rf.fked, There
was no indication, in this sample, of any products resulting from
the degradation of elastomers.
A hydraulic oil sample was taken on 26 February 19¢_q from the
i. hydraulic charging unit reservoir on LUT 2. In addlti<m t_, par-
ticulate contamination found in tlm sample, it was reported that
a "long fiber of pale green jelly" was present in the sample. No
biological tests were perfotmmd on this sample. If the visual
description was accurate, it may also indicate the presence oi:
viable organisms in the hydraulic system.
Viable organisms could have been introduced into the system
in a variety of ways; either by atmospheric means, by external
means (components, maintenance, etc.), or transported into the
system while the hydraulic oil supply was being replenished. AIr
organisms require water to maintain their viable state; others
' require nitrogen or oxygen in addition to water.
, Viable organisms cannot be sterilized by a normal component
' cleaning procedure. They can be sterilized by either applying
heat-steam or by the use of biocides. The applications of heat-
; .... steam to the service arm systems is not satisfactory because of
the detrimental effects to elastomers and components. Complete
elimination of water vapor from the system is a very difficult
:_ task and generally can only be accomplished by a vacuum technique.
Viable organisms have caused problems in other systems such
as jet fuel tanks, and the problem was solved with biocides. To
out- knowledge, only one study has been directed towards the use
of biocides to control fungi in hydraulic oil. This study was
performed in England on a hydraulic oil different than MIL-H-5606.
The use of biocides is common knowledge; but its effect on the
hydraulic oii, elastomers, and components in the system has not
been investigated. Further study is recommended in this area of
technology to combat fungi formations in hydraulic oil.
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The mass transport of fungl from one part of a system to
anotlmr can be prevented by the use of filtration techniques.
Five-mlcron nominal (or less) filtration is required; the minimum
_iltration level in the service arm systems is 10-micron nominal.
It is our recommendation that the vent-to-atmoaphere on the
hydraulic cha;ging unit reservoir be eliminated. This vent should
he replaced with a small positive pressure nitrogen system (with
pressure relief capability) to prevent water vapor from entering
the hydraulic system___A_closed system is recommended to prevent
degradation from corrosion and to eliminate condltion_ conducive
to the propagation of viable organisms.
Moisture will enter _hydraulic or pneum_tLc system by a dif-
fusion process unless a positive p=essure is maintained on the
system. The service arm systems are pressurized only during
test operations and in the launch countdown. No aLtempt is made
to maintain positive pressure on the system d_ring the long in-
terval between launches. It is recommended that a small positive
pressure be maintained on the nitrogen system to prevent migra-
tion of moisture and particulate into the system through relief
ports, calibration fittings, bleed orifices, etc. It is further
recommended that the hydraulic system be fully blanketed_ith
hydraulic oil at a small positive pressure to prevent atmospheric
contamination and drying out of the seals. Elastomers in a hy-
_draulic system will dry out, leak, and deteriorate from age if not
blanketed with oil.
The history of component failures on the service arms indi-
cates that the single largest contamination failure is corrosion
of electrical contacts. Most of the electrical components are
located in the service arm consoles. The consoles on the service
arms are not purged with nitrogen and are not adequately sealed
to prevent moisture from entering the consoles. Further, inspec-
tion of the service arms revealed that the doors on the consoles
are often left open between launches. Again, the least expensive
method of preventing corrosion caused by atmospheric moisture is
to maintain a positive pressure (0.5-inch water gage) within the
service arm consoles. This can be accomplished with dry nitrogen
or air. On a system as large as the service arms, a compressor-
dry-air system would probably be more economical than the use of
nitrogen.
The service arm hydraulic system is essentially a dead-ended
system and cannot be thoroughly flushed in the event the system
were to become heavily contaminated. On future designs, a flush-
through capability should be provided.
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The hydraulic oil used in the service arm systems is MIL-II-5606.
Our experience has shown that NIL-H-6083 hydraulic oil is superior
[o NIL-H-5606 and has two distinct advantages: (1) NIL-H-6083
contains a rust: preventative as an additive; (2) conglomeration of
fine part[c,]c_s will not occur In MIL-II-6083 a_ they will in MIL-H-
5606 hydraul Lc ell. The pr_pertles of MIL-H-6083 are very s:i_ni[ar
to MIL-H-5606, and Ill'compatibility pr,blems exist. ReslcltmL MIL-
11-5606 hydraulic ell in a system need not be completely ellminated
prior to adding MIL-lI-6[)S3. I, itc_rature c.mparing the two is avail-
able; no unl.'avorablc, at.cotlnts wer¢_ l:otmd during our review.
4. Samplhag Procedures
Meetings were conducted throughout the course of: the colltract
with thost: perstmnel in NASA, Boeip ,, and Bendix who were direct-
ly associated with, cJr reslmnsLblc: for, sampling procedures, analy-
sis, and contain|nation control., Tile following samples are nor-
maily taken on the service arm systems:
i) Hydraul.ic Charging Unit - Two samples are taken at the
HCU during validation procedures. These are dynamic
samples taken while the system is running. Samples
are analysed for acid base, moisture, and particulate.
Critiera for moisture are taken from MIL-H-5606B and
'., criteria for particulate are taken from both MIL-H-
5606 and 75M09467;
" 2) Resupply Fluid - Hydraulic fluid received in drums is
not sampled for moisture content. Problems have
_ arisen in meeting 75M09467 particulate criteria when
sampling tlm drums. The HCU reservoir is filled from
the drums by means of a }land pump that does not meet
i cleanliness criteria, and fluid is introduced into
the HCU return line downstream of the filter;
3) Service Arm Hydraulic System - The hydraulic systems
on tile service arms are sampled during validation
procedures to level II of 75M09467. Samples are
taken with pressure on the system at (a) both sides
of tile arm retract cylinders -- upper and lower hinges;
(b) test port of the secondary retract gage; and (c)
the hydraulic standby (70 psi) system on the hydrau-
Ii. side;
4) Pneumatic System - The service arm pneumatic systems
are not normally sampled as part of any standard pro-
cedure unless "contamination is suspected" or compo-
nent failures indicate contamination. When samples
are taken, level IV of IOM01671 is used for criteria.
Tile pneumatic header is sampled during tile validation
procedures.
|
_...
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Specification 75M09467 is used as criteria for all service
arm hydraulic system samples. This criteria document was not
referenced in the contract and was not specified in any of the
engineering documentation reviewed during the contract. The
cleanliness levels in this document are considerably relaxed as
compared to tile other existing service arm cleanliness criteria.
The specification was orginated at Marshall and was reportedly
used on Saturn I. Particulate criteria excerpts from 75)409467 are
given in Table 111-6.
Table 111-6 Particulate Criteria (75M09467)
l:
ge I II IIII: Serve Valves and Actuators and Accumulators
Range _ Close Tolerances Cylinders and ReservoirsI. i ,
10-25 5,360 23,680 42,000
. " i ,i ii
25" 50 780 3,640 6,500
50-I00 II0 555 I,000
100-150 + fibers Ii 52 92
iiii i ii, r • ii , i,., ,, ,,.,
150+ 0 6 0
In meeting with the various operational groups concerned with
the service arm samples, it was apparent that a group responsible
for a p_ 'titular arm did not know what procedures or criteria were
being used for the other arms on the tower__ The requirement to
take a sample, and the governing criteria for each sample, are
only spelled out in each respective operational test procedure.
There is no composite correlation of the samples taken on the
• Saturn V launch stand.
The operational groups were of the opinion that the present
cleanliness levels were too stringent. No quality controls were
found to exist that specified a "no-go" situation when a system
did not meet specification. It was noted that up to three sam-
ples were taken on the same system before criteria would be met.
Tables I11-7 and III-8 show the results of hydraulic samples
taken in the _CU and on the service arms. Figure III-27 depicts
these results graphically.
Fifty-six samples from the nitrogen distribution system were
reviewed and each sample showed only I to 5 particles in the
range of 50 to 140 microns, with no particles above that range.
An extensive blowdown of the system is performed prior to taking
the pneumatic samples in the distribution system.
"ii i • i ii i , ,, , ,
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Bendix takus samples only when a request is received from tile
,. contractor. No conclusion is made by Bendix as to whether tile
sample meets specif, lcation, l!ydraulic samp].es are taken by the
open-bottle technique wit]] the volume ranging from 100 to 1000
m] depending upon the contractor's request. Gas samples are taken
by tlm Mi].lipore method with flow volumes of 30 to 130 SCF. A
contamination precount is made on both the open bottle and Milli-
pore pad pr_or to taking a sample. Bendl× prefers the open-bot-
tle techn[(lue rather than a Mil'lipore bomb bec.aliSe the_/ be l.ieve
the C()llnection tllat must be made with tile Miilipore bomi_ intro-
duces more cunt.amlnatlon, Extensive tests conducted by Martin
Mariul(a on Titan vehicles has proven the reverse; that less ex-
terlla[ C,_lltami.llatioll [s Introduced .In UHilD_ (.he Mi]1,.i,po_e bomb_
and results are more consistellt.
Bendix was questioned as to problems Cmco¢,ntered IN cleaning
components and systems to the KSC-123 specification. They stated
that no problems were generally encountered in cleaning components
to Level IV of KSC-123, but some problems occurred in cleaning
systems to tlm same level. They also stated that Level I of KSC-
]23 presented many problems and subsequently required more effort
in cleaning, particularly with more complex components.
The sampling procedures used on the service a_m systems are
believed to be inadequate to ensure an acceptable system cleanli-
ness status throughout all phases of operation. The follo_ing
procedures are deemed necessary to ensure good practice in this
regard:
" l) Nitrogen samples s'." ._id be taken on the service arm
systems on a regular basis and as part of a standard
procedure ;
_. 2) Scheduled hydraulic and pneumatic samples should be
taken during the long intervals between launches, or
ddring down-mode;
" 3) Hydraulic fluid transferred from drums to the HCU res-
ervoir should be filtered prior to entering the HClJ;
4) Hydraulic fluid should be received (as validated) as
meeting the MIL-H-5606B specification;
5) A standard sampling procedure should be initiated to
coordirate all of the samples taken on Complex 39.
This procedure would serve to combine a_.l sampling
information and criteria into one central document
and would eliminate confusion among differ'_.nt groups.
The procedure should list fluid commodity, ,_amp[e
pert location, the method used for the sampling, and
tile criteria for the sample;
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6) No quality controls were _n ovidenee in the event a
sample did not pass criteria. Sample reports should
be controlled by quality control and a resolution
made _f the sample does not meet criteria.
5, S_Ys,tem Ori fi!@s_
Orifices are one of thn more important factors ts be considered
in the analysis of cleanliness levels for fluid systems. An analy-
sis was performed on all of the orifices in the service a_nl systems
as part of thic study, Table lll---9..presentsa compilation of all
of the orifices, both hydrau/ic and pneumatic, that exist as indi-
i vidual find numbers in the service arm systems.. The _ahle prese.nts
each orifice diameter in _nches, and the equivalent micron slze.
•, Table Ill-9 Service Arm Orifice Size TabL,lation
: w
Item-Find Specification Service Diameter Diameter
Number Number Commodity (in.) (microns)
t IN HN mH t . t
A-5469 75M04165 Hydraulic 0.02.0. 508
A-29601 75M04165-2 Pneumatic 0.030 762
A-5872 75M214 79- 7 Pneumatic 0. 1406 3,570
A-5873 75M21479-7 Pneumatic 0.1406 3,570
A-5738 75M50184-I Hydraulic 0.114 2,895
A-5644 75M50184-6 Hydraulic 0.030 762
:: A-5648 75M51695-2 Hydraulic 0.030 762
) A-34762 76K00189-I Pneumatic 0 .lilY____ 1,955
! A-34765 76K00189-I Pneumatic 0.112.7.__. 1,955
A-34815 76K00189-I Pneumatic 0.077 1,955
: A-35730 76K00189-2 Hydraulic 0.043 1,092
A-35731 76K00189-2 Hydraulic 0.043 1,092
A-34951 76K035 78-1 Pneumatic 0.047 I,193
A-34971 76K03578-9 Pneumatic 0.09.3 2,360
A-34989 76K03578-12 Pneumatic 0.040 . 1,016
A-5594 --- Hydrua Iic 0._450 ii,430
A-5865 --- Pneumatic 0.030 762
A-5973 --- Pneumatic 0.030 762
_m
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The smallest: dlameivr In tile _orvi, cv arm ,syttt_m I_ 0,020
inches, or 508 microns. TilLs ori£ico was included ill the eonLmll_
Lnailon tents (l_oe Chapter VI1) and tile orifice did not clog oven
tho.gh partition '_1' to 1000+ ml.crona and fibor,q (up t- 2{}00+ lui-
or,ms) were [ujected into the test system,
Ollr collclufll.ons_ backed up by test, are that the orifices Ill
the ,qorvl.co arll! aysComq aria Ilok 12¢1o small; oven with thL: lit'I/
t'JOrlllltntulS loyal rt_commendod by thitt _tiidy,
At thla jliilcCuro I.L should he recot;nlzod tiler fact:era .l.her
I Iron the absolule or lftco diameter must be contti.dort, d wht,0 ovtllu-
nl lot. the poilnl.blllly of el'If ice cltlggillg, _olllo _J17t:h_,sv Ioclorl_
I) t'art, icl,_ _h;ILl£.. if all pal:iicle_ wt, rt, el ;I Iiar,I
i.tpht_ric,'ll tdlapt,, lhv orlflcp dl,'lnlolor woilld lit, IIn,
I I.mltlny I)actor. This, h-wuw:r, ],_ pracl it;lily
IIUVOI" the c"l,se; lllld ,_llllc(' cIIPI'oIIt IIII';IHIIYIII}', pl;acl Ic_'
gages tile longest part-tel, dllnens[-ii_ the probabII Ity
is quilt high thai a i%IVOll partl.cle would pas,q throul,,ll
an orl[l.ct, even t'hough its [OllgeS[ dilllt'llS[Oll Is }_,retl[el °
l:han the el'lib[co dfauleler. In low velocity hydraulic
,_y._ICt_lllSl fibers will l:(ll'lli a lll,'lt:_ l:lui_ tit'{ log a,,t a
,_3t'ret,I1 l)lal t l'apS smaller parl i cles rt, sllltill/; ill a
; clogy, ed origice, ttowever, th:is c[1.'¢tllllStanct, shotl[d
"- be ml.nimized by the applicati.on of adequate flit ra-
p: Lion _echniques;
"" 2) Particle composittort. Ordinar[ly, typical Ctllltalllillll-
tion is composed of both hard (metal. l. ic) and st,fL
(organic) materials. Depending on the 171ui.d w'loclty
within the system, so[ter particles larger than the
ori£ice diameter will be extruded through an orifice.
Harder particles will not: pass through an equivalent
orifice size;
3) Particle Density. In gaseous systems, high-density
particles tend to settle out in traps inherent in the
system, due to large density ratios between the par-
ticle and the gas. Fibrous-type contamination would
more likely be entrained in the fluid stream. In hy-
draulic systems where the fluid density illmore near-
ly the same as that of the particulate, much less
settling can be expected and entrainment should be
considered to be predominant.
• L>
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Wh_.a de,sign raqulrumants dietat_, the usa of orlf[aes that are
within t|l_slzu range covered by cleanlineg_ r_quirements, a
metl_od that should receive consideration is the use of series
_r|fi.ces. This technique involves placing two or more larger
orfflc[,s in series to achieve the same flow-limiting effect as
w_,uld bt.,,btalnl,dfrom one ve_'y small ;_riflcc. Low-flow hydrau-
lic systems are felt to be most deserving of this approach; pneu _
matt,: syqtems with attendant: hill1 [lul.d veI ocitLes arc, much leas
pr_n[, to buLldup el: nasttnl,_ ef particulate contaminates,
6,__flareice Ar_ Cylin0._.rs'
TI., mn.lor s_,rvl.ao arm component probl.aml_ associated with con-
tarot,rotten thnt w_,r. ld¢,ntified t-o uu hy NAflA Involved cylinders
;llld /IccHl1111]_llt_r_t. 'P}H,It,, problems were n,,l;n dLract ranu]t of
pnrt tc'ulnt¢,, 1mr t'alh¢_r resul, t(::d l!rom into l:nni, corrosion produe_s
ntld d_.i.t_rlt_rntod seals. The causes of sttch difl!icul_les were:
l) Inadequate removal .f el.caninE _olvel,ts;
2) l,ack o1_ bl, anket pressurization;
3) Improper lubrication durin_ reassembly;
4) St:el damage during assembly.
Making the assumption that th_se factors are cuntrolled, Cltecrl-
tieal failure mode for cylinders and accumulators is a piston
sticking due to mas._Ive amounts of particulate contamination.
The cylinder force analysis (Table III-I0) was conducted to
determine the probability of a piston becoming stuck in one posi-
tion due to contamination. Using the appropriate inlet pressures,
calculations were conducted to determine the hypothetical thick-
hess of material that could be sheared. The numbers tabulated
in tile"Shear Capacity" column of Table III-i0 reflect a circum-
ferential band of metallic material, having a shear strength of
I00,000 psi, that could be sheared by the forces available on
the piston. This analysis is theoretical, and only presents a
relative gage in evaluating the forces present in each cylinder
since the shear strength of contamination is a variable and has
not been determined with any degree of accuracy. As can be seen
from the tabulation, significar.t thicknesses would represent such
massive amounts of contamination that this failure mode is con-
sidered to be an extremely remote possibility. This analysis
only considers the forces necessary for a piston to become stuck
on one position, and does not relate to the shearing of seals
due to contamination.
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Iv. _.CgMPO,NEN_ANAL_ SIS
In any cleanliness level analyBlsj a detailed study of the
c'(mq_onentsin the system is recogniged as one of the most impor-
tant functions, The purpose of thls component analysis was to
(I) determlno the degree of complexity and sensltiviLy of the
components; (2) determine those components deemed to be mo_t
prone to contaminatlon failures; and (3) select critical tempo-
. nents fur test.
: The categorized component list (Appendix A)_ developed as
part of the systems analysis task, was used as the baseline llut
Oil' ('l_llll_(Hl(!nt, s LOb. ana].yst, d in detail° Tl|e COmlmnent.s contained
'.:herein were determined to lm critical to the operation of the
service arms and were possible candidates for a contamination
failure.
A detailed analysis was conducted on emch component to deter-
mine its sensitivity to contamination. The final product of the
component analysis task is contained it,the individual Component
Analysis Sheets (Appendix B of this report). Each sheet lists the
component specification number, vendor name, vendor part number,
component location(s), possible contamination failure mode, and
a detailed description of the component relative to contamination.
The following sources of information were used in the compo-
nent analysis task:
... i) Component Specifications;
./[,
" 2) Compt cnt Engineering Documentation;
3) Failure Analysis Summary and Reports;
,, 4) Detailed Component Drawings;
i 5) Related Experience;
_!... 6) Contact with Vendors.
•.- Each component specification was reviewed for materials,
" lubricant, pressures, flow rates, intended application, and yen-
, dor source. The failure analysis sheets were reviewed in detail
to ascertain the past history of failures experienced with each
; particular component. Component drawings were obtained from the
vendors and examined in detail. The engineers' experience played
a strong role in this task. Basically, their evaluation concerned:
k_ ! 1
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I) Past experience with the valve or tileparticular
design ;
2) Clearances between moving parts;
3) Hardness of mat,,r_nls in contact wit, each other;
4) Orlflc_ diameters;
5) Seal h+¢'atlon and _,onfipuration;
6) Flow areas and velocJ.tles;
7) Quantity or volume of £1u_.d as seen by th_ valve;
8) Adaptal_i].ity tu cleaning, dead-legs, etc;
9) Aetuat:iun f.rc_s available;
i0) Intend_d deslgn application versus the actual appll-
cation {.......
].I) Relation uf the component to other components in the
system;
12) Sur fa_'c finishes;
13) Degree to which the component would generate particu-
late.
The+majority of the vendors of the components in question
were contacted to gain specific information as to recommended
clcamin_ ].evels, part failure history, cleaning procedures, part
costs,+ and cleaning costs.
. One comment was expressed by all vendors contacted; that
: their component_ used in the service a_m systems could be rail-
ably operated at less stringent cleanliness levels than are re-
quired by NASA. The Marotta Valve Corporation indicated that
they felt their "commercial clean procedure" would yield compo-
nents that would come very close to meeting the MSFC-164 speci-
fication, and that the Marotta components would operate satis-
E factorily in the service arm systems at this l_vel of cleanli-
ness..
Another fact revealed through vendor contact was that the
costs associated with the cleanliness levels now specified for
" the service arm components were very high. Table _V-_ show_ _he
approximate base cost for the component and the costs for clean- "
ing. It should be noted that a fixed price or "set-up charge"
is incurred each time a process is set up to clean a _omponent_
_. , , ,,, • |
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whether for one component or for many components. It is recom-
mended that these costs be taken into account when purchasing or
cleaning eompm_ents; thus, it is mor_: economical to clean several
components at a time rather than Just one component.
Table IV-I Cleaning Co_ts
Cost with No
SpeeiLica Li,n
Cloanlng or Cost wi_h Speclf%¢atlon
Clean]iness (lloaning_ Clean) Jness
Specl f:l cat loll Test:flip (_'c,m- T( _L,S + C]uanlng SeLup
No. murclal clean) Chacge p_r Lot
h ,
75M06116 $ 397.00 $547.00 + $175.00
75M08823 380.01) 530.00 + 175.00
75M08824 265.00 310.00 + 175.00
75M0_825 310.00 360.00 + 175.00
75M08826-X 2100.00 2350.00 + 250.00
75M08827-X 2650.00 2800.00 + 250.00
75M08829 330.00 375.00 + ].75.00
75M08830 295.00 3hO.O0 + 175.00
75M08831 285.00 355.00 + 175.00
75M08836 395.00 450.00 + 175.00
75M09285 348.00 520.00 + 175.00
75MI0090 1350.00 1435.00 + 175.00
75M13255 285.00 355.00 + 175.00
75M51630-XY_X 25.00 30.00 + 25.00
76K00187 470.00 520.00 + 175.00
BI0425701-2 490.00 535.00 + 175.00
..,.: Marotta P/N
_ii 800262-19 11.5.00 140.00 + 150.00
" Marot ta P/N
204002 90.00 ii0.00 + 150.00
Marotta P/N
MV 583 285.00 335.00 + 175.00
Note: Approximate pricing for quantities of i to 3.
Another problem area that was encountered during the course
:. of this study was component cleaning procedures. Several vendors,
, who were contacted during this study, did not perform their own
[ cleaning operations, either because they did not have cleaning q
facilities or because their facilities did not meet the require-
meats of the NASA criteria. The ,sual case was that the vendor
would build the part, assemble it, perform the necessary func-
tional tests, and then send it to another vendur for cleaning.
&.- ................. ,,,, ,
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The vendor performing tilecleaning would then diaanBemble the
eomponent_ perform tilenecessary cleaning,, and reassemble the
component, In the case of some eomptJnonts_ no functional tests
were performed after the component was assembled. In addition
to tileexpuns_ inw,lvod (Table IV-2), the finnl assembly may l,t,
performed by technicians who are not a_ familar with tilecompo-
nent as iv the -,anufaeturer. One vendor found it necessary to
send a _echnlcian along with the part to maintaln e.mponent In-
tegrity on final assembly. The ideal m_lutlt,n would be to se-
lect vendors who perform the;_r own elean_ng opera£1ons.
Table IV-2 Component Cleaning Costs
i .
Ch.an:l, ng Costs
a_ a _-ereell£Llye
8poclflcatJon Single Item of Base Prlcu
No._ Base Price Clean Cost (%)
75M06i.16 $397100 $325.00 " 82
75MD8823 380.00 325.0C 86
75M08824 205. O0 220.L'0 83
751,108825 310.O0 225.00 73
75M08826 2100. O0 500.00 24
, 75M08827 2650. O0 400. O0 i5
75M08829 330.00 220.00 67
75M08830 295.00 240. O0 81
75M08831 285.00 245. O0 86
75M08836 395.00 230..00 58
751'409285 348.00 347 .O0 100
75M10090 1350.00 260.00 19
75M13255 285.00 245 .O0 86
75M51630 25.00 _ 0 120
76K00187 470.00 225.00 48
B10425701-2 490 ,O0 220.00 45
,' 800262-19 115.00 175.00 152
204002 90.00 170.00 189
MV583 285. O0 225. O0 79
75M06606 550.O0 723.00 131
75Hi0992-1 210.00 370.00 176
75M10992- 2 279. O0 380.00 136
75M08053 421.00 743 .-00 176
: 75M08822 2800. O0 200. O0 7
i,-. I III i
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The following 16 c¢,mponenCa (Table IV-3) were solected for the
conLamination test_, Tn_k II ¢,f this program, Other components
were deemed critical but war_, _'.ft:h__ame configuration nr_ those
shown below, Tile cy1._.nder_, aecumul._Itors, and check valv_,s were,
not determin_,d to be part_.cularly ct_llliOilllnzlIz]tqli-' :J.Licol._I iiIdld
represent the remaining broad categories t,f COnlpOll_ll_8 C_)lltaillt:d
in the service arm Bys_¢!lll_, They ware also necessary tt, cpmplt, Ct,
Lhc ta_t circuit8 that were represtmCotivo of the Beryl.or. glrm
ftlnctJ.Pn, The, _pec_.fJc dt, tail._ _f L'_|¢il t'_,mpollellt nr_, ii_,tt,d in
l:hcJ.rrt:lilmcti.vt,C_IIIp_IIalII-Anal.),8,l,s81w(,I_,Appt,nd_;_:B,
tl )Igll16, IV-3 '.I'e_I:8puaLmunl_ for C_,lItam_LlmLl_,n1]v_I.
81mIInr NAoA
Nolllt!llC]_l_llrt' Velld_l? P_l't; Nlllllht,1 ° Pol'l. [{_,, QI ?..
l_cgula t_,r }in r,, t t.a Va I vt. C,, rp_, rn t t.un 22 74(_4- Jl 1 75MIISH2u I
Ragu] a I't,r Mart, t t a Vn1 ve Co rp_,ra t im_ 219OOA -,J I '}I 7 bM{_i_a__ U I
Regulator _arotta Valve Ctrporation 230904-1.2 75M08831.-1 I
St ]._noid Valve Mar_,tta Valw_ Ctlpt,_ation 806097-1 7%108823-1 3
Solenoid Valw_ Marotta Valve CorporaLton 228154-02 7_M(18824-1 I
Solenoid Valve Marotta Valve gorpt ration 22588',-02 75F11)882').-I I
Solenoid Valve Marvtta Valve Corpor.: '-!. 806098 75M0!)285-I 2.
Cylinder Pathon Manufacturing bumpany 31llX3SUI01/2 75blt.)I_'_06-i I
ABR
Cylinder Pathon Manufacturing Company QU4X3SUI91/2 75M09014 I
,,.. ABR
' Accumulator American Bosch ACG300281 7."_MO8814 2
Check Valve James Pond Clark 277-TI-STT 73MO5363-4 2
(,
,.-=.
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V,, LITERATURE SE+ RCH
A_ an intregal pnrL t,f til[8 sLudy, a JiLeraturu/indllsLry
8oaf+oh WNS inadc Lo (,bLain llval]_ab].u illfl,rli1_qLionCOllCc:rnillg COll-
Lnnli.nation in hydraullu _nd pnuumat;.u fluid_, Particular umpha-
_+._+wn_ pl_cud on Inf(,rmnLh,n r_+.latlng to cunLamli1qtl,m l_,ve!_;
g('nersll.y u_ud ill cqllJpmt.nt nnd Hy,_t;cm_ t;Imilar it, tlit}_+t,In ut:'.
at C{.nlplex 39 t nnd IiII;t,M,_tl_}nct,ncurnln_, the rulatJ,n_h_p b{_..
Lwt,{'N cuntamJnatJun l._,v(,]_ Illld (.quiplnunl. pu_rf,,rmane(,,
{+,l_[l,llil[(.,l+J_,(,d I.[[.(,r;it.tll+t . +;(,,,ll+(_,h W_IH (+'(+ll(Ill(_'l+ d I,Y P'IIII'[ .111 NIiI']"
(.It:, ;llld I1 ].J-st 111+, ,,1+ pul+LJ-llt'l|k +ll+t:l(']('+ + ('{'111.'('1+11+1l+-_ t'i.lilPlllJll/ltl,,il
wn++ t,l+tnJl_¢+,(I i'r(,llÁ NASA and tilL! ]}u[ulll-;u ]}{+Clllll{,l}l._l{ Jt,ll i:(!ltl,.l'.
DIII'JlI_,} thu ]]l+ie|'flttllTu Ht'ilrch /l+_')2 +IFI;IUI(-+I+; t,11 ,.tult'llllin;ll i,q) Y,'(.)+i.
surv(,y(,d, Fl:oln lh|u numl>vr_ 170 artl('le£+ wure ,,rdt,rt,d lhr_,ti?,l_
t,tlr I,ll,rary. Thu al_st;rg_cls for 43 _+15 tile 111t,sL J.nft,rl_|,'ll Ivt. ,'l,'li +
C]{!8 con¢crnJllg thls sttuly urt, Jncl,ul, d Jn Al+l+vndi:-:C,
_t)igcgClt_!ral ct,ncltlsJ(,n_ may b¢, l_t,acht,d 0,g a r,+,stlltof th(,
lJ terattlr(., search:
]) TI+e maJur hody of the lltt.r_tttrv ct,ncvrns hydrattl_cs:
in particular, serw+ wl]vus. Al.nlt,stn_, inf_,rmaLi,n
was found t,n ct,ntamination i. pneumatic systems,
This may indicate that the majority of contaminatien
problems were associated with servo valves and flight
control feedback vJrcuits, and Llmt ne particular
prol)lems have beer, expvriencud in pneumatic systems;
.... 2) Included in the abstracts are several papers that
', describe the actual operating contamination levels
of aircraft and ground checkout carts, fhu majority
: t,f these samples indicates that aircraft are operating
satisfactorily with w+ry dirty systems;
3) Very few contrulled contamination tests were described
in the literature. Many tests have been conducted on
fil.ters, but not on components or systems; ....
: 4) The attthors of literature on contamination in hydrau-
:.,. lie and pneumatic systems are very definitely divided
" into two distinct camps -" "clean-clean" and "dirty,"
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,V,!_,CLEANLIN_ES LEVEL RECOI@IENDATIONS FOR TE_T
111 s,,veral o[ the reports and papers reviewed du_+ing our
lltcratur¢, sea_ch, _he authors cl.tha_ prefaced or ¢on_luded their
r_n_rkn with a _tatamcnt to tileeffect that "the_o a_:e a_ many
r!J_! lib,rent cl.etml.int, s_ _pocification_ in existence as there nre
p_'rl_/_IIIiwv]-LLID, o11 II., subject." Everyone concerned with cleall_
1 in_t p_ol_l.,,mn m.vm_ to s_.,l._ct u levi,1 that works in hi_ own
t,._p_|:£¢'nc('.All o17 _llomajor _ehn£cal uo_£etiou are deeply in-
valve, d, wItl_ nu..,rous COllllllll.:I:{_en alld mtbcommigte.un ntrivin,;
mil,,lltI, ly w£th thu qm,ltt£on, Prucl;£cally vw,_'y major auroupoe
, firm has its own clc,anlng _peclf£ca_i.on_ _hc,m£1itary and the,
NASA ,,ncl_l_;iv,,n_,v,:ral. Any study that undurLakt,u to com_olid_,te
nnd v,ompol:v l:ll|.n mass o[ l:vquirement_ £s inlmud£atvly ovvrwlml.mvd
wil:h lilt; d£1q_'aritit, s between tile vat'ious issuillg organizations.
F,v£duncu of lahu same div_rsity of opfl.nion was found durta_g tile
litc_ratu_'t_st:arch; those author_ concerned with reliabte compollcnt
and system op(.,:'ationpraised extraordinary cleanliness, whereas
those saddled with tilercsponsibility of attalning) maintaining.
and certlfyi:g clean hardware or f]uids were much less demanding.
Both sldt,s o[ course, can logically justify their positions;
this) however, is of little consolation to the person attempting
to appraise hi,'own position.
On the foils.lag pages all of the pertinent cleanliness [n-
formation nppIIea_le _o this program is tabulated. Table VI-I
_. lists nettml spec: flcatlon cleanliness levels from NASA and tileblilitary, as well as recommended standards published by techni-
cal societies. T_ble VI-2 lists information found in the liter-
stere concerning _arious company specifications and successful
operating experience. An examination of these tables reveals
several areas of particular interest:
i) Many confli_'ting NASA specifications exist, a situa-
tion that has been discussed in Chapter III of this
report;
: . 2) Many of the specifications and standards are closed-
., ended, that is_ allow zero particles above some cut-
off size, whereas others are opeu-ended, allowing a
small number of particles of any size;
. 3) Virtually all of the specifications and literature
are concerned with hydraulics -- in fact, during this
program practically no information was found regard-
ing cleanliness of pneunmtic systems;
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4) All parties apparently use the longest particle dimen-
sion as criteria, except North American who uses the
smallest dimension;
5) A]I parties rely on manual particle counting methods
per ARP-598, except Boeing who relies solely on a
mass measurement;
6) In gcner_l, the speclficatloas and p_oposed standards
contain crlte=la that arQ much more 8trlngent tha_t_he
¢leanl_ness levels encountered in fully op:_ratlonal
equipment as reported by several surveys in the liter-
ature.
With all of this d£ver_e information in hand, our task was to
interp=et the speclficat_ns with regard to the specific Saturn V
service arm systems, and supplement them with othe= factors that
in our opinion are essential to the dete=minatlon of a satisfactory
cleanliness program for any system. The following spec£flcations
and factors, that were investigated during th£s task are listed
below--and are discusse_d in detail in the follewin_ pages:.
i) Existing NASA.and M_l£tary specification requirements
as shown in Table VI-I;
2) T_chn_cal Society recommended standards as showruin
Table VI-I;
3) Company'specifications of users in similar applica-
t_as, a_ shown in Table VI-2;
4_ A_tual condition recommendations fzom similar systems
as shown in Table VI-2, and actual fluid sample re-
ports from the service arm systems;
5) Consideration of the fluids used in the systems, as
d_ussed in Chapter XII;
6) Consideration of the components and the configuration
of the actual service arm systems, as discussed in
Chapters llI and IV;
7) Vendor recommendations and Martin Marietta experience;
8) Assessment of the component function and the criti-
cality assigned _o that function.
t
.,,, ,,. , . ,
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Six different NASA Specifications and four Military Spe=ifl-
cations are listed in Table VI-I.
_h_ NASA Spec_Lcatlons are divided into the following cate-
gories:
i) Hydraulic -
75M09467 - Fluid, components, and assemblies,
MSFC-16O - Fluid, compon_u_t_], and assemblies;
2) P_eumat ic -
IOM01671 - Components and as_lembli_m,
MSFC-I.64 - Components and assemblies,
_L_FC-234 - Liqu£d and gaseous nitrogen;
3) Fluids, liquid or gas
KSC-C-123 - Components and assemblies.
Cleanliness Specification KSC-C-123 is identical to IOM01671
e_ce_t that it has been rewritten to be used for either hydraulic
or pneumatic, applications.
The Military Specifications categories are as follows:
I) Hydraulic -
ORD 10425040 - Components and assemblies,
7; MIL-H-5606B - Hydraulic oil,
MIL-H-6083C - Hydraulic oil;
2) Pneumatic -
AFBS 61-3C - Components and systems.
Considering the hydraulic specifications first, we found that
in general the component specification sheets originally refer-
enced ORD 10425040. This was_ in most casesj later amended
to allow MSFC-166 or K8C-C-123 as an alternate. By referring to
the tables, it can be seen that appreciable differences exist
i' between these three specifications; the cleaning vendor thus has
; considerable freedom of choice. Hydraulic fluid from the service
arm system samples is normally checked to 75M09467 or MIL-H-5606B
which contain still different levels from the th=ee specifications
used for component verification.
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The criteria for pneunmtlcs are-less complex, Zt was found
that most component _peclfication sbeets originally called for
IOM01671 and were later amended to allow KSC-C.123 as an alternate.
However, these two specifications are essentially identical, Ouc
or two isolated components were found _hat referenced MSFC-164;
thin-.Is a very loose specificat_n and-has limited usage... Nitro-
gen gas is procured per MSPC-234_ but no evidence was found of
any specifications used for pneumatic system sampling.--- --.
Several components _ere found-for which u_age was speclfied
£or clthcr hydraulic or pneumatic applications; these generally
referenced the iOM01671 sp_4_icat£oa, later amended to allow
KSC-'C-123 as an slt.er_native.
All but one of _he above speclftcations (MSFZ-166) are closed-
ended; that is, zero particles are allowed above a.certain cutoff
size. In our experience the impgsi_ion of such a requlrument,
for a system the size and complexity of the service a_m systems
is very restrict£ve. The service arm fluid samples that %,' re-
ceived through NASA substantiate this position. In many instances,
the samples easily met the appropriate specification level, except
for one or two particles above the cutoff size. Wc have found
that this condition is virtually impossible to eliminate. An
open-ended specification sucl%as MSFC-166,.wlth adequate filtra-
tion _echnlques, was recommended by many of the vendors whom we
eonta2-tad during thL_ program.
In addition, all of the abeve sp_clfLca.tlons except two (MSFC-
164_ which has very limited usage,, and I01_01671/K_C-C-123) are
felt-.to impose restrictions that ape unnecessarily stringent for
the service arm systems and components. Our experience with hy-
draulic systems associated with Titan ground-.support equipment,
and numerous surveys on o_e=ational a_rcraft reported in the
lltera_ure_ indicate that much higher contamination levels are
tolerable than present service arm speciEications allow.
2. Technical Society Standards
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), the American Society
: for Testing Materlals_ (ASTM) and the Aerospace Industries Asso-
elation (A.T.A)have all been concerned with cleanliness determina-
tions for the pa_t several years. T_heapproach has generally
been to establish a particle slze/quantity distribution curve by
one Of several available mathematlcal methods.. The resulting
curve, when plotted on log-log _ coordinates, is e_senttally a
straight llne,
-
&._ .
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Differing levels are established by creat_ng.multiples_ such as
any suceessiv_ l[_veldoubling the previous one. The slope of
the line on a log-log'- plot will vary depending on which distrl-
b_il:|onct_rw_ formula was chosen. Several papers were found in
tlm literature which attempted to prove that one particular curve
fitted Lhe available experimental data be_tter,than others; this
appc.nrs to be a very nebulous concept to prove, The various
_oci_,tle_,_have crt_ated, revlsed_ and combined several versloni_
but:thrc_: have been widely circulated and are constantly found
referenced in the literature and in vendor catalogs. These are
ART(;-2fl,NAS-1638, aml a comb£nt_d tentative standard of the SAE,
A._;TM,and AIA (unnumbered). All sf these arc hydraulic _peci-
llcation,_ and arc. open-ended with a cutoff level at i00 microns.
Rt,l_,r¢_nccto Tal_l_ VI-I reveals that none of these standard_
agrees with the oLhers, or with any af the Military or NASA spec=-
fications. The NAS-IO38 is, however, the most widely recognized
throughout the industry, and-since it contains 14 levels it is
also the most widely applicable. It was our decision then that
in recommending a cleanliness level, we woul& attempt to use an-..
existing class from NAS-1638 rather than add still another inde-
pendent specification to the collection already in existence.
3. Industry Spec%flc:_t£ons
Industry cleanliness specif£_at£ons are l£_ted Ln Table VI-2.
Without exeepti n, the authors s'ated that these levels were
determined from actual test and experience with specific equip-
ment. General Electric utilizes Levels 6 and 8 directly from
NAS-1638. Perusal of this table reveals two generalizations that
can be made: (i) the majority of the specifications are open-
ended, again substantiating our position, and (2) the majority
' of the specifications have cutoff points in the i00 to 300 micron
range. All of these companies use the ARP-598 particle counting
method except Boeing who, for their GSE, relies solely on mass
measurements. Also, all companies use the longest particle di-
" mension except North American, who reportedly ut£1ized the
,i shortest dimension as criteria. While these specifications are
quite diverse, taken together they illustrate an industry trend
toward open-ended specifications with emphasis on the lower micron
ranges, implying reliance on system filtration for removal of the
larger size particles.
T
IINIIIlI I I In nnnnnn , • ....
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4, Qgar_tions Experience
During the literature search, four field surveys were found
of operational aircraft hydraulic systems; one included seve;al
samples fr-om tactical mlssiiQs.. We have plotted the tabular data
from these surveys on log-log e coordLna_ ancL_upgrlmposed the
levels, from NAS-1638 (see FLg.--VI-I through Vl-4).. _i_ure VI-5
is a similar pl_t of hyd_aulle samples taken by NASA. at various
points in--the service arm s.ys_em.-.. I_ L_.._¢-emphasized-ghat all
of _he_e plots-mep;_esent SatisfactoriLy opamating hydraulic-sys-
tems, t|_ maJc;:ity of which-¢ontaln ser_sltive serve valves that
are not prosan_ ia _he servlee arm system.
As would be expected in such a-large sample population, a
'argo variation in system cleanliness is evldant. Kowever, the
agreement in slope between NAS-1638 and the KinnQy, Robinson,
and NASAdata is quite remarkable.. The P_rker data, while evi-
denclag a somewlmt different slope, still, fall_ well wit_hin the
range of several levels of the NAS-1638 and could readily he con-
trolled to tha_-crlteria.
_e correlatio_ between such a large cross-section of opera-
tional data wi_h NAS-_638 is felt to be anothe_ strong argument
in favor of uslnM this document as a cleanliness erlteri_.-for
the service arm hydraulic systems_ rather t/%an creating a new
specification. Without ap_lylng statistical _rocedures. to this-
dat_, Levek.8 _s representative of the fle_d.sampl_s., as well as
an acceptable compromise of the _e¢ommendaEi_ns of boC2n.Kinney
and _iley (Eig.._-4> for a_eidance of. silting problems. General
Electric- (Table _I_2> also u_il_zes-Level 8 as an acceptable op__r-
ational level for their en_i_e controls.
5. Fluid: CoDsi_erations.
Two aspects of hMdraull¢ flulds-should be noted with respect
to cleanliness Level d_termlnatlons. _irst, since MIL-H-6083C
is a relative newaomer to this techmology, the vast bulk of ex-
perle_=e _.oted_in the literature is with M_L-H-5606 oil. Because
: of the presence of the additive methacrFlate as a vls¢oslty Im-
i. prover, MIL--a-5_06 hydraulic oil has a _oved fervency toward
. particle agglomeratlon_ that is_ smaLL particles tend to stick to
: one another forming, in effect, large particles.-- Methaerylate is
identified as the adhesive. It has been shown that vlbZ_tlon
actually aggrevates this phenomenon by increasing the force with
i which particles strike each other. If the agglomerates are broken
up by agitation and then subjected to a further inactive period,
.' they will reform, MIL-H-6083C does not contain methacrylate,
and does not exhibit this phenomenon.
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Second, the corrosion inhlb£tlve properties of MIL-H-6083C
are important to tileservice arm systems from three aspects:
(i) the fact that adequate measures are not available for pre-
vention of moisture entrance into the HCU, (2) the _et that
thorough system flushing is not possiblt, due to many dead-ended
iLnes, and (3) tile long inactive periods between launches. Forma-
tion of corrosion products (particulate matter) within thin systc.m
due to these three factors must b_ considered as a potential
sou=co of contamLnaelon problems. Martil_ Marietta's experience
w_h MIL-H-6083C has been very satisfactory, and literature found
on the subject has all been quits favorablt..
6. System a_d Componet%t.Co.Rflguratlon
During tile first half of I:hls study, the major effort illvolved
detailed studies of tileservice arm systems and components. Manu-
facturer's drawings were obtained for many different components,
and personal discussions were held with several vendors concerning
the operation of their product and its susceptability to contamina-
tion. The details of these investigations are fully discussed in
Chapters Ill and IV, but certain aspects relate directly to the
determination of a cleanliness level and arm reiterated here.
Table 111-9 presents a compilation of all orifices, both hy-
draulic and pneumatic, that exist as individual find numbers in
the service arm systems. Diameters are shown both in inches and
in microns... The minimum orifice diameter encountered was 500
mlcr.ons_ which is not too small for the cleanliness levels recom-
mended for the service arms.
Filtration techniques have been discussed in detail in Chapter
III of this report. The point to be made here is that a cleanli-
ness level determination cannot be nmde purely on the basis of
orifice diameters or blueprint clearances, but must consider also
that adequate and sufficient filtration techniques are employed.
In general, the service arm systems contain adequate system f£1-
tratlon_ The necessity of opening any given system for component
replacement or when taking system fluid samples, plus the prob-
ability of internal contamination generation by certain compo-
, nents, demands that filters be included as an integral part of
_ the system design. The presence of adequate filtration is also
! assumed when open-ended cleanliness specifications are proposed.
Other techniques that should be implemented to ensure maintenance
of any given level of system cleanliness itlclude the use of
blanket pressurization throughout, particularly in the hydraulic
reservoir to prevent moisture intrusion, and prefilterlng fluid
prior to filling or _dding fluid to the reservoir.
_-- I I I I , , , ...........
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During the detailed component investigation, only two com-
ponents Were found that contained in_ernaL =leavances that might
b_ conside_od out of the ordinary; both of these are spool-type
solenoid-valves, one from Stcrer (75MO8841) and the other from
general Controls (75M08839), Both ace used in kydraul£¢ systems,
The _ter¢._ valve only supBl_es flugLd.-to-t.hep£ic_ of another, con-
_r_l-valve; thus the flow is insignificant.. Thi_ General Com_rols
valve £s used only in tlw manual operation system agd does got
have a-fa&_ur.c history,. This valve, is no= a =r_t_£ea£ ¢ompement,
la. spo_l-type valves, no seals ace uged.-og.th_ s_ol;_am.Cal-te-
metal f...,'l,t--;f,.srelied on to hold-teal_aga to a_% o.=cep_ble l_vel., and
as a consequence the clearances arc qui_e small,, I.n such a com-
ponent, it L_ contamination in th_ extremely sma.ll range (0 to 5
mie=ons> _,at should b_, considered troublesome; _hc large; par-
t£cles simply cannot enter the clearance space, floweret, for
s£1t£ng problems. _o result from the small particulate, large flows
must he present if the contaminate is to build up, Ncither of
these compgnents is s_cept£ble to _hese conditions,. All othe;
components are comp_atlbla to a,_. op_r_-e_iecLc_eanliness speo%-fi_a-
ties a_ long as adequate filtration is pxesQ.Dt.
7. Vendor R_commend._.tigns an4 Industry Experiet%ee
During the component £n.vestlga_ior_ many vendors were con-
tacted by telephone an_ sever=l were visited in order t_ dlscuss
in detail the type of ¢onstruc_i_% _. their pr_uct and its mode
Of o9_rat£oD. Zn these dlscugslon_, not ot%e s_gl_ vet%dc>r Indl--
e_ted" that extra%ordinary cleanliness, proaedur-es were necessary
for.rel£eble o_e=ation of their components. M_ny were familiar
with MS_C-S_EC-164 and felt tha.t this was a reasonable req_i=e-
men_ for {_neumatic systems_ both from+_he _andpo.ir_t of attain-
ability and of reliable performance. This is one of the most
liberal. NASA sp.eclfications, bud=also-the one to which the fewest
references _re made, Many vendors quote long histories of satis-
factory performance on aircraft hydrau/ic systems where no as-
procured clea=liness requirements are impgsed. In summary, no
data was obtained by vendor cDnt_et which, irudicated,a need. for
p_esen_ly £mp.osed levels of NA_A-=leanllness specifications to
ensure fun_hional adequacy,.. This ¢oac_uslon incl_des the Sterer
and General Controls spog_-type solenDid valves men£1oned e_rller,
.. Miarti_.Marietta has consider_ble experlenee with both hydraulic
and _neumatlc contamination control,. Flight control systems for
the complete family of Titan vehicles are hyd_aullc, and include
ground charging and checkout equipment. Martin _tarietta-designed
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Titan vehicle launch stands both at Cape Kennedy and at Vandenberg
AFB contain major hydraulic stand actuation systems as well as
ground pressurization systems both for ground control purposes
and for vehicle requirements. The level of our corporate e]uanll-
heSS specifications used for the pneumatic apBlleatloas is sim-
ilar _n content to MSFC-S_EC-164, and our level for hydraulic
components £s much less stringent than either MSFC-PROC-](]6 or
10425040 (see Table VI-].). Using these cleanliness lew, lr_wu
have attained all em£nen£1y successftll record throtlghollL the Tit;lll
II weapon system, tile Gumgnl program, and tile Titan _IIA, Titan
lllC, and Titan lllB series of ]am_clws for the Air l:orc_..
8. Rueomnlendat:|.ons for Test
Conslderat:Jons of all the dale and other [llfOl'lll;ll'[.,ql ol)t;llll{,(l
during the analysis port:ion of this program, and n careful weigh-
ing of all other factors discussed herel.n tlmt w_-feel tire pet:-
tJ.nent to this question, led us to propose the foll,._wlng cleanli-
ness levels as recommendations to the test phase -f lhls program:
i> Ilydraul ic Tests
NAS-1638, Level 8
i i
Size Range
(microns) 0-5 5-15 15-25 25-50 50-100 Over I00
Ul m
Quantity peg -I00
Milliliters of Fluid. Ne limit- 64,000 11,400 2025 360 04
2) Pneumatic Tests
Particles
: Size Range
(,microns) 0-300 300-500 500-1000 Over 1000
|
Quantity per i00
Grams of Gas Unlimited* iO 2 None
Fibers
Length
' (microns) 0-750 750-2000 2000-6000 Over 6000
Quantity per i00
Grams of Gas Unlimited* 20 2 None
*Total filterable solids limitation, 0.3 mg/100 grams of gas.
L iiiii I ii, i , i,,,,, , , ..........
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Los&one Dimension (mtcruna) _' t. 5_ los 50p 1o(),
_Spectft¢ition, HA6 1636, Jinuary 1966
%qss OO UnlimLtnd N,,,,.
CLs_ 0 N,_ne
Clase l 1
Clams 3 2 ------t_
Class 6 lb
Class 7 _2
CleAn 8 _4
C|a_n 9 405 128 _"
Class lO 256 ---_-lw
Clans ll :51_
_l_sn 12 102_
_¥d_aalt¢ _pa_tf_#_tlon, Tantsttve _n_a_d
(PASt Af_TH, ATA) j
Clean Q 1
ClOne I )
C$_nm _ 5
Clean 3 11
Gla_a 5 87000 4t
GYsss 5 9_
Glass ? chru lO
Uydcaalt_ 8pQ_t_toattan, ARTG-38, DecQ_¢ 19_
Class I Unlimited Non(, +2 Ftbor.
Glass 2 I _ +_ Ytbc_s
Claus 3 _D 1 _ _ Ftboce
CLans _ _ _ _7 Ftboro
Cloee 5 T_D 320 None \ FLb0_0
Hydraulic 8pcci_icet_, 75M09_,67,, 7 _ovember 1965
_luld - GS_ Oa_:Lmited None
Fluid Level g Ho_e
Fluid Lovsl I% None
FluLd Level ZZZ - 6500 g04_
Oo_pononts None
Assombliea t None
Hydraulic 8pacifications P,SFC-PILOC-166, 15 t4_rch
1967
Fluid 3
Gomponange 2 "--'--_"
"R_d_aul£c 8peeiflcation_PJ)-10625061_ 25 Apri_
1960
Subassembly _n2Lmi_d None
Ass_mbl_ and 8Fstem None +10 Fiber8
Pneumatic 8_eci£1cation, 101_1671, 28 April _96_
Particles
Level Z L_I JaaJA:dd
hnvei Z_
Level 17_t
Level ZV
Level V
Level V_ . .
Fibers
l_vst Z UnlhuLCed
Level XI M_Le_slm.__EOLD_O_LITFRA ....
Level XV
Level V
Level VI
_neumat_e m_t _ 8p_edeiow. _8_-G_I_$,
14,l_rch 195B
_att_Ioe
Level Z None
Level Zl
Level 11I
Level IV
Level V
Level VI
Fibers
Level I .,--4.UniimiCed Nohe
L_._l
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92 Nonn
3 Nom._
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,3
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].o,,. LULDO J'l: .ERAME
,ol..... _I,+..+.
_ _ I ] Non,+
......... I_; i I _lo._
lO , - ,,, , 1, Nor,ah,,. ii
L . m ,, -,, , ,, 10
, Ngne
Zl
,. 'I _i"°"°,1 ',o., '
+I ,..el'' . ...:'F- 'l , l,o_.+...
, "IT,, i I..... 'el to + +l + _,_,,,o,.,et.... _,0+' t,_: :,i" +,i.......,. ,o.°
+
t .
None
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l.O mglEt_
It_ At'ca I,O mg/ft_
_.I Nonu 2,0 mg/_t_
3 2 1 None 3.0 mg/Et_ Parts) Assemblies) Syst_Ioeand Subsystems
N/A _I/A
10 _ None
I0 ......m.,.._.I Non,., N/A NIA _l_._._ __
1,0 mglft_
: t,O mgl_t_
i _t_ Area t.O mgl_tu
I 2,0 mg/ftP
None 2.0 mg/ft_ Parts) Assemblies) Systems and 9,vhevstems
None 3.0 mg/ft _
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ClAss L 3 ----ti_ !
CI_so 3 ll ---'-_"
ClAss 4 2i
Claop 6 Io0( _2 _--I_
Clasu 7 thru I0
HTdrnulic _p_cifLcatt_n, ARTC-28, December 1964
Cl_sa I Unlimited 2C N,>ne +2 FLbo_
C1as_ 2 TeD ] -----W, +3 Pibor_,
Claus 3 TBD 150 I _ _ Fibers
CLaNs4 3 '-_ +7 Fiber.
Clasp 5 TBD None +l Fiber.
_ydrsullc 6pacifie#tion_ 75N09667, 7 HDvember1965
_l_d - _6g Unltmlted Hone
Fl.ld Level I So_e
Fl.id Level _] None
Fluid Lava1 I_Z ' 6500 None
Con_on_nrn Hone
Asse_ties 530
Hyd_sulte _pacift_s_ion, HSYC-_O_-I_6, 15 Hatch
1957
Fl_Id Unl_mired 3
condensate tO0 _ _---lr,
AssembtleA 530 10
HydFa_ltc flpneifi¢_iont OR_-lOk_506l, _5 April
1_50
flqb_nA_mbTy Unt_ited Hone
Assemblyel_l_yseem 5_0 None +10 Yibersl
P_Pgl_g#C_pspl_¢_t_np, 10H01671, _8 April 19(d, -_
Psr_tplo_
_ovel I Unlimi_od
_svel XZ
bevel II_
hovel _V
_evol V
_evel Vl
Level Z Unlimited
LcvGl I1
Le,elXXXI13t.DOLI[FRAME
Lovul IV !
Love1 V
Love1VZ
"'_Oum_-tl_'_-_yd,_eutt_ 8poeifieatioU_
14 Hatch 1958
_arti¢les
Level % Unlimited
Level 11
Level ll_
Level IV
Level V
LiNal VZ
_ib_es
Level t U_limited None
Level IZ
Level ILl
lewl IV
Level V
Level VI
_d _dreulie 8peeiflce_ion_ EF8-_O_O_
ttar tin Mar_otte
level A (Airborne _dra_lios) lh_tJ.,mtted 10
Level G Perfidies _6to_d t_e_ce)
Level C Fibers _ound Pnetmmtius)
Itmetumti¢,_1_-8_¢-164, 27 July 1954
ComponeuLe Unlimited
Assemblies
Pneumsti¢_ AI_8 Exhibit 61-3C_ _ March 1953
Components Par tleles 0nli_iced
Compon_hts Vibets
Systems Particles
Systems Fibers
Hit_ose,, HSFC-SN_C-234,21 8eptember 1964
Type I Gaseous B_t_een Hanefeetur[. Pt_n¢ and 8hl in Contai_e_ .None
Type II Liquid Flltratio_ BetWeen F_ufec_m Plant and 8hi Cdfiteiner
t'_L-R*5_O6Bt26 June 1963 inset
HIL*H-6083C_ 11 September 1967 Unlimited 250 _-,-,,Iw
rOLDO, ,,
.............. 00000002-T$C] 2
100 ml VoI
: +10 Fibers 100 mt Vol
1 None
10 None
{ lO0 Liters
es Required
I00 ml Vol
_--ib 100 nl Vol
r_nn-
_lll IIml l l l
00000002-TSD01
./A -- _cl.. i-_gzL-..5_ --
Class 2 " Good H|ss|le Bystom
lOG ml Vol Class 3 - Critical Bystemt Jn Ceneral
Class 4 - Critical System, tn General
Class 5 - Poor Htsstl_ Bystem
Class 6 - Fluid as Receiwed
Class 7 - industrial Service
N/A
I Class 1 - Grnand Test UntLs
I Clans tl-O,l ms/lOG m) Clean 2 " Serve and Pc_e¢ Systems
I CLass 12-O.3 ms/tO0 ml
100 ml Vol Class 3 - ^oroapac0 Ground Equip.,,,nt
• Close ]3-0,5 ms/tO0 mt Class 6 - Aerospace Ground Equipmonl
Class 14-1,0 ms/tO0 ml
Class 5 - Refinery _uppl_ed Fluid
N/A
Onmponents, Aasemblle_ and Fluids
Level Z - Rervo Valves
'tO0 ml Vol j hnvel II - ^clusters _nd Cylinders
Level llI- Accumulators and Reservoirs
Mt
. N/A
100 ml Vol NIA
£t_ Area ; Components, Asnembt£os and Fluld
100 ml Vol N/A.
tO0 ml Vo$ H/A Bystemj, AssembLies and 8ubassemblLes
tO0 ml.VoI N/A
l
l.O mS f t::'
1.0 mS/f t:'
,ft:' Area l.O tag/ft:'
2.oms/ft_' FOLflOUT_ERAM_
I None ,,, ,,, 2.0 mg/ft;_ , ,--d
; ld 3l, 21 , No.e . 3.0m_/." ,,.r_-,Aseomb.oo,sys_,..sa.dS,,bsys,:oms
NIA N/A
m
1 None ,,, I
tO .... I Non_ ,, _,
1o ..... !_ None N/A .., N/A ,_.*._e,.. ,
l
Z.G mg/ft _
l.Omg/ft _
£t2 A=ea 1.0 mg/ft _
2,.0 mg/ft _
None . . .r 2_O-mglft2 Pares, Aasemb1£ee, Systems and Subsystems
Id.. 3l: "2'1, 1 ".o.e 3.o_/_t_
N/A N/A
$_ Hone 1 None [ 'I
., tO U Hon_ N/A N/A .....
I I00 ml Vol 2,0 mgllo0 ml lffluent Flu£d and Blowdown Gas
2 None ,, I ft _ Area 2.0.-mS/ft: 2
JJ ill J
20 _ _Ione ft _ Area 2,0 mR/ft_ ..........
_t None ft _ Area 1.0 mg/ft" Components and Assemblies
.-.... _lJ None ft _ Area ... 1.0 mg./ft _
ml
ft_ Area 2.0 mg/ft _
None f_:_ Area 2.0 mg/ft _ Components and 8yetems
;_one WA N/A
gone N/A N/A ........
t 100 Liters N/A Liquid and Gaseous Nitrogen
as Required N/A ......
100 ml Vet N/A
; Hydraulic Fluid
i [ toomlVol N/A
00000002-TSD02
qi_ 5_ i0_
t, , i_ itF-111 Air_raft Ylight Cont,_ol , , , , r-¢ ,.... _ , ,
, ' '! [-Se1:voAatuato_ (Appendix C__.Items42 a_Id43) Operatlo_l L_vel Unlimilmd 20_i)004,000
I i I I i |
Ge.e_.l_ _t_i_,zngln_ _n1_mlted l_,q002,BSO
Hyd_aulJc Con_l Sys_ System Clean_ to Unlimited 6&i_00 LI,40C I
(Appendix C, Itom 19) 0perstional L_vel _' " [
!
| II
Titan I, Hydreullc Oper_tional Level Par_l_le_ Unl£mltedl ..... l"
Plat form Systems Ft.be_:s OnlimLted
I | ,
(Appendix C, Item 5) ...... , [,l
North AmeCicsn Level 1 Unllmit6dl •
(Ape11o) Level 2 Unlim_._ed
Hydraulic Systems Level 3 U.nllmlted
LGvel 4 XinllmltQd|
Fibers Unlimited
_' l u i
i{i , i
Zhre,Un_.d_ntifiedAir_,em_ _.ufec_u=erA ,, _nl_Ited l_,Oob4,8ooI
Manufacturers. Manu_aegure_ B Unlimited %0,000 _,000i.
: , ........ ._' 11,500.Hydraulic Oil Requirem_nts - Manufacturer C Ua!imi_._d 2, 00! I III I • I I , ,, "
(Appendix C, Item 35) I.
i I I i i i i iiii i iii i i i 1 .
Survey of 143 Navy Plen_s Hydraulic Systems Unlimited 87,000 21,400 [..... ! , ,
(Appendix C, Item 38) Recommende_ Level i. ::__- --
Coutmmi_atlon in Aincraf_ Hydr_ullc Syatem_ Fu_xlmum..Samp_.ed Unlimited _01_300_ 47,150I.... |. °.
Wr_.ghtPet.ter_sonAF_ (Appendix C___ 3_> ' '
(Ai _ndix C, Item 3@)
" 'unl ' ' ' " 00'IN th American N_trogen SpecLflca_io_. i_,ted It I11 II Iru i
conwl_ llyd_au1£_Sl_cl_£cat£_ .... Unlimlted .................. 9'000
(Appendix C, Item 45)
Hydraulic Specifications GSE Boeing No PirtlculaSe Requirement --Welght, 0.3 rag
for Serve Systems I%awOil Hughes Average of 4 L_gest Particles 50_, None >I
I [I i
All North American Unlimited 2,875[
[ II | i
MIssile Mar tIn-Marietta Unlimited 4,500
All ABMA .... Unlimited 2,150
All SAE U,,n.'.limited 50_000 _0,00_
GSE Lockheed _nlimited ' 3_5_)0 1,250iii i |
All Westinghouse Unlimited 5_000 None
(Appendix C_ Item 29) Missile Fluid BuWeps Unlimlted lO_i.0 4_00C
_- I |. "
_light Control Lockheed .... Unlimited F I0,0)0 2,50C
Missiles Boeing No PartiCulate Requirement . Weight, 0.5 m_, I
FOLDOUTFRAM_
L ,,,,
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M_.69-484 Table VI-2 Indun_r
io_ so_ 1oo_ _oo_ so,
- 1 I" ! ! _, • _ ....w ! • ' } ! ! ! ! ! I ] ! ! I m • l _ ! I" I ! I w -_ I ! ! ! ! ]
"" " ? i | i roll
L' ......
%o?9i2,8 o ....  a6' 9o16iii
54_00 I1,40{ 2,02.5 360 64 m._...._j i I .,,. , ....... , .....
i jll Ii fill I
1,0)0 2.50i 70I L I I I i i al i
ii I Jill i i
! i100 I LO Nonem i i r ml
100 10 None
{ ii i I is J m I m,
s llS,o.(,iII
I Particles + Fibers
., i i ,l
i |i i mill . i l,
[4 I I .......000 ,800 I,.200 240 16 4i.ii i i N ,
1o,6_14,000 1,ooo moo 5o3
. • • i i i , iii
2,_OOJ1,500 150 20 5 ------e-
, i i ,ii I i, i i i i i
000 21,400I 5,150 430 41
• " I -- . I_ i Jl
..... i I ii .. i ii 11 i i i i
3oo 47,1s01 24,_0j 8,_0 s,s90• n l" llln _ • " i r '- J • "
im , i i ,i i i,,i i i| ,,,,
1ooI lo 5 I Nonei u r I i .. m IIi
9,000 900 90 9m .(one+ I Fiber
,..... -........... , r m l] i i iiii- i i
_-Weight, 0.3 mg/lO0ml......
!
les 50p,14one >150g
2,817 1. 5 350 l0 None (Rnted by Smallest Dimension)• "- "'l i ii m I IT ..... 1 nr "
4,50oj 700 450----------_ + 20 Fibersj ..... r , r.... i.. I ,
2,150; 530 60 None + 10 Fibers
i - l i,
,o,,o_.o..zo,ooc........ s,oo0 _ 5oo2_o
'.%s!o1,2so :_iO - i 2ss
5,000 None
I II V] l l I
Io,_o4,000 t,ooo ioo 5o3= • • Im iii ill • L i ii F" I III I
'o,obo :2,500 500 50 I0
. /looi .....
FOI .:
i
-. III
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NOR-6g-4B4 Tnble V$-2 Znduatry Experience .nd Bpe_ificetion V_-13 and V_-L4
200_ 500_ I000_ 2000_
I t ! 1 ! " I I _' ! _ V I 1 I I 1 I l 1 "" I T "l_S'-- ! I ! 1' 1 ..... I -'--1 "r | l- | I I |
1i P_rtlcl_s + Fibers 5 Rone
70 20 3 Nonv
25 5 Nono
r/ i i
5 q None ii i
J Particles Fibers 6 None lm
I None
L
None + 1 Fiber
(Rated by Smallest Dimension)
be_e
"-- 50]3m ii
FOI.[_our i_l-,;.,v,_t_
L , , , , ii
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flange
S 15 25. 50 L00 200
..... ":_._,011
- I 'i I
100s0_ .... I .,, r [
__ I I ,I
,.., _.o,_._ r ' \ _ ] "
- • I % ,JL,,,;_81 ,
I
l,ooo. *" [
tj-
N i
, ,oo !"' -- ' ' ' ]' 'l
• - , !-I
; iI t
: _ I l q _ I
i
• z_., i ! ! .
- .....I I
-- _" N£1ey-i_ecommended _-Ve]. I
1, , .... ]- J-- !I
I- I t iII": L _ I......... L,, l
....zo 2"_ _o 4o 5_, 6o _ _o_ zo _o eo 8o 2oe 300
x_ _C_i_le _i_e, lttccoae (1,oga}
I F£sure Vl-[ _Lcl_ Count Ana1_id (31 oper_t£otnll aircra£E and mlssL_el)
}_..., i i I II I i
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_n_n
5 ].5 25 50 100 200
1
_ r
_,ooo,ooo_ m. [ I
-- ' r_t_r Re_.Z'._rtQ.OAppencttz C, _l;nm 26'
* L,, (_g,t,nney_ _Z_I: 7)., ["
- ,l,Oo000
a _ *.-
].0 "
1.
I:
L 5 LO 20 30 40 50 60 80 1.00 2_ 40 GO80 200 300
l_rticle S±zet M_erons (lo8 2)
Figure VX-2 Particle Coun_A_lysLe (ll AF aircrd£t)
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i i m
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Rango.... .5 15 25 50 100 200
• : Ro£o:oneeAppendix C) _gn_ 38
I (Reb:Lnaon),.-
" o.1 8"7
-16
,-,10,000_ _,. • .
1,ooo V! l 7' "_. I',
o ,,I 4 | "
!. I
,L
!
I..........5 ...........lo 20 30 40 50 60 80 Ioo 20 40 60 80 200 300
i x) Particle Si_.e) Nicrons (log _)
'; lLtsure VI-3 ParticIe CounL Analysis (143 naval aircraft)
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i00,000
I 5 10 20 30 40 50 O0 80 100 20 40 60 80 200 300
x, Pa_ticto Size, Hie_ons (lob _)
YiSure VI-4 Pacttcle Count Analys£s (17 AF airccaft)
_,, , i i i
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Figure VZ-5 ParticL_ Count Armlyzig
(Service Acm l_auli_ System.)
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Tho fo-11ow_ ty_. o.f--gongam_nan_w# o usod _o.makoup _ho.
cont.am£na_iont_ boCh tho hF_au1£e and pnoumat_c_a_I
t). A,_¢. '_co_rso';'_o_i _u_Ct
2) _cl. _on. o_-g_ F_x=_c},os;
A phoCo_hr_hof _&_h-_o_ami_at is showeri_-F_es V"IZ-1 _h_o_$h
VlZ_4.
_e A. C. _oad 4_st (_t_. "_Z-I). i_ a oomp_ite of. =c_eene_
and 8_:ad._ du¢_ particles), p_lma=£_y qua=_a.. Z_ is natural _oad
dust E_omArizona.__The be_t¢ _pos_tion in ee._hsize t:snge_s:
@_o._ 1_'± 2.:
5 to- L0. t2"_ 3-
tO. to 20- 14 = 3
20 to 40 23':t3
40 to 8.0 30. ± 3
8_ t;e 20.0. ................-9± 3
The road dust was use& because £_ _e_rese_ a _ard ¢_yst_line .....
pa_t£_e o_ an-_egulax, shape s£mLl._tO.will.b.low_atmos_riC
¢on_aminat£on n_rmaLlyfound in.£1u£d syStemSat.Cape _e_y.
., It is a_s.o,compa_._tiveto lappta_B compounds',._ilte¢ test melia,
" and _Che_ con_unlnar_tsfound in h.Fdra_L_a_t p_euma_£¢systems. -
'1'hehax_ne_sof th_se-dus_p_¢t_tes-witt at_'o.Simuta_emetal
" pj_ iclee.
/
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Figure VII-3 Teflon Particles - 140X
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Figure VII-4 Cotton Lintner Fibers - 140X-
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The red iron oxide particles (Fig. VII-2) are uniform spheres
app=oxlmately 5 microns in diameter. These small spheres werm
used to evaluate the effects of silting, stiction, and wear caused
by small particles. The hardness of these particles is also
sIm ilar_/_> me _al.
The teflon partlcl_8 (F_. VI_-3) are a _omD_slte of irregulaD-
shaped., particles rangi_4_ in size from--30 to 1000 micDo_s ,..._e
teflon tep=esan_s particles that _ _%nternally generated from _ha
ma_y plasti¢-4nd, teflon parts uaed-i_ the service arm systems as
lubricants (base. de=i_tive)_ se_.£s, seats, hose liners, and
sealant tape.
The cotton lin_ner fibers (Fig. Vll-4) range in size from 50
to 4000 microns and were used to simulate a soft Zlber commonly
found in atmmspherlc contamination.
In erode= to accurately establish the number of particles in ..........
each size =arLge for the total cor_taminant to be used in the
tests, it was necessary to ascertain the number of particles for
each constituent as a function of weight. With the exceBtior_ o_-
the iron oxide, none of the suppliers of contaminant were able
to supply this information, The r_imber of particles-par given
weight was required i_ order to establish particle counts and
total weight of contaminant per I00 ml of oil or I00 grams o_
gas. W_ight ¢onversioas were also required because of the large
amou_bs of c_ntaminatio_, injected, in _ach test; thus a manual
mi_oscopi_ cou=t.wotuld be an-extremely lengthy procedure and
would not be as accurate.
Automatic particle counte_s were used to determine particle
count for a given weight. The HIAC automatic particle counter
was used initially but did not prove to be adaptable to our tests;
the ROYCO automatic particle counter was adaptable, The ROYCOt
cou_ter, iS based, upon the principle of light refraction, a_d like
i most counte_a it integrates the area._f e_ch particle and c_te-
gorlzes it aa a. round sphere in each respective size range._ In
m_nual microscopic techniques, the particle is sized by its
longest dimension; thus some diffenences exist in the criteria
baseline between manual and automatic techniques.
The initial procedure used was to weigh a sample of the con-
stituent, place this sample in i00 ml of prefiltered Freon (car-
rier @luid)_ and then introduce the contaminant to the counter.
" ' O0000002-TSE04
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The initial tests_ using the above procedure, produced an
unacceptable amount of scatter in data. As a result ;he tests
were inconclusive. The majority of the problems were due to
,U_erat:itmal techniques. Samples weighing 1.5 mg were first used
but it was found that the particles were conglomerating. Smaller
samples (0.048 to 0.3 mg) produced large errors in weighing in-
accuracies which magnify themselves in terms of particle counts.
A highly accurate electronic weighing device wa_ used to weigh
the samples. This device can di_feranti_te to I x i0 "s grams
but even this order of accuracy was not sufficient. Dilutions
were tried, hut the dilutions did not prove to be representative
of the total mix prior to dilution. Other-problems were ex-
perienced in particle settling, traps, etc.
The final series of tests was conducted using gravity flow
through the top of the ROYgO counter. The flow configuration to
the inlet of the counter was designed to eliminate traps and
settling points, and to prevent-air bubbles from entering the
counter during the initial flow process. Automatic counters,
which operate on a light principle, will readily interpret air
bubbles as particles and will count them as such. An ultrasonic
bath was used to prevent conglomergtion of the particles. It
was also necessary to use large quantities of flush fluid
[_iltered Freon) to completely wash all of the particles from the
test beaker and through the tubing to the counter. The above
techniques provided highly repeatable data from sample to sample.
Figure VII-5 shows the particle count for 1.0 mg of A.O. "coarse"
road dust and Figure VII-6 shows the composition of the OX60
teflon.
Table VII-I shows the composition of the contamination level
used in the contamination tests. The pneumatic and hydraulic
contamination levels that are being used in the contamination
tests are approximately 30% higher than those recommended for the
service arm systems. Increased levels of contamination were used
in the contamination tests to ensure a margin of conservatism.
The comFcsite level includes large amounts of hard abrasive con-
taminan .s. System contamination, as observed in the field, will
not include such large amounts of these particles. The whole
intent was to over-test the components to ensure a margin of
reliability.
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Particle Count Analysis Plot
5 15 25 50 I00 200
Ran__i__i__ ] _- . ," -_....... ........ iF .....
1,000_000 J................... I ......
lO0,000 -- -...... ] ..... I
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-- .__ f__Particle Count peri0_000 _ __. L--I.O mg of Road Dust.
o== _q '
4-1
1,000 ......
" I00 .......... _'_ I
= -\ I
-
10 .........
- I
-- I
- I
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x, Particle Size (microns)
Figure Vll-5 Particle Count Composition A.C. "Coarse" Road Dust
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F,ange 5 _ 25 50 tOO 100+-
.,.,,,m
t ,00.0,000 "-
,,,,,me
lO0,OOO ..........
m
10,000 ,_ ....
= _-- _ /- Pax_.icle_CountAnalysis .Plot
° .. 4o _1000 _ ,, _,,e-¢ I
.P,t
"' 1(_0......... ,'
• _ " --_'j_
-- Particle Count per.
l.O mg of. 0X60 Tefloa
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Figurb VII-6 ParticI6 Count Compositlon OX60 Teflon
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Tablo V2T-I Cen_;_t£on Te_.C L_v_L_
i!
.lo_-u.._5_ 2_._o_ 5t._o_ to_+
0.2_+ _-/],0_ g_s gs_ 2670 L130- 300- 70 L3! i
A,g..,t_o_e" Rlo_- Du_t
0..06 mg/LO0 S_.am.s g_ 1.94(1-.. 'LO.30 170 29 L
Rsd..I_ Oxide
<0_1 mg_LO0, grams..gee 3700 0 0 0 0
<(_.1. mg/_30 gr,_,n_gas ........ (4000_ maxhnu_)
0.30 n_/LO0 gram_ See 8310 2160 470 90 14 + £Lbers
l_e_natic _on_amina_io_ .T,e_.t-Level
, , , ,
Siz'e _axx_e
0]£60Tef_t o_
Z..O ms/lO0 ml oiL... 2Z,200 9",40_ 2,_)0 564 108
, , ,, v
0.2"m_l.lO0,-Ioil 6,460 3,.42_ 565. _7
I_ed _on:
<o.o_- m_._l_; m].- c_LZ... 3"_71_ , o _ o o
"' Cbt ton-. I_:Lntnm;-_be_s--. '"( ' ....
<_.1 mg_1OO,ml oil .......... [4000t_m_ximum)
co=
2.2 ms/tO0 ml, oiL-- . 32,370" 12,820 3,065. 63L Lll + gibers
Eydraulic Contamination Test Level
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Figure VII-7 shows the composite level of contamination used
in the hydraulic tests. 'l_lecleanllness ]eve]. (Level 8 of NAS1638)
tentatively recommended for the hydraulic systems is superimposed
upon the test level. Figure VII-8 shows the contamination level
used in the pneumatic tests. Both of these cleanliness ].ovels are
considerably loss stringent than tile levels presently specified
for _he servic_ arm sys_ums.
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Particle Count Analy_z:,Plot
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Figure VII-7 Contamination Level for Hydraulic Tests
"- ............ O0000002-TS E10
MCR-69-484 V_-I3
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Figure VII-8 Contamination Level for Pneumatic Tests
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Vlll. CONTAMINATION TEST PROGRAM-
Th,' obl,'cLlv," of the' study was to evaluate the cleanliness re-
quir,.,ments l.or tilepneumatic and hydraulic components in the ser-.
vice arm systems at Complex 39 in an effort to relax the cl_,anli-
nt.ss It.w_is, _md their associated high cosL, while maintaining
scrvic_, ;n:m r_,lLabtl|ty. A _est program was included to confirm
Lhe functional performance of components subjected to the final
(l(,anliness luw.ls to be recommended.
Te,stswere performed on pneumatic and hydraulic components
nrr;ingc,d in a system typical of the service arm applications.
Each comlmncnt in both the pneumatic and hydraulic systems was
subjecLcd ko 1500 operational cycles, a number selected after con-
siduracion of all of the scheduled tests, launches, and anticipated
checkout on the,service arms for the duration of the Apollo pro-
gram. The 1500 operational cycles are four times the maximum cy-
cles expected on the se_-arm systems.
A. TEST CRITERIA
The test criteria were established prior to procurement of
components and the subsequent test effort. T_he cr..iteria_which
" formed the basis for the contamination tests, are quoted in the
following paragraphs.
I. Component Procurement
Test specimens will be procured to the vendor part number
which corresponds to the similar NASA service arm specification.
The test specimens will be procured commercial clean.
2. Receiving and Inspection
Components shall be inspected for general conformance. The
components shall also be visually inspected, with magnification,
for contamination. The valve shall not be disassembled to per-
form this inspection. The contamination observed shall be re-
corded.
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The internal flow path of the hydraulic components will be,
flushed with clean hydraulic oil and sampled to determine the
contamination _evel of the valve as procured. The component will
not be cleaned in the flush mode unless the component exhibits
extreme contamination.
3. Functional Text
A bench functional test will be performed on each component
to ensure its integrity and also to establish baselin_ functional
performance for comparison during the contamination test. Per-
formance criteri_ shall be recorded prior to and during testing.
Fluids used in the functional test shall be filtered prior to the
test specimen.
4. System Cleanliness
The test system.shalL.be cleaned to test.level '_" (Table
VIII-l) or better, prior to installing the test specimens.- Care
shall be taken to minimize exterior contamination when installing
the test specimens. The effluent count of the flush fluid shall
be recorded.
5. System Functional
A functional check of the system shall be performed subsequent
to the test specimen installation to ensure proper system opera-
tion prior to conducting the 1500 cycle test. The fluids used
: during t_e system functional check shall be clean filtered fluids.
The hydraulic loop shall be drained after the functional check.
_ Photographs of the system shall be taken.
6. Test Fluid1
Hydraulic Test - The test fluid shall be MIL-H-5606 hydraulic
oil prefiltered to 3 microns. After filtration, a quantity of oil
equal to the volume of the system shall be prepared. Contamina-
tion shall be mixed into the oil to ensure a homogeneous mixture,
Precaution_ shall be taken to prevent further contamination of the
oil by exterior contamination.
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Table Vlll-i Cleanliness Levels I
Level A - System Cleanliness
Particles
t
i Size (microns) 0-300 301-500 501-I000 Over i000
Quantity per ft"°
: of significant
surface area Unlimited* i0 2 0
,,,
.'[ Fibers
: Length (microns) 0-750 x 25 751-2000 x 25 2001-6000 x 40 Over 6000
Quantity per ft2
o£ significant
surface area Unlimited* 20 2 0
*Total Filterable Solids Limitation, 0.25 mg/ft a
Level B - System Fluid Contamination
Size Range
Contaminant Type 6 - I0_ Ii - 25_ 26 - 50_ 51 - 100B I00 +
L 0X60 Teflon
0.24 mg/100 grams gas 2670 1130 300 70 13
r A.C. "Coarse" Road Dust
!. 0.06 rag/100 grams gas 1940 1030 170 20 I
Red Iron Oxide
<0.I mg/lO0 grams gas 3700 0 0 O 0
Cotton Lintner Fibers
<0.i mg/100 grams gas ........ 4000_ maximum
lllll ' ,_ _ ................
" Total Particle 'Count
":' 0.30 mg/tO0 grams gas ,_J310 2160 470 90 14 + fibers
*Total Filterable Solids Limitation, 0.3 mg/100 grams of gas
....... O0000002-TSF02
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7. Criteria for Success
The test system shall be cycled for 1500 cycles. At inter-
vals of 300 cycles the leakage of each component shall be veri-
fied. Component leakage and regulator set pressure sha.il be the
primary criteria for determining component failure. Pressure
levels and component response shall alan be monitored for indica-
tion of component failure. After the completion of the test each
component shalL.be subjected to a functional test and the data
recorded.
8. Component Failure
If a component shall fail prior to the end of the test,, the
program manager shall be notiiied and he sh_Ll make one of three
determinations:. (i) repair the val_e, (2) continue the test
without repairing the valve, or (3) discontinue the test., The
main objective will be to continue the test, if possible.
9. Failure Analysis
At the conclusion of the test, and _rior to repairing any in-
ternal component parts, each component shall be disassembled.
Contamination shall be noted and recorded. Photographs shall be
taken to note contamination, valve failure, or general condition
of the component. A failure analysis shalL_e conducted if the
valve failure was due to contamination.
B. PNEUMATIC CONTAMINATION TESTS
The pneumatic testing effort was started on i0 March 1969 amd
was completed on 4 June 1969. All testing was performed at the
E Martin Marietta Cold Flow Laboratory at Denver, Colorado.
The functional characteristics of eight components determined
to be critical to control arm operation were established by func-
tional test. The specimens were then assembled into an operational
system, and operated 1500 cycles using deliberately contaminated
nitrogen gas. The functional tests were repeated to establish
any functional degradation, and the specimens were disassembled
for inspection.
|
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Allspeclmens operated properly throughout =he testing, with
the exception of specimen-l, Marotta Regulator.227464-Jll. This
regulator was found to he extremely sensiDive _ contamination and
failed as a r_ault of poppet seat erosion. _ Thi_-reg_lator has a
history of nine £ailures on the service arm systems.
_isassembly of the specimens showed a major amount of co=--
taminant .present and--little component degradatlon.
i. Ob lectives
The.objec_t_iX_.of the Rheumatic _amln_io_.tests were to:
i) Test selected co_%trol arm components in a typical
flow system. Component selection was based upon.
susceptibility to contamination combined-wlth posses-
sion of a critical function in. the° control ara_ system;
" 2) Demonstrate the reliability of the_ components at_an
increased, level-of contamination hy subJect£ng them
to 1500 operational cycles;
3) Perform functional .tests un each test.component before
" and after the 1500 operational cycles, in.order to
de termine comp_qDertt degrads_tion;
4) Maintain cleanllness-of the test_iluid a_ a prescribed
: level ;
5> Disassemble and inspect the components-followlng the
test, te determine the effect of test fluid conta_lea-
tion,
2. Test Speclmens
Test specimens wei'e procu=ed to the vendor part number which
corresponds to the similar NASA. service arm specification, The
test specimens were procured co___
• NASA Equivalent
Specimen Manufacturer Part Number Part Number Name
7/ _1 Marot ta 227464-Jll 75M08829 Regulator
2 Marotta 228154-02 75M0882_-I 2-way solenoid valve
• 3 Marotta 806098 75M09285-I 3-way solenold valve
4 Marotta 806098 75M09285-I 3-way solenoid valve
5 Pathon QU4X3SUI9I/2ABR 7._M09014 Pneumatic cylinder
6 Marotta 230904-12 75M08831-I Regulator
7 Marotta 806097-1 75MD8823-I 2-way solenoid valve
8 _rotta 225884-02 75M08825-i 3-way solenoid valve
................. .,.,
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, Test Equipment
a. Instrumentation
•he recorded instrumentation functions and the gages used
ir_-the pneumatic tests are specified on the schematics given in
Figures VIII-I through VIII-5. A Consolidated Elect=odynamics
Co=_oration Type 5-124 recorder was used fo= all recorded data.
Accuracy of all readouts was -+27_full scale.
b ,___Test Fixture
The test fixture schematics used for functional and sys-
tem testing are included as Figures VIII-I through VIII-5. Each
test installation was cleaned to the level shown in Level A in
Table VIII-l_ The cleanliness was verified by a nitrogen flush
at a higher flowrate than anticipated during test fixture opera-
tion... Photographs of the system test installation and control
panel appear as Figures Vlil-6 and Vlll._7, respectively.
c. Contaminant Injector
During system test operation, a known contaminant was in-
jected into the system periodically._. The device used for adding
the contaminant to the flow stream consisted of an AN-827-6 cross,
omlented as shown in Figure Vlll-8. With the cross oriented
ve=ticalLy, the contaminant was loaded through the upper port
into the capped lower one. The upper port was capped and the
cross oriented as shown in the figure. The velocity of the ni-
trogen passing over the contaminant filled port caused sufficient
turbulence to draw contamination into the flow stream. The angle
at which the crosses were set was determined during development
tests in a separate contamination injector development system.
The components in this system were sized to approximate
the flow that would exist "n the system test fixture during pres-
surization of the cylinder. The approximate injection rates,
with the injector angles, are shown in Figure VIII-8. Although
the majority of the contamination is consumed early in the flow,
the overall injection schedul_ is much less severe than the 'batch"
techniqDe, and more closely duplicates the contamination distribu-
tion rate that might be found in a typical system. The injection
rate was sized in this manner to ensure that all of the contami-
nant would be removed from the injector and distributed through-
out the test system in the remaining cycles.
M
L ......... ml ii i i
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d. Co=taminant
_he contaminant used was a mixture of ground teflon partL_
cles, A-.C. coa=se dust, red--Iron oxide, and.cotton lintner fibers.
The particles we=e mixed to £orn_._ comppsi_e level equLv_1_nt to
Level B.o_ Table VIII, L_ The..con_aminant mi_tuze wa._ irLJec=ed at ............
a rate o/ 0.3__g per .100_grams of gaseous nitrogen.
4 Test Method and Procedure
a.. Functional Test Method and Procedure
Each_ test specimen..was subjected to a functionaL.test to
establish its operating characr_-r.ls_ics prior to the system test.
The 2-way and 3-way solenoid-valves were tested for in-
termal and external leakage and.response time.. "Inlet_pressure on
all v_iv_.s was 2000 psig of gaseous nitrogen._
•he tesr_ specimen.l regulator was tested at ar_ inlet.
pressure of 450Q psig o£ gaseous nitrogen for i=ternal, and .exter-_
naL.leaka_e, for ability t_ regulate p=essure at a giv_R-s_tting,
and for ._,pability of vent/rig downstream pressure in ex_=ess of
the--set pressure.
The test s.pecime_ 6 regulator, was tested for e_ternal
lea/u_e_ set p.ressure, anc_ ability to veat downstream p_essure-in_- .....................................
excess _£. the Set pressure.,_ T_e. r_gulator was _ested. with a_t irL-
let pressure of LO00 psig of. gaseous nitrOgen, and was purchased
with a preset_and lockwlred outlet, p.Kes.suresetting of 120 psig.
The test s.Re_imen 5 pneumatic cylinder was tested-at a
pressure of 1000 pslg of-gaseou_ nitrogen fo= internal leakage,
L external leakage, and breakaway pressure.
E b. System Test _thod _..D_Procedure
T,he eight test, specimens were combined with a minimum of
add liOnel, components to form the operating system shown sche_
maticaliy in _Igure VILi-5, The gaseous nitrogen inlet pressure
to the system was adjusted to 4500 psig_ and the outlet pressure
of test specimen I adjusted to i000 psig. The system was operated
automatically through 1500 cycles, using the logic sequence in
Table VIII-2.
k-m | I m
O0000002-TSF06
++
V%II-8 MCE-69-484
1
O0000002-TSF07
MCR-69-484 VIII-9
Prior to each set of 50 cycles, contaminant was added to
the system at the two points indicated on Figure VIII-5. For a
description of the contaminant used and the contaminant injection
technique, consult paragraphs VIII, B, 3, e and VIII, B, 3, d.
All effluent gaseous nitrogen from the system was passed
either through a Millipore filter tool, Model XX45-047-00, or a
Martin Marietta developed in-l_ne fLL_er holder and counter
(ILFHC) tool. This tool allows examLnation of.-the f.ilter paper
without removing it from the flow system. T_e vent from the ini-
tial 195 cycles of each set of 200 cycles was passed through the
Millipore tool. The Millipore paper was then analyzed for parti-
cle size and size distribution. The vent from the remaining 5
cycles was then passed through the ILFHC and used as a verifica-
tion of particle size and size distribution
After cycles i00, 300, 600, 900, 1200 and 1500, internal
leakage tests were performed on all test specimens to establish
any degradation. All of these leakage tests were performed at
the system pressures used during the cycling test.
Table VIII-3 gives a summary of test operations during
the 1500 cycles.
c. Final Inspection Test Method and Procedure
Following completion of the system and functional tests,
each test specimen was carefully disassembled for inspection. The
component parts were inspected for evidence of abrasion, contam-
ination, lubricant deposits, etc. Photographs were taken of sig-
nificant items.
5. Tes_ Results and Discussion
a. Initial Functional Test Results and Discussion
Test data from the initial functional tests are presented
in Tables VIII-4, Vlil-5, and VIII-6. For discussion of the data
that do not meet the test criteria, see paragraph Vlll_ B, 6, d.
m
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Table Vlll-3 S_s_em Test Run Schedule
After Cycle Inspect Inspect Add Leak
Number ILFHC Mil iipore Contaminant Check
0 X X
5O X
I00 X X
150 X
19-5 X
200 X X
250 X
300 _ X
350 X
395 L
400 X X
450 X
500 X.
550 X
595 X
6O0 X X X
65O X
700 X
. i IH i. i, i i r , ,
750 X
795 X
800 X. X
850 X
900 X X
950 X
995 X
i000 X X
1050 X
ii00 X
1150 X
1195 X
1200 X X X
1250 X
1300 X
1350 X
1400 X
1450 X
1495 X
1500 X X
7 -"
L , i
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The data shown for the internal leakage test of the cylin-
der were obtained after washing the hydraulic fluid from the in-
terior of the cylinder and relubricating the seals with Atlantic
54 lubricant. It was felt that the excess hydraulic fluid present
in the cylinder as received might unduly trap the contaminant
present in the syste_ nitro,_en, and prevent the eontamlnant from
reaching other system components.
The following observations were made of the contamination
existing in the components as received from the vendor. The com-
ponents were procured in a commercial clean condition. Inspec-
tion was performed in the flow ports only, since it was a require-
ment that the valve was not to be disassembled for inspection prior
to test.
Pressure Regulator <75M08829_ - Upon removal of the inlet
port fitting, one particle of dirt (125 microns) Was attached to
the fitting. Lube was found all around the diameter of the inlet
port flow path. No lube or particles were observed in the outlet
port.
Two-Way Solenoid Valve <75MO8824) -
Inlet Port - Slight lube film and dust contaminatlon were
evident on the flare sealing surface. One particle, approximately
_ 75 microns, was found on the end of the union (Fig. VI_I-9).
i Outlet Port - Lube film was found in the union flow path.
. Dirt was observed on the threads of the port. A 75 micron teflon
particle was observed in the outlet port glow path. A large burr
was attached at the bottom of the machined port. This large burr
_ broke off and migrated to the cutlet filter screen during func-
tional tests.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve _75MO9283_ S/N 280_ - The pore
_'_ closure plugs were clean. No burrs were observed----_n the po_t
threads. Th_ lube used on the O-ring seating surface (common
port) was sl_ghtly dark from many small particles. The normally
open and normally closed ports showed no visable contamination.
Three-Way Solenold Valve (75M09285_ S/N 281) - All port
closure plugs were clean. On all three ports, burrs or catches
were observed at three places spaced around the lower thread. No
particles were obserced.
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PneumatlcCvlinde_r (75M090!4 _ - Visual examination showed ,
a large quantity of hydraul_: oil in the cylinder. Slight con-
tamin_tlon w_ob_erved which appears to be dirt or parti_le_ from ..
pipe threads,
Pressure Ro_ula_o_ (75M08831) -
Inl_t Por_ - A small (50 mlcr_n) metal _ol_rmd flake was
obSemv_d Ln _he port cap together wi_h approximately i00 sm_iL
particles (50 microns maximum). A large (0.040 i_,) piece o£
luh_ was observed in the flow path of _he f_tting. T_ valve
inlet flow path look_d cloaa with a sl_t lube film on _h_ sur-
face,
Outlet Port - Four lint particles (0.080 in. maximum)
were observed, on the int_rior of the port cap. Exeesslve lube
was found.ln the fi_tlng flow path and £n the port, No particles
were observed, but may have been present in the lube film,
Two-Way Solenoid Valve (75M0_823) - At the base of the
inlet port union some black particles (i00 microns) were observed.
Three particles (25 microns) were observed in the inlet pelt.
No-partlcles were observed in the outlet port, although a bur_.
was observed on the valve body at the bottom of the port threads.
This burr appears to be firmly attached and is a result of the
thread _ap.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (75_18825_ - The valve was dou-
ble-bagged but did not have plugs in the ports. The common port
c_ntalned many small particles, the lar_gest being approximately
75 microns ....The normally-open port contained some very small.
particles le_s than 25 microns in size. The normally-closed port
contained, many small (less than 75 t_icrons) particles at the
bottom of the port,..
b. System Test Results and Discussion
The system test was performed per the schedule in Table
Vlll-3. The Millipore and ILFHC sample data _ppe&r in Table
VIII-7. The result of the interim leakage tests appears on
Table VIII-8.
!
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Table VIII-7 Milltppr@ Particle Count Daca.
_LFHC Data Milllpore Data
mmm
Number of Particles at Cycle No' Number of Particles at Cycle Nee
i i i • ! i i
Particles 600
M_on Ranges 200 /+00 800* 1000 "1200 1500 200- 400 600 800 lO00 1200 1500
i i I "
100-200 15 3 . 20 154 32 13 1 23 75
200-300 14 1 l0 28 18 $ $ 3 0 2 20
300-500 L 1 4 32 4 2 0 1 _l $ $
500-1000 0 I 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
Over 1OO0 0 0 i* 0 0 0 0 0 0
l_ibers
Micr._nRanges , .............
0-750 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 3 1-
750-2000- 0 0 0 0 0 $ $ 0 0 0 0 $ 4,
2000-6000 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l
Over 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*Appears to be a conglomeratlen of TYE particles..
t_etalllc fiber, not a pa_t: of injected contaminan_.
SSample void, filter paper broken.
Table VII_C-8 Systent.Test-I.nterimInternal Leaka.ge Test Data
,irll
Internal Leakage ¢$CCR)
Test Specimen
l= i,H m
5 5
Cycle Number 1 2 3 and 4 4 Extend Retract 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 7250 565 0 0 0
" tO0 NA* 0 0 0 4200 4 0 0 0
I 300 13,500 0 0 0 3340 30 0 0 0
600 60_000 0 0 0 3120 14 0 0 0
: _" 900 60_000 72 0 0 211.0 20 0 0 0
; •
1200 60,000+ 2 0 0 1800 250 0 0 0
i •
• 1500 60,000+ 0 0 0 1410 110 0 0 0
i
, - *Specimen failed at cycle i, was removed from the system at
: cycle 50, was refurbished and replaced in the system at cycle 200.
i •
bl :
.?
_= , , | i ii
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At =he initiation el system cycllns, specimen l.failed
by leakage through the seat.. Results of _ Pailu=e analysis showed
the stainless steel poppet seat,was eroded as if sandblasted,
Examinstion of the con_aminant inJo¢r.or upstream of this specl-
men showed tha_ essentially all. th_ c_ntsminant was sit11, in the
inJe_to_, s_..th_,test spacime_ had hog boon "sl_gg_d""wlch _he
eor_smlnant. While the £al/uxe analysis was being conduced, _h_
system was r_n. thco_g_ 20_ cycles, The r_f_rb£ahed s_¢.imen w_s
g,ha_ r_e=urne_ to tha sysr.em.,and the cycles contiau_d, Zmmedt-
_teLy on resumption of-the cyclL_g, _es_ speeime_ 1 failed again
in.r.he sam_ n_nner, $in_e _he _e_ leakage a_Aowe4 dowrm_:aam
pressure _o increase until the b_ilt-£n, reZief device relieved.,
system pressure_ were still main_alned neac._hose required wi_h
external venting from spucime_ i being the only obvious system.
problem. The system was allowed to continue in this manner
through the duration of the 1500 cycles.
The eontaminan_ in,errors p_formed a_i_qma_ely during
the 1500-cycles,
_igur.e VIZI-10 shows-the cenditi_n of the Millipore
filteD papers used in the contamination tests. The correlation ..
between_sample numbers and. tes_ cycles is tabulated..
Sample No, T_t Cycle Material
_205_ 200 Cycle_.- ]_..per.._
B2_58 600 Cycles TefLon
B2059 8CO Cycles Teflon
_ B2060 10go Cycles Teflon
B2061 1200 Cycles Teflon
B2062 1400 Cycles Paper
Millipore dat_were not obtained at 200_ 1200, and 1500
cycles because the fil_er pads were blown out by the high
velocity particle impingement. The standard filter, paper was re_
placed w i_h high p_essure teflon filters after-the first failure .....
, These teflg_ filters are designed to take high pressure surges
_" and high velocity impingemen_ and are considered to be the strong-
_ est filter pads aveilable._ Even the teflon filters would not
take the high levels of contaminant introduced into the system
and resultant particle impingement.
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Table VIII-7 lists the particle counts obtained on the
Millipore samples. The data is not representative because of
filter pad erosion. On samples B2058 and B2059, the center of
tilefiltt,r pad is badly eroded implying that many of the,partlcles
passed through the filter. The technician in the laboratory re-
ported that sample B2060, at i000 cycles, was highly charged with
static electricity and _hat when he disassembled the Millipore
hold_r, approximately 50% of the particles mJumpedI_off of the
filEcr pad and thus were .lotcounLed,
The filter pads were weighed to determine the total
w_.ight of contaminant in the sample. The w_[ghts, in all eases,
w_,re less than the tare weights taken prior to test and contami-
nant weir,hi was there,fore not obtainable. The decrease in w(_ight
is aLtributed to l!ilt(:rpad erosion.
e. Final Functional Test Results and Discussion
Following eompletlon o£ the system test, each test speci-
m.n was subjected to a functional test identical to that pe_-
formed prior to the system test. The final funetlonal test re-
sults appear on Tables VIII-4, VIII-5, and VIII-6. The most
significant result was the improvement in the pneumatic cylinder
leakage rates and breakaway pressu=e. With the exception of spe-
cimen 1 regulator, the remaining test specimens showed very little.
change in characteristics from initial to final functional tests.
d. Test Specimen Fail_re Discussion
. : system test, specimen regulator
During the the i failed
_ twice, the second failure occurring after a complete refurbish-
i
i ment. This regulator is very sensitive to contamination.
The solenoid valve specimens 3 and 4 exhibited response
times that often failed to meet the eriterla established for
E functional testing. The criteria were based on the valve manu-
facturer's acceptance criteria, with one major exception. The
manufacturer uses the valve position indicator switch for response
measurements, while for this test, the solenoid current trace
with its eharacterlstlc indications of poppet motion was used.
":_: It is felt that this method, while yielding longer response times,
:,'/ is a more consistent and accurate measure of a valve's response.
During system interim leakage testing, specimen 2 sole-
noid valve exhibited internal leakage at two of th¢_seven pre-
scribed measurement intervals. The leakage was zero at all other
measurement intervals, and was at zero at the completion of all
testing. RefL,r to Table VIII-4 for these data.
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e, Final Ins eetion Test Results and Discussion
Following completion of the final functional test, aa_h
test specimen was completely disassembled for inspection. Fig-
ures VIII-f1 _hrough VIII-35 are included _o show the dlsassem_l_d
components of each specimen. Residual contaminant was present in
all. the test spp¢imcns, Tile majority of the con_aminan_ added
to the system evlden_ly lodged in the test specimens. Relatively
li=_le contamlna=_on.reaehed the sample tools downstream of _he
system, and an inspection of the system _ublng dr@ not reveal any
slgnlf_icant quantities of contaminant adhering to the tubing
walls,
A detailed description of th_ ohservatlons made for each
component on final disassembly follows, and is in sequence with
the com_._o.r_gjllA.,photographs.
Pressure Re_ulator ,(75M08831-I) - The interior of the
regulator was completely filled with contaminant which appeared
to be primarily teflon particles rather than roa_ dust. The en-
velope shown in Figure VII%-12 contai_s the contaminant which
dropped our of the component upon disassembly. The filter screen
appeared tp be completely clogged with large te_lon particles.
The poppet..,spool, and inlet screen are fully, coated with contami-
nant (Figure VIII-13),
i Bo_h the knlet and outlet fittings contained large amountsof contamins.t£on_ trapped in the lube on the end of the fitting
(Figure VI%1-14), T.hecondition shown in the figure was also ob-
' served on many of the other components. No indication of wear
'_ on the O-rlngs or sliding surfaces and no erosion or wear on the
., poppet seat were observed.
/ Two-Way Solenoid Valve (75}408824-1) - The filter screen
• on the inlet fitting was pushed out of the flow path and the
screen on the outlet fitting was gone (Figure Vlil-17). The
screen was later found in the i/4-inch tubing downstream of in-
jector #2. Th_ valve was heavily loaded with contaminant. A
great quantity of particles were trapped in the lube on the spool.
The poppet seat and all software were in good condition.
. --.
K.-- , .......
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tamination was trapped in this valve as compared to the oth[,r
components. Both the inlet and outlet ports were relatively
clean. The flow path into the "cylinder por_" makes a 90-dog
b_nd prior to en_,rin_ the cnmponent. The bulkhead at this point
was badly eroded indlca_in_ impin_mm_:nt on the 90=dog surface.
: Very f_.wparticles were, obs_,Jwud on the spool but two ve_'tlcal
scratches were observed on _meh side of the spool at 180 dog (Fig,,
ure VIIi-20). The matching surface on uh_ valve was not scratched.
No further d_gradat_on was observed on the,poppet, software,, O-
rln)_,s,or sliding surfaces.
Pressure llandload_r (75MO8829_- 'fho _nlct por_ was rc,la-
tively clean. Dark colored parklcltm (road dusL an¢l re_l iron
ox£do) were observed in the outh,t port. The main s_,a_ ,_uallng
surface on the poppet stem was badly eroded (Figure VIII-23 and
VIII-24), It is concluded that the eroded seat was caused by
particle £mplngemunt and is the cause of the leakage past the
maLn seat. Erosion on =his val_e was greater than _hat observed
on the initial failure of this handloader. Many particles were
trapped in the lube on the retaining spool and sensing piston
(Figure VIII-25). No galled or worn surfaces were evident. The
O-rlngs and software looked good. There was a considerable amount
of contaminant trapped in the valve body.
Th=ee-Wav Solenoid Valve _75MO9.285.-I_S/N 280) - Contami-
na=ion was observed in all ports. A solid film of ,Just particles
was trapped in lube around the outside diameter of the spool
(Figure VIII-28). Particles were entrapped in the heavily lubri-
cated poppet stem. Although this valve did not leak, a fine ring
'_ of erosion was found on the poppet seat due _o particle impinge-
mont. Figure VIII-31 shows the contamination and eroded poppet
i seat on valve serial number 281, which is similar to that observed
on valve serial number 280. The O-rings and seats did not show
any evidence of wear or failure.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (75MO9285-I _ S/N 281) ,- Many par-
ticles, observed on the normally closed inlet port, appear to be
road dust; not as many particles were found in the other two ports.
The valve was heavily lubricated and particles were trapped in the
lubricant, Many large teflon particles were trapped in the lube
• on the poppet stem (Figure VIII-31). The fine line of erosion on
the poppet seat %_as caused by particle impingement, although this
valve did not leak (Figure VIII-31). No galllng, wear, or degra-
dation of software was observed.
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Two_-Way_Sole_n_old_Va._ive-(7_5MO8,?_ - The Inle_ fitting,
inlet port and outlet port were relatively clean. Many road dust
particles wore _rapped in the lubricant on the poppet stem and
spool piece. No wearing surfaces or degrqda_ion of softwar[, was
: evident:,
Pp.eumatlc Cyllnder _75M09014_ - The rntra_t side of the
cup seal was full of lubricant and par_i¢len, A rla4_ of ].ubri-
cant a_d partlcl_s existed on the barrel at _h_ en_lof tra-vol on
the _,_r.a4_tstroke, Lubricant a_d--ga.gtlcloswere observed on the
cyllndor head on the retract s_de. The extend _ide of the p_ston
was relatively ch_an, although ¢on_a4nlna-_od, N¢ scoring, ga|l|n_;,
, or wear wan vi_alble in the.barrel. %he brass piston rln_- showvd
normal and even wear, qgho cup seals wore not damaged,
/
k--
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C, HYDRAIILI_ gONTAMINATION TESTS
Tim Insting effort: wss started on 4 April 1969 _nd was com-
pl_-'t-¢_d on II July 1969. The hydraulic tost_ wo_. po.rformod at tile
Mar_in Marietta llydratlllt:_Laboratory at Denver, Colorado.
The, functional char_ct.rinties of nine aomponants dotarM.nt:d
to lm crit-leal I.oaontrnl arm ope_atlon w_a a_tablishad I_y fune-
{Joll¢]]. LOS[. The sp_,clm_.,na wert_ than a_ombl-_4 into all op_rLltlOll-
a] f|ysl:_ull, and operat(_d tllrough 1500 cycla_ usl.ng dog£borately
e,_n_am.l.llal,M MtLolIo5606 hydraulic o_,1. Tile functional t.(.,sls weft,
r_,l,._Jl_,d t.o t,l_tl.lblt.h any functl, onal dogra(hil'ton, lind 1ht, specl.-
m,_n_:_w_,ro dtsus_embled for inspection.
8¢,v.ral O-r_np l_l, lures occurred during system chucko.! and
also during the contamination Le_.t.s. None of these fal.lltres ca|_
be atl:rtbuted to contamination. _t is recommended that consider-
atJon be given to Improving O-ring dasign, such us O-ring diameter
clearances_ groove ,,:ross-sectional areas, and a44embly design, to
those test components that displayed O-rlng anomallus during tlle
system contamination test.
During disassembly and inspection, contamination was found in
every section of tube, fitting, and test component, particularly
where hydraulic fluid residue was not completely drained from tile
• component. This inspection showed that the injected contaminants
were well distributed throughout tllesystem.
Function tests were conducted on each component in order to
accurately evaluate individual performance before and after the
systems test. The test components operational characterlstlcs_
between the initial and final functional tests,._for all practical
purposes are the same. There was very little, if any, degradation
in performance. It is therefore concluded that the servlce arm
hydraulic components will function reliably at the contamination
levels used in these test_.
I. Ob,]ectives
The purposes of the hydraulics tests were to:
';" 1) Test selected control arm components in a typical flow
system. The test specimens have been selected as be-
ing more susceptible to contamination;
00000003-TSA] 0
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2) Dumon_trnte thn rullnhillty of the test npoelmenn _t
an increased level of contamination by subjecting them I
to 1500 operatlol_i cycles; 4
3) Functlm_al to_t each te_t _peclmen before _nd _ft_r
tlm 150o op_r_tlon_._ uycl_n, in order to dotarm/n_
componmlt dogr_d_tj,on;
4) Ma/_t_in cloan]lnt_ of the to_t f],tlid Nt p,_pro.nvr_bed
1.V_l ;
5) Di_an_omhlq _nd 1.napoct the tuHt _poc_mens fo].low_.ng
the t:_,st, I:o dote, rmJ.ne t:hu _ffw:t nf t:_st f.JuJ.d con,.
t_lmi, na t:J,on,
2. Test Gomponent_
The test specimens_ listed £n the tabulate-on, _u_ge p_oeured
to the vencLor part number which corresponds to the alm£_a.r NASA
service arm specification. ,The test specimens were procured com-
mercial clean.
quantity Test NASA
To Be Sr ec_mel_ Equiva lel_t
'l'es[ud Number_ Manufauture_: Part Number Part Number Nam___.ee
2 6 James Pm_d Clark 277-TI-BTT 75M05365-4 Ch_ck valve
1 4 Pathos Manufac- 3HIX3&UI01/2ABR 75_ Cylinder
l; turin;2 Company
I
2 3 American Bosch A_G300281 75M0_814-I Aceumula tot
2 5 Marotta Valve 806097-1 75M08823-I Solenoid valve
• 1 7 Msrotta Valve 219004-J151 75M08830 Regulatori.
1 8 Martin _arletta None --- 0.020 Orifice
3, Test Equipment
a, Ins trumenta ties
The test system schematic, Figure VIII-36, shows the in-
strumentation functions used du=ing the test, The instrumentation
accuracies are listed in Table VILLI-9.
u
i i| ii
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b. Test Fixture
The test fixture schematic used for systems testing is ]
Shown in Figure V]_II-36. The test installation was _lushed w£th
MIL-H-5606 hydraulic fluid _o thac [eve] shown in Table VIII-]O.
Table V[I%-ll shows the system clesn]._.ne_;,level _fter the compo-
nents we.re installed. The test f! .td (.4_I_f_-5606p_,-_,:,r, lir o_]_.
was prefiltered to 3 microns absolute prlo, to int_oduclng the
fluid into the test system. The e]eanl.lne_,slevel of the prefi]-
t_red fluid is showh in Table VILI-12. The cle=nllneas data-below
was obtained by means of a HIAC aatol,matieparticle cotnte=. Photo-
graphs of the system test installation appear as Fig,-_s V_II-37,
VIII-38, and VIII-39.
Table VIII-10 HIAC Particle Counter Data, Tust System
prior _--C_mponent Instal.late[on
• Particl.e
;Range First Next Next Next Next
(microns) i00-ml. I00 ml i00 mL. Leo ml_ I00 ml
,,tm
5 to 15 133 1.16 103 79 55
15 to o5 5 3 i I. 4
hM ,,,
125 to 50 0 0 0 0 0
50 to i00 0 0 0 0 0
i I00 + I 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-II HIAC Parti=le Counter Data, Test System
_: afte= Component Insta/la2_ion
L"
" ParticlB
i Range F_rs t Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
ii
5 to 15 283 143 144 95 81
15 to 25 I 2 I 0 2
25 to 50 i 1 0 0 0
50 to I00 0 0 0 O 0
m
100 + 0 O 0 0 0
k_ i i | , ,i ,, ......
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Table VIII-12 HIAC Particle Counter Data, Prefiltered
Test Fluid
J ...........
Particle
Rnn_,e First Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml 100 ml
5 to 15 14 3 7 3 4
]5 re 25 2 1 I 0 0
25 to 50 0 0 0 0 0
a
50 to 100 0 0 0 0 0
ii
10o + 0 0 0 0 0
c. Colltamil]allt
The contaminant used was a composite mixture of ground
teflon particles, A.C. coarse road dust, red iron oxide, and cot-
ton--lintner fibers.. The composite level is shown in Table VIII-13.
The total quantity of contamination particles was grad-
ually added to the system to obtain equal disperse] throughout the
system.
Table VIII-13 Hydraulic Contamination Test Levels
S£ze Range
6 - lOp Ii - 25!, 26 - 50_ 51 - i00_ I00 +
OX60 Teflon
2.0 mg/100 ml oil 22,200 9-,400 2,500 564 108
A.C. '_oarse" Road Dust
0.2 mg/lO0 ml o£I 6,460 3,420 565 67 3
Red Iron Oxide
<0.01 ms/100 ml oil 3,710 0 0 0 0
Cotton Lintner Fibers
<O.l mg/100 ml ell ........ 4000_ maximum
Total Particle Count
2.2 mg/100 ml oil 32,370 12,820 3,065 631 ill + fibers
L
O0000003-TSB02
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_. TesL..Mathod and Pcocedure
a. Receiving and Inspection
Test components wer_ inspected for general conformance.
The component flow ports were visually inspected using 3X masnlf£= .........
cation. No avldonce of contamination was observed. Tost compo-
nents wore not disassembled to perform this inspection. The in-
ternal flow path of tilehydraulic components was flushed with clean
filtered hydraulic fluid. The influent fluid was pref_itered to
3 microns absolute, A sample of e_/luen_fluid free a%l test
components was samp]ed with a lilAC automatic pa=tlcle counter; the
results are shown in Tables VIIL,14 Lhru VIZZ-24. These samples
Were taken to evaluate the cleanilness level of each component as
received from the manufactu _r. There was no attempt to clean the
test components during this flushing nDde.
Table VIII-14 Effluent Particle Count, Hyd=aul£c Accumulator
(75M08814-I, S/N .6K3299)
Particle
Range Eirst Next Next Next Next Next Next• Next
(microns) 100 ml 100 mi 100 ml 100 ml 100 ml 100 ml 1/30 mL 100 ml
bl , r ill
Oil Side of Accumulate:
_,5 to 15 32_196 29,823 28,244 24,663 24,673 24,240 25,163 29,2.77
15 to 25 819 947 715 59& 615 587 &73 538
Ul
25 to 50 116 178 109 76 79 73 45 52
i ill : _:-
50 to I00 3 0 I 0 I, 0 1 I 0iiiii i ii i i ..... 4
I00 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i iiii
Gas Side of Accumulator
5 to 15 13,873 "14,733 14,718 16,387 15,309 14,232 15,36'4 15,471-
15 to 25 83 97 99 117 119 I00 121 120
25 to 50 5 6 ' 9 5 12 14 7
I ii _i i i
. 50 to i00 0 0 0 0 I i 0 0
i i ill i, Ii "I" ii
• I00 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k I i • ii O0000003-TSB03
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T_ble VIII-15 Effluent Particle Couilt,P_ydrauli¢ Accumulator
(75M08814-I, _/N 6K3300)
: ...... r
Particle
RanIde First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) 100 ml I00 ml. 100 ml 100 ml 100 ml I00 ml I00 ml KQ0 ml
..... 0i1 Side of Aceumulata_
i I ,r
,5 tO 15 22,824 20,023 27,913 _38,636 21,755 21,642 21,897 ,19'330
15 to 25 484 355 539 702 294 353 352 323
25 to 50 38 43 60 94 43 37 28 30
50 to 100 ] 1 0 1 4 0 0 1
f l •
I00 + 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas _ide of Accumulator
5 to 15 38,389 ,26,983 ,24_601 ,31,946 30,968 24,992 ,,,24,3'9725,317i
15 to 25 341. 215 177 280 332 199 171 210
r i i
25 to 50 47 19 22 31 52 37 21 20
i ........... l
50 to I00 I 1 0 0 I0 0 0 0
i ml b i m m v |
I00 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-16 Effluent Partlcle Count, Hydraulic Cylindbr ....
(75M06506-7)
PaZticle
_ange First Next Next Next Next Next Next Last
(microns) I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 mL 100 ml 53 ml_
.......... Cylincer Extend Mode
5 tO 15 84,004 60,414 65,333 69,318 88,664 126,336,,,155,922, _03,536
.15tO 25 2,519 1,724 . 1,950 2,069 3,080 .4"926 7,116 14,268
I 25 to 50 2,007 242 261 305 425 541 718 . 1,362
50 to I00 3 4 3 4 6 _3 8 13
! r ii
i00 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cylinder Retract Mode
, 5 tO 15 81,531% 7'4,930 69,401 _75,889 76,592 72,605 77,284
._.5.tO25 1,747 1,078, i_D94 1,399 1,192 9&7 1,064i i hJ i
25 to 50 105 151 113 183 169 118 133
i r ,i
50 to I00 12 4 1 1 4 6 4
i |
100 + 0 0 o 0 0 0 0
I.
*Data corrected to I00 ml sample,
%This was a 500 ml sample and was corrected to I00 ml.
'- " O0000003-TSB04
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Table VIII-17 Effluent Particle Count, Hydraulic
Cylinder (75M06506-7), Initial
Fluid Sample
Milli_Dore Sam]le Visual Count
,nu . I r ! ...........
_artlel_-.
Range
(m_ons) Re ira ct Retract Extend
5 _o 15 13,400" 9,750* 14,300.
an
15 to 25 400* 150. 318"
25 to 5_ 200* 159' I12_
e. ii
50 to I00 ii 4 9
| I II
lO0 + II 3 4
m
Tota% Filterable
Solids 0.9 mg/100 ml. 0.9 mg/l.00 ml 0.9 m_/100 ml
*-Data based upon statistical count of two squares.
Table VIII-18 Cylinder Influent Particle Count,
Hydraulic Bench Oil Sample
Particle ..... '' sample Number
L:La._g,_ .......
(microns) I.....N + I N + 2 N+ 3 N + 4. I%+-5 N + 6
ir
5 to 15 1818 129 70 83 76 40 52
,,- , h., • ,, .. , - ,,,|l,,,,
15.to 25 6 2 i 0 0 0 0
_.
25 to 50 2 i 0 0 0 0 0
50 to I00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i00 + O O 0 0 0 0 0
I ....
i _ i i
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Table VIII-t9 Eff]uent Particle Count, Two-Way Solenoid Valve
(75HOB823-1, S/N 398)
HIAC Part£cle Countar Data
Particle i
Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(mlerons) 100 ml ]00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml
5 to 15 48,780 29,830 16,775 8,06B 3,877 2_f97 1,397 1,071 B67
15 tO 25 21 iB 32 8 12 8 4 19
25 to 50 IO 3 _ 0 o 2 0 o i-
50 to lOQ l 0 0 0 0 0 l 43 0
,! - " ' L i
1oo+ o o o o o 0 0 o o
.... i,, ,,,
Table VIII-R0 Effluent Partlele Count, Two-Way Solenoid Valvo
(7.5H08823-I, S/N 399)
ttiAg Particle gounter bata
rl ii .....
F_rtlclc
iRcnge Firs t Next Next Next Next Next Next Next Next• (microns) 100 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml 100 ml 100 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 mL.
i a [.......3,739 I" i,087 8165 t:o 15 18_0v6 6,409 4,668 4,236 3,227 2,803 I,,
:15 to 25 243 llZ 41 15. l_J 13 9 21 I0
25 to 50 50 23 3 3 3 5 3 8 2
m
50 to 10o 3 , 1 1 1 0 o o l, o ,, 0
lOO + o 0 o o 0 o 0 1 0
_able VZll-21--Ef£1uent 9actlcle Ceunt, Gheck Valve
(751'K)5365-t_, $/N 9021312)
HIAC Particle Counter Da_¢
P_ttiele 1Range First ._Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml i ;_0 ml IOO ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
5 to 15 '20,616 39,816 51,894 52,073 66,050 102_069 102,709 71,162
15 to 25 147 22 8 6' 5 3 3 4
• . i w |, i'
25 to 50 36 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
-, i _, f f 1. i|
' 50 to I00 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-- j i i,,, H . , I
•I00 + 0 0 0 0 ... 0 0 0 [, 0
,' Parti_le
' : Range Next Next Next Next Neat Next Next Next
: (micron,s) I00 ml IO0 ml I00 ml IOO ml I00 ml i00 ral 100 ml i00 ml
5 tO 15 49,304 27_859 12,999 5,129 2,037 955 583 252
15 to 25 3 2 1 1 3 1 6 1
.H
25 to 50 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
i ii i J .. i i
50 to i00 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
J, i i i l ii I
I00 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
' 00000003--I'SB06
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Table VI11-22 E£flueut Partlc]e Count p Check Valve,
(75MO5365-4, fi/N9021313)
HIAC Pa_tlcl_ Counter Data
,,, ,....................... - _......
Range FI_ Ne_L Next N_x_ N_xL Next Next Next
(mlerons) 100 ml IOO ml lO0 m] i00 ml I00 m! I00 ml lO0 nll i00 ml
5 to 15 4,147 1,503 1,300 ],909 12,342 30,888 9'_,609 19,702
l j _ l [
15 to 25 90 20 7 6 2 4 6 5
....... -J,, _._ ......... 4:. [
25 to 50 20 0 2 2 2 0 I 0
[ l l_l l I i
50 to i00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i _ I J ,11
i00 + ....... 0 0 i.. I0 0 O , O I 0
"-Particle i' ' '"
Range Negt Nox_ Next Nc,xt Next iNext Nex_ Next
(mleron.) ,I00 ml L00 ml I00 ml I00 ml ICe ml i.IU0 ml I00 ml I00 mlJi
5 LO 15 9,523 3,415 1,136 441 244 152 135 122
uL _..i l II
15 to 25 3 2 ] 4 3 2 1 O
i. I , ', , ,,,---, i.
25 to 50 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
.,i
50 to I00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N ,,
lO0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O
Table V_ZI_3 E£fIuent Particle Gount. Check Valve (751_O5365-4)
Milllpo_e Fi%ter.Visual Couat
_Eartlcle ($/N 9021312) Partlcle (S/N.9021313)
Range Number of "Kange Number of
(microns) Particles per 100 ml_. (mlc=ons) Eartlcles per I00 ml*
......... L l
5 to 15 174 . 0 to 50 Too numerous to count
,,i, HI
L5 to 25 28 -50 to I00 5
,i ,
25 to 50 6 100 + 2
'll
50 to 1.00 1.5
I00 + 0
Total Filterable
S_li_s 0.3 ,tg 0.4 mg
: W200 ml sample taken# data corrected to I00 ml.
Table VIZY,_4 Effluent Particle Count, Hydraulic Pressure
Regulator (751408830-2)
HIAC Particle Counter Data
"" Particle
Range _irst Next Next Next Next Next Next
! ', (mlcnona) 100 ml I00 ml I00 ml IO0 ml 100 ml 100 ml I00 ml
.......5 to 15 39,216 17,744 14,833 4..,412 2,501 ij903 ,...1,847
15 to 25 273 64 42 56 17 6 8
25 to 50 4B 17 I0 4 3 0 0
i ml
50 to I00 6 1 0 1 0 0 0
I00 + 1 1 2 0 0 1 0
O0000003-TSB07
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b, Functional Test Method and Procedure
An initial functlo_a] b_nch test w_s performed on each
component to nnsura its Intagrlty and to establish a baseline per_
formance criterin prior to the system contamination test, The
component functional pertorma_cc data wore used an crlt_rla _o
evaluate componen_ degradatJon during _y_tem contamination tests,
The test fluid was MIL-H-56(J6B hydraulic ell prcfi]torod to 3 mi-
crons absolute. Functional tests were performed on the test com-
ponents using the t_st system identified in each NASA component
speci float ion,
The a_'cumulaLors w_:re tested for internal and t_xternal
leakage for a period of five ndnutes with 4500 pslg on one side
of t.he piston nnd zero pslg on tht_ other.
The hyaraulic cylinder was tested for internal nnd _xter-
nal leakage, and breakaway pressure at 4500 pslg; leakage was mon-
igored for 5 minutes at each condition.
The two-way solenoid valve was tested _or internal and ex-
ternal leakage and..for response time.
The cheek valves were tested for internal leakage, crack-
ing, and reseat pressures.
. The regulator was tested at an inlet pressure of 3000 psig
for internal and external leakage, for ability to regulate pres-
sure at a given setting, and for capability of venting downstream
pressure in excess of the set pressure.
The flow rate of the orifice (0.20 in.) was calibrated at
an inlet pressure of 3000 _+25 psig.
c. System Test Method and Procedure
The nine test specimens were combined with a minimum of
additional components to form the operating system shown schemati-
: cally in Figure VIII-36.
The hydraulic test system was pressurized to 3000 psig
"_ using the fluid power of the hydraulic power supply. Flow to the
test system was controlled by a hydraulic serve-selector valve.
: The following sequence of events describes a half cycle of the
contamination test.
K-- i ii , • = ,
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High pressure fluid flow was supplied to the t_st system
by the hydraulic power unit supply. A low frequency functlonM
generator AupFlied an amplitude and frequency signal to the elec-
trical switching console. An input signal w_a emitted from the
consol.o to open the _ervo-_elector valve to permit high pressure
flow to _ccumul.ator 31, simultaneously emitting o signal to _hc
solenoid valves, opening vMva 51 meg-closing valve 5_, The flow
from aecumulazar 3: was then passed through solenoid vaIv-e 51. and
to the piston side of cylinder 4, Flow f_om the aolenold valve
(5_) passed through test Items 7, g, and 9:__nd combined to Ll_w
through check valve 6e to accumulator 3_. Diaclmrge £1ow from the
accumulator passed through the se_vo-selecto_ valve into the re-
turn ef the hydraulic power unit supply. The reverse sequence of
events cempleted a full test cycle. The test system was operated
through 1500 full test cycles.
Component internal leakage checks were performed every
300 cycles. System effluent was sampled every 100 cycles through
the nlAC atttomatlc particle _ounter. Millipore samples were also
t_ken at.lntervals of 300 cycles, _Qe Table. Vlll-25 for a summary
of test operations during the 1500 cycles,
Table VIII-25 Sgquene e of 0p_ratlon
Leak Check
Cycle, Number HIA_ ._MilliDore after Lust Cycle
0 X
1 X
i00 X X_....... X
:" 200 X
300 X---- X X ...............
400 X
500 X
600 X X X
700 X
800 X
900 X X--- X
I000 X
Ii00 X
1200 X X X
1300 X
1400 X
1500 • X II X X
k| , | i i • i
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d, Final Inspection Test M_thod and Procedure
Fo|]c_wlng _:ompletlon of the syst_,m _nd funct_onnl tests,
each test flpecilnullwas _:orL_fully disa_s_mb]_.d for inspect'tie.. The
cnmpononl pnrls v.,t,r,_ Ilmpoctod for evidence of abraH:lon, col]tanl|-
notion, lubriL'_int dvponit:_, ,_tc'and phouogroph_ w_ro taken of sig-
nifi_l_nl J.t_un_ (Fig, VIII-40 tl1_n VIII-64),
tl. In'It_J:.0.!._'_.n_llon_!_l_.Tp_l:. Ret_ulttl and Dlfl_'ufl_ion
',lh_l daLo 1_,°_}IIIthq Initial fLll1(JLlO_l/)l lofl_S _-ll_-, p1?o_It,11_t_d
]_ 'J'ob1_,_4 VIII-'2(_ thrnu_;b Vlll_31, The olf]uol_l porl]cl_, c,om_t,a
Ioi: _,o_h uop_pollt,t|l ol'u 14hewn ,In Ioi lu_l VIII-14 lln'_mgl_ V[11o24
The Internal ,_,ako_,u of uceumulator B/N 6K3300, _,s tuslt, d
prior to S)'st_tl| Lust, was _._ll,oSL _WO Lit.us t'hu spu¢ift._:aliol_ or,l-
turin. Accumulul, or S/N 61¢_299 _xbibitud zero leakage. Th_ crack-
Ing pressure of regulator 75M08830 was 65 to 70 psig abow; speel-
ficalion in all cask,s. Additional tests v'eru condm, tud when II
was noticed that the vent cracking _nd reseat prossurus wum, af-
fected by Lhu inlet pressure to the regulator. The test data Jar
n]] remaining components was well within specification. Thu al,ovo
anomalies dld not affect the test program since the functional
tests were conducted only to ens'.:re basic component operation and
to obtain baseline performan,?- t_ for comparison aftt,r the con-
tamina tIon tests.
The effluent particle counts, shown in Tables VIII-14
through VIII-24, are comparable to Levels 7 and 8 of NAS 1638.
The variety of components represented may provide some indication
of a commercial clean condition, since all of the components were
procured in a commercial clean condition. The influent background
particle count of the hydraulic oil was generally below 25 parti-
cles in the 5 to lO-micron range, with no particles above 15 mi-
crons .
k_
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'l'al_lt. VIi[-26 F_ncti.o_al Tu._t Data, HydrauLic A_cumulato_
Functional To_t Data
S/N 6K]2g_) S/N fiK3]O0
T{'8[ ]_,UqJl|[l-'lll(JllL Illlt].a] _'¢ l"i-n_]* -_l[l-a-1 _);- Fin. l¢_
l,ll¢'rnol ],_:aka_;_, 1{i Drops put () ' O 1.2 0.36
Air to cHI S_rl_, 15 M_nutu_
Mil ){ J Imll.
_nto,_nal Leakage, 10 Drop_ par 0 6.1 %_2 -0
Oil _o AI_ S'Ldc_ L5 Mhlut_,n
MUXJ li)illl}
' -- L _' = n N
l,:zl_,rnal L_,akayu Buhhle, Q'J_;hi 0 0 0 0
pl'l_ lllJ.lllll ¢', i
'l'_hle VIII-27 Functlon_l Test Data, Hydrauli_ILnder
(75M00506- 7)
T_sL Rusul ts
Ma X i H1LHI| ,,11 1" ,1
Tus t AI h_wabl e In£tial .... Fi_la.l
, , , • | I! r
Piston Leakage - Extend 5 co/rain 4 d_ops 5.6 drops
_'Jston Leakage - Retract 5 ce/min 8 drops 6.2 drops
Exterpal Barrel Leakage O 0 0
m, i,I i _,, ,
Rod Fnd Exteralal Leakage I drop./25 0 0
operating
cycles
Break_way Pressure 60 7 4.5
Extend, psig
Bre,_Kaway Pressure 60 6 3,5
Rutract_ ps_g
O0000003-TS B11
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Table VIII-2B Function_l T_st Data, Pr_oumati¢ Two-Way
Solenoid Valve (75M08823-I, 8/N 398) I
I
Spou_ f_cation
TL_nl (;ril u_:i _ Initial Final
E×ternal L_ak_go Solenoid -Bul_bi_ _ight No Laakags No L_akag_
E nf._rg:l ;;t,d
Inl,.,rn;_l Luokngu Sol_,noid ', _.:_'/I,,ln M;_:H.I,.n No Leakage 3 dr0p_/mJn
Do =o norgizod
J,i . • ........................... _..... i
E×turna:l l,unk;Ige Solt, noid Bul+l_lc Tl, ght No Leakage No Loakage
]';n_.,rgi z.ud
i , i L .
Iuturn_l. Loal<nge Solenoid 5 cc/m._n Maximum No Loaka-g 3 drops/rain
Dc -(mor_;iz_d
IIll I [
RusponoTime 75,,,s(:cMaximumOpenlng 1.91 4.70
Cycle No. ]. 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.80 4.32
i, l
Response Time. 75 ms_c Maximum Opening 2.04 3.90
Cycle No. 2 75 msec Maximum Closing 1.91 3.78
Rcspons,: Time 75 msuc Moximum Opening 2.49 3.93
! Cycle No. 3 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.17 3.93
Response Time 75 msec Maximum Opening 2.02 4.32
Cycle No. 4 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.60 4.06
.,,, , ,|
Response Time 75 msec Maximum Opening 2.23 4.44
Cycle No, 5 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.42 3.81
,,, .,
.:: Ac tuation-Deac tuation
Voltage 8 to 18 vdc Pu11-1n 17.4 18.60
Cycle No. I 1 to 17 vdc Drop-Out 2.9 2.0
# .
L .........
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Table 91I_I-29 Functional Test Data, Pneumatic Tw_-Way
Solenoid ValWa-_(75M08823-1, _/N 399)
Test- Rosults
Specification - _ .....
Test Criteria _nitial Final
: External Leakage Solenoid Bubble Tight No Leakage No Leakag,e
Energized
InLernal.Leakage Solenoid 5 ec/mLn Maximum No Leakage L_op/ml)]
De-energized [, ,.
External Leakage Solenoid Bubble Tight No Imaka_e No Leakage
Energized
: Inte=na_Leakase Solenoid- 5 cc/min Maximum No Leakage I droRZ_Ltn
De-energized | ,,,, m
Response Time 75 msec Maximum-Opening _.98. 3.77
Cycle No, I 75 msec Maxlmum Closing 2.84 3.89
Response Time 75-msec Maximum Opening L.9_4........... 3.89
Cycle No. 2 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.79 3.76
:: Response Time 75 msec Maximum Opening 2.09 3.68
......, ,.
Cycle No. 3 75 msec Maximum Closing 2.84 3.8]
Response _ime 75 msec Maximum Opening 1.88 3.55
C_cLe No. 4 75 msec Maximum Closing 3.00 4.06
ResPonse _ime 75 mset Maximum Opening 1.97 3.82__
! [ Cycle No. 5 75 msee Maximum Closing 2.98 4.08
i i ,, , , r, ,.
L Actuation-Deactuation 8 to 18 vdc Pull-In 16.8 14.']
Vol rage
Cycle No. I I to 17 vde Drop-Out 2.8 1.90
J
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Table Vlll-30 Functional Test Data, Hydraulic Check Valve
(75M05365-4)
Test Data
S/N 9021312 S/N 902131']
Requirement ]_nitial Final Initial Final
Test (psig) (psig) (psig) (pslg) (psig)
Intornal 1,eakage Zero Leakage 0 0 0 0
at 4500
Cracking Pres- 0.5 to 1.0 0.85 0.55 0.75 0.80
suro
Reseat Pressure 0.5 to 1.0 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.75
Table VIII-31 Functional Test Data, Hydraulic Pressure Regulator
(75M08830-2)
Test Results
Step Inlet Requirement
No. Pressure Test (psig) Initial (psig) Final (psig)
A-I 3000 Lookup Pressure 2900 i 50 psig 2840 2840
C-I 3000 Lockup Pressure 2750 i 50 psig 2750 2760
C-2 3000 Cracking Pressure 2810 Maximum 2875 280_
C-3 3000 Reseat Pressure 2690 Minimum 2850 2755
C-4 3000 Vent Leakage Bubble Tight Zero Leakage Zero Leakage
_,. C-5 3000 External Leakage Bubble Tight Zero Leakage Zero Leakage
F-I 3000 Lockup Pressure 500 500 500
. F-2 3000 Cracking Pressure 550 Maximum 615 520
F-3 3000 Reseat Pressure 475 Minimum 585 490
F-4 2750 Lockup Pressure 500 500 500
F-5 2750 Cracking Pressure 550 Maximum 620 515
F-6 2750 Reseat Pressure 475 Minimum 585 505
F-7 3000 Lookup Pressure 150 150 150
F-8 3000 Cracking Pressure -- 320 165
F-9 3000 Reseat Pressure -- 290 140
,, m_.
F-IO 2750 Lockup Pressure 150 150 150
F-II 2750 Cracking Pressure -- 340 i60
F-12 2750 Reseat Pressure -- 310 !4_
JL
_ G-I 4500 Internal Leakage Bubble Tight Zero Leakage Zero Leak_,_e
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The ._y,_l_:.l c]uan]/ness particle Cmlnt d_ta appqar in Tablfl_
VIII. +,,-' 11,_ ,_:.li VIl]++.4_. 'l.h<_.r_':_ults of thu i+nterim le+lkage test_
;ir_. shc,wr, 1_ T.,I,I,+ Vl.ll_4tJ.
........ " ........... C+:.._L?..... .'.2._._L'I','St .',v_l o..,1+I:'AIj!+('j [oilal ,lu ¢1,, lit _e:it " After tilling the
l,+'Jl 5',+,+;tt'lllwill< hydr_lltlj<' i?l+LiJd, _lld priulc to Collt_llllilc)_llll + llljec _
l.Jt+ll_ _+.'UI+F_ll +,l++'l','ltJon_l ll_++b].t!,l_ W_:+ L+ll+'+Itliltur_d_a all _ re-
.q_d.l I.hc syst,m_ teat.in_, was delayed until the pl:oblem++ could be
solved. Tho problem area++ were prima_+tly heat huiIdup, a.i_+ en-
tr+lJ IIIlIOllt + aim co, rap,orient O-rt ng fat lures.
During system cheekm_t tests, it was found that the energy
intr_Mucod tt_ opur++te the system was heating up the hydraulic oil
st,l,st:_ntially, and _cu packs did not provide enough heat sink to
dt.,;Sfl,ate the h_,at. To solve the problem it: was necessary to build
cooling cofls into the test system and i,m+m:se the coils in +--dry
ice/alcohol bath. This method stabilized the system temperature
at _pproxlmately 120 to 150°F. Air jets were used to cool the
solenoids on thu two-way valves.
Air _ntrainment was a problem_ since the RIAC automatic
particle counter will not differentiate between contaminant parti-
cles and air bubbles, and will readily coune all air bubbles that
pass the sensor. Air bleeds were installed at the high points of
the system but this did not solve the problem completely. By cy-
; cling of the test system, in conjunction with the use of the air
: bleeds, it was possib].e to eliminate the majority of the entrained
air in the system fluid. In addition to the high point bleeds_
!i, an accumulator (Fig. VIII-38) was installed in the system upstream
of the automatic counter. HydraulLc oil from the system was ad,+
i mitted to the accumulator, and then the flow from the accumulatorwas directed to the counter. The purpose of ti,eaccumulator was
i" to al]nw the entrained air to rise to the top of the accumulator,
,. thus tt_inimLzingair entrainment in the first I000 ml of the sample.
i:
The air entrainment problem was not in evidence when per-
i_ looming the initial component effluent particle counts. Effluent
.: counts were performed with an o_en _ system rather than the
_. clo_ed loop used in the systems contamination test.
.: Before starting the contamination tests and prior to in-
troducing contaminant, 200 cycles were run on the test system in
checking out the system operation, At 195 cycles_ the pressure
handloader (75M08830) started leaklng at the top of the handloader.
00000003-TSC03
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The handloader, was disassembled and it was found that the magn
piston O-ring (P/N J2OOAl6) was rolled over and chewed up on the
inside diameter. The ad_pter pilot for this O-ring has a vary
sharp 90 deg edge with no chamfer. The manufacturer of thls'hand-
loader stated that similar failures h_ve been experienced _n Lho
assembly of this part, The fo/lure analysis concLuged that _h_
O-ring failure was initiated upon assembly, F_guro VIl_-43 shows
the _in piston O-rlng failure. The light coldzred particles on
the piston in Figure VIII-44 are lubricant,
The poppet storeO-rlng aLso fa_led at 195 cycles. This
failure and subsequent failuros were a result of excessive O-ring
groove width (Fig. VIII-45).
The handloader (75M08830) was =epalred and reinstalled in
the test system.
Test System Con_onent DiscrspancX - The pressure handload_
er (75M08830) le_d through the top Qf the Imndle at 935, _I.L3,
and 1326 cycles. In each of these failures the-poppe_ stem O-rkn_
(P/N J200A2) was chewed up (Fig. VIII-45). New O-rlngs were in-
stalled after each failure and prlor to continuing the test. The
O-rlng failures are attributed to = =oiling and splra/ing actlon
in the O-ring groove with subsequent nibbling on the inside and
outside diameters. The failure analysis concluded that th_se O-
ring failures were not due to contamination, but to ez.cesslve Q-
ring groove width which permitted the O-ring t_ raiL-and sp_K_l.
The O-ring (J20016A), in.the main _istoB of the handload'er,
had two failures: (I) Just prlo= to tes_, and (2)after 1326 cy-
cles (Fig. Vlll-40).
At 1113 cycles it was observed tha_ the filter screen on
the inlet fitting had been dislodged from the fictlng and.h_d mi-
grated to the retaining spool in the handloader. The screen was
removed tram the component prior to continuing the test.. At 1.326
cycles the fi_ter screen in the outlet fitting was isld back paral-
lel to the flo_ stream.. This screen was also removed, The filter
screens failed as a _esult of contaminant loading and subsequent
ZIP across the screen, even though the screen is a very coarse
mesh (Fig. VIII-46).
All of the remaining components functioned in a normal ii
manner with no anomalies for the full duration of the system test. I
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Tabl_ VIII-32. HIAC Partlc1_ Counter Data, T_t _:ystem
aftur Checkout (0 Test Cyclu.)
w ............
Partlclo
Range First Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml io0 ml I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml
5 tO 15 28,728 33,347 13,580 7,6_9 6,688
15 tO 25 579 655 353 197 154
25 to 50 60 77 52 37 26
50 _o 100 I I I 0 I
:I00 + 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-33 HIAC ?article Counter Data, i00 Test CyelQs
, . r
Particle
Range Flr_t Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml I00 nfl I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 m]
to 15 ']14,941 114,670 112,663 111_4,78 129,715 112,084 111,833 'ili,II0
:5 to 25 10,484 10,279 10,031 10,002 10,820 10,043 10,063 I0,027
25 to 50 1,041 1,018 " 1,003 1,000 1,088 1,006 1,006 ,,,1,001
50 to I00 105 i01 i01 I00 III I00 100 I00
r
100 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-34 HIAC Particle Counter Data, 200 Test Cycles
"Particle ......
Range Ylrst Next Next Next Next NeXt Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml 100 ml
um,
,,,5 to 15 ,216,62'8 ,,201,454 176,419 163,576 168,911 14_,177 123,234 ,121,724 120,039'
15 to 25 14,061 . 13,495 12,371 12,224 12,059 1,732 9,327 9,109 8,720
=, ,,, , ,,,
25 to 50 1,766 1,670 1,388 1,422 1,390 1,186 1,007 961 970
'" 50 to 100 47 53 57 41 57 34 23 22 23
,=,,
100 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-35 lilAC Particle Counter Data, 300 Test Cycles
_artiele
Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) iO0 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml I00 ml IO0 ml I00 ml
5 to 15 181,467 151,585 121,571 116,556 185,166 :136,804 i135,449 135/139 139,450
.., ,., ,H
15 to 25 15,656 1.3,734 11,314 1,896 6,340 2,507 2,250 2,241 2,582
25 to 50 1,788 1,519 1,178 1,105 781 272 227 250 252
,=,. ,,
50 to iO0 152 133 , 107 104 38 9 i0 9 1410o+ o i o o 1" o o o o,, i , H i
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Table VIII-36 }IIAC Particle COunter Data, 400 Test Cycles
Particle
Range First NexL NoxL Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml 100 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml IO0 ml i00 'I I00 mlir !
5 to 15 184,036 195,988 165,303 164,976 146,524 144,627 142,370 141.582
15 to 25 11,626 14,32] 13,000 IZ,737 11,699 11,401 II,144L_ 11,203
25 to 50 1,964 1,351 1,939 1,930 1,655 1,703 1,602 1,621
50 tO 100 153 161 188 90 176 183 173 . 166
I00 + 2 5 5 I 2 I 2 0 2
Table VIII-37 lilAC Particle Counter Data, 500 Test Cycles
Particle
Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml i00 ml
5 to 15 '"183,020 "i82,065 172,4gl 141,580 112,815 112,610 111,855 "114,318
15 to 25 11,571 14,812 15,337 12,989 10,339 i0_092 10,132 10,013
25 to 50 1,174 1,591 1,652 1,336 1,144 1,031 1,000 1,000
50 to i00 109 119 121 106 102 I00 i00 i00
100 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T=b/e VIIZ-38 HIAC Particle Counter Dat_t, 600 Test Cycles
r
Particle
• Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(mlcrons) I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml IO0 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
5 to 15 197,573 178,170 173,178 141,040 112,406 111,304 II_,442 112,086
! 15 to 25 17,063 16,199 16,045 13,249 10,422 10_!A6-- 10,223 10,203
25 to 50 1,898 1,/13 1,670 1,325 I_044 1,013 1,017 1,021
50 to I00 131 128 124 II0 102 I00 I00 I00
I00 .F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-39 HIAC Particle Counter Data, 700 Test Cycles
,:.. Particle
Range First Next N_xt Next Next Next Nex£ Next
(microns) lOO ml I00 ml i00 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
5 to 15 151,212 '153,024 155,587 151,682 148,945 149,625 150,363 '151,254
15 tO 25 10,517 11,456 12,194 12,392 12,304 12,440 12,561 12,744
25 tO 50 1,081 1,164 1,175 1,167 1,127 1,154 1,169 1,157
50 to I00 105 104 103 105 i01 102 102 104
100 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table VIIZ-40 HIAC Particle Counter Data, 800 Test Cycles
! I ,I __
Range First Naxt Next Next Nvxt Next Next Naxt
(mlc_on_) I00 ml IOO ml I00 ml I00 ml IO0 ml IOO ml I00 ml i00 ml
,, w _ i q l
5 tO 15 180,308 167,887 168,091 166,531 166,667 166,777 16_,899 165,279
| ,r i
15 to 25 13,538 13,577 13,674 13,856 13_953 14_092 13,97_ 14,062
.- !
1,32025 to 50 1,227 1,258 1,264 1,288 ,,,1'312 , I-,329 1,333 -,
50 to I00 103 105 _03 109 I04 I07 103 102
foe + 0 0 O 0 O 0 0 O
Table VXIZ-4A-.lilACPartlclc Counter Data, 900 Tes_ ¢yc1_s
Particle
Range F_rst Next Next N_Jxt Next Next Next Next
(microns) I00 ml i00 ml 100 ml I00 ml i00 ml _00 ml I00 ml IJ_Oml
.....5 ro 15 69,419 95,140 I00,243 102,458 98,551 .98,084 98,925 99,597
15. t<:)25 11,058 12,130 1,2,846 13,226 13,425 13,718 13,324 13,984
c251 _ I_0
w | w [ |
1,135 1,22L-, 1,322 1,325 1_320 1,366 1,350 1,395
50 to LO0 106 l, 110 , 109 108 ,, 107 107 109 113
I00 + 0 _, 0 0 0 I" 0 0 0 0
¢_bL_VIIZ-42 HIAC Particle Counter Dat¢_ i000 Test Cycles
,, f ..
Parti_le
Range First Next Next Next l%ext- _e_'t N_xt Next..
(m_euons) i"I_0 ml 100 ml I00 ml i00 ml 100 ml I00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
..l_ Co Z_ 8_,8_ 95,_82" )01,769 87_886 85,688 84,661 82,'926 74,538 .
15 to 25 L,322 5,14_ 7_372 6,669 6_408 6,340 6,240 5,_73
,- l,
25 to 50 257 756 992 875 818 76t 767 672
, | ,|
50 to 100 12 58 44 31 30 26 26 19
I00 + 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-43 lilACParticle Counter Data, 1100 Test Cycles
"P_rti_'_e
Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) 100 ml IO0 ml 100 ml i00 ml I00 ml !i00 ml I00 ml 100 ml
H i , r_ i, ,H n ii
5 to 15 tI0,750 91,983 78,050 68,516 61,070 51,329 47_371 44,242
• 15 to 25 6,726 7,579 6_649 5,827 5,325 4,319 3,856 3,587
I | i,
25 to 50 866 1,016 871 717 617 484 506 410
50 to 100 32 23 28 11 t0 16 4 8
100 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r -,,,
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Table VIII-44 lilACPartlclu Counter Data, 1200 Tvst Cycles
Part1¢Ic,
Rallgu First Next NL:xI N_xt Next Next Next Next
(mhn:o..) ]00 1.1 tO()m] ]00 ml 100 ml 100 ml i00 ml I00 ml I00 ml
t7o _]
15 to 2'_ 6,5tlb 7,fiOh B,079 6,5'37 5,713 5,B1.3 61264 5_695
'?,5 |o 50 834 928 955 834 637 617 672 632
5o t. ](m ]0 24 2'9 20 21 16 25 12
lO0 4- i) 0 0 0 0 {) 0 0
T_H)Iu VIII-45 IIIAC Perth']c, Cotmter DaLe, 1300 Test Cyclcu
P_.lr t :I.,.,1,.,' ....
Ran_,e First' Next Next Next- N_xt Next Nexm' N_xt
(lB_erons) tO0 m] I00 ml I00 n,1 I00 ml 100 ml 100 ml I00 ml 100 ml
,r i
5 to 15 90,475 61,371 57,287 52_639 33_655 29,278 31,167 31,002
15 to 25 1,811 3,880 4,693 4,677 2_862 2,424 2,826 2,638
25 to 50 235 461 581 535 332 270 314 263
50 to lot) 13 11 10 I0 5 3 3 8
100 + o 0 0 O 0 0 0 0
Table VIII-46 HIAC Particle Counter Data, 14CO Test Gyclea
Particles
Range First Next Next Next Next Next "Next N_xt
(microns) IO0 ml leo ml 100 ml IO0 ml iO0 ml lO0 ml 100 m% llrl00mli .i ,r
5 to 15 46,451 46,680 47,123 49,068 46,562
15 to 25 806 769 801 816 664
25 to 50 108 136 135 147 87
50 to 100 2 8 5 3 7
100 + o o 0 0 0
Table VIII-47 HIAC Partlcle Counter Data, 1500 Test Cycles
Particle
. Range First Next Next Next Next Next Next Next
(microns) IO0 ml IO0 ml I00 ml i00 ml IO0 ml IO0 ml I00 ml i00 ml
it i ,i,i
5 to 15 67,781 48,434 38,426 33,378 32_678 32,131 28,888 26,364
"'_ 15 to 25 5,748 5,179 4,220 3j713 3,723 3,658 3,278 2,966
25 to 50 831 759 678 524 510 525 437 427
50 to I_}0 32 30 17 15 15 7 11 4
100 + 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
" -- - - 00000003-TSC08
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T_bl_ VIII-48 Hydraulic Oil Particle Count (Milllpore)
, s_mp__-Ni,mb_r.... 69_t3o41....6_64269M_-0_9_o4469M_o4s
Volume of Sample Counted (ml) I0 5 I0 I00 lOO I00
,s_mpleT_kf._!.Te_tC_LI_No,,jO0 _00 600 gO0 1200.......ljO0_
Particle Range (micron)
6 to L0 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNT_ TNTC
II to 25 TNTC 16,400 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC
! 26 to 50 TNTC 6,600 6,600 9,000 3,100 17,400
: 51 to I00 930 _00 1,500 1,240 650 1,500
Ovur I00 420 700 S40 695 385 480
tn
Not_,l l) TNTG - Too Numerous To Count,
2) Samph, volumes diluL(,dfrom Lo_al sample tnken,
Tab].(,VIII-49 System Tost Interim InLurnat Leakage Test Data
Pt'essuruDucay A£tur Five Minutus (pslg)/Ro_ulator SuLPressure . Pressure
Applied to
_vst Serial /3000 +150_ Cyel_ Number
Components Number _ 0/- • 0 100 , 300 , 600 900 1200 _500
Cylinder 75M06506 Piston Rod Side 0 0 0 0 2.0 3.5 5.0
Piston Side 0 0 0 0 1.5 3.1 4.6
,,,,
Rugulator 1592 Inlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2960 2969 2940 2920 2920 2935 2960
3300 Oil Test Side 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 4.5 3.0
Air Side 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 4.5 3.0
Accumulator.- ' '
3299 .Oil _est Side 0 0 0 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0
Air Slde 0 0 0 1.0 2.0 4._) 6.0
, , • i r
Solenoid 399 Inlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0@utlet
Valve _ ' '
398 Inlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Outlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 i.0
Check 9021312 Outlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Valves "
9021313 Outlet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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After the system contamination test wan completed, func-
Lional tents wvru eonductt_d for each component in order tn _u-
rately evaluat¢_ eomponunL por[ormanet_ _ter te_ting, Performance
wa_ m_surod againnt tht_ initial Junctional tent r_ultn _btalned
pllor to the conL¢Iminstlon _onts, Tnbl_,s VIII-26 through VIII-31
present tilt, r_,sul, ts of oaeh compon_nl, final funetiona_ to_,
The to_ results between the profuneglonal and po_gfune- i
tJonal te_tn are vt_ry nearly the name in all respects, The fol-
lowing _,oneJ, u_ion_ may bu r,,at, ht_d from t.h(' dagal
].) Thtr data eompar_non prior t:o and aft_:r gh_, cont:amina-
tlon te_tn are nearly the same showing vOvy little
if any_ d¢,gradatlon in p¢_rl:ormance;
2) The cylinder leakage is comparable, and the breakaway
force d_creasod;
3) Solenoid rt,sponse time increased slightly, and inter-
hal leakage increased but is still within the service
arm specification;
' 4) The check valves had zero leakage and _he cracking
and reseat pressures decreased;
5) The regulator performance improved and was within
specification, whereas the initial performance prior
to the contamination tests was out of specification
in some instances;
6) The accumulator internal leakage decreased on S/N
; 61<.3300. The leakage on S/N 6K3299 increased from
zero leakage to 6.1 drops per minute. NASA criteria
are i0 drops per 15 minutes for this accumulator. The
leakage was due to O-ring laminations, not contamina-
tion;
7) The 0,020 bleed orifice flow rate performance was
identical (0.48 gpm at 3000 psig),
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P__rq_.sureHandloader (75M08830) = M#/uy l!in_!pattlclc's of
contaminant were found in all parts of the handload,.r, partlctl-
larly where oi) residue still remained. Figures V[ii-42 and
Vlli-43 show _h_, =ontami_tan_, which ¢onsls_ed of A.G. road dust,
teflon_ ruJ, b_!r l+articles_ and flb_rs, rtmlalnittg J. tht, valw' In,fly
and piston I' i
[i The O-ring (J200AI6) in the main pistoa ::.how_.d normal I
I.
[i wear (Fig. V111-44). Two previous failures of tl,J., O-,:Ing
occurred prior to and during the tests. The first O-ring failed
• prior to contaminant injection; the sc,cond at 1320 cycles. This
_+" O-ring failure is attributed to assembly problems and rolling and
I spiraling in the groove with subst_quent nibbling on the inside
and outside diameters. The cause of this O-ring failure is Pot
attributed to contamination.
The sensing piston O-rlng was not worn. Four longitudi-
nal scratches were observed on the O-ring ]ands, but there, wut'_
no scratches on the mating part. The teflon pilot on the sensing
piston was burnished on one side of the outside diameter duc to
wear, and showed some longitudinal scratches. The corresponding
inside diameter of the retaining spool showed wear marks for the
full 360 deg with some longitudinal scratches. These indications
of wear and scratches are attributed to contamination. The
measured final clearance between these _wo parts is 0.001 in.
(25 microns). A,C, road dust and metal particles were observed
on the retaining spool.
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The main seat of the poppet stem was badly eroded due to
particle imping_ment, although thln handloader did not leak. The I
_rosion wa_ nimilar to that evidenced in the pneumatic handlo_dvr !
which has n similar configuration, Deep scratches wore ob._;orved
on the mating nylon seal for the full diameter of the conical
sealing surface, Th_e scratche.,Jwore caused by particles flow-
ing over the seat of the poppet valve thus causing the gouges,
The: O-rln_; (J200A2) on the poppet stem was badly chewed up. Dur-
h_ Lh_ con_nmtnatlon t_f_tflthis O-ring failed four times (Fig,
VIII-45), I_ i_ our conclusion _hat these O-ring failures are
not due to contamination, bu_ _o excesslw, groove width which
permi_t_ the O-rl,n_,_to roll and spiral, It shouZd bu not.(,dLha[.
this component, and the flow orifice, actually saw 3000 test
cyvlq,H whoroa_ the r¢,malnlng compon_nLs wore run [or 1500 t_._t
t'yO| c-'_,
Figur_ VIII-46 shows _he inlet atxdoutlet fittings and
filter screens. The inlet fLUter screen dlslodgud from the fit-
ring at lll3 cycles and had mlg=a=ed to the retalnin@ spool _n
the handload(!r. At 1326 cycles the filter screen in the outlvt
fitting was laid back parallel to the flow sift,am. This screen
was removed f_om the system and is shown in Figure VIII-46. The
filter screens _.ailed as a result of contaminant loading and
subsequent AP across the scceen, even though the screen is a w,ry
coarse mesh. The outlet screen was loaded with a black residue
that appeared to be either a rubber seal mat_rial or lubricant
from the accumulators,
i All of the remaining O-rings, seals, and piece parts in
: the handloader were in good condition.
Check Valve _75MO5365-4_ S/N 9021312) - Many small parti-
cles and long fibers were observed in the check valve body and
poppet. When the valve was disassembled, it was found that the
O-rlng in the valve which focms one of the sealing surfaces was
missing (Figure VIII-48). T_e valve did not leak during the con-
tamination tests or postfunct_nal tests. This check valve de-
sign has a dual sealing action; it first forms a seal on the O-
ring, then on the metal seat. It is believed that the O-ring
was never assembled into the valve, and it was received in this
.. condition. There was no sign of seat erosion or valve degradation
: due to contamination.
•(,:
j!,
Check Valve (75MO5365-4, S/N 9021313) - Many small parti-
cles and long fibers were observed in the check valve body and
on the poppet. There was no evidence of degradation in the valvv.
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Two-Way Solenoid Valve (75MO8823-1j S/N 399) - The sole-
noid body wa_ fairly clean with a few large particles of teflon
and residual lubricant in evidence.
Several particles were observed in the residual lube in
the V-groove between the two top O-rings (Fig. VIII-51). All
thr,.e O-rings on the stem showed normal wear and were not chipped
or nlbblud. The backup rings were not scratched and did not
show any signs of wear. Long (0.25 in.) slivers of O-rlng were
observed in both of the two top O-rlng grooves, but were not from
this valve. The main poppet seat was not eroded. The main nylon
seat was not er_oded or scratched, but did show some evidence of
cold flow. Thera--wa_no evidence of wear in the valve.
A long sliver (0.625 inch by 200 micron I of stainless
steel w_s still attached to the O-ring pilot edge of the O-ring
support Seat and is _ result of machining (Fig. VIII-531, This
edge was very sharp. The mating static O-rlng was chewed up and
its conditiQn is believed to be the result of assembly over th_
sharp edg£ or because of a '_inchin4_ effect" during assembly.
Two-Way Solenoid Valve (75MO8823-I, S/N 398) - The
cleanliness condition of this valve was similar-to S/N 399. All
three O-rings on the poppet stem were in good condition. _he
nylon seat was in good condition, but showed evidence of some
cold flow. _here was no erosion on the main poppet seat. The
bottom stem pilot showed indications of wear and longitudinal
scratches for approximately 0.25 in. on the diameter. The mat-
ing inside diameter on the retaining spool also showed indica-
tions of wear and longitudlnal scratches (Fig. VIII-52). The
, measured clearance between these two parts is 0.001 in. (25
microns). The wear and scratches were not severe, but can be
attributed to contamination. Figure VIII-52 also shows many
particles inside the spool, the majority of which were of O-ring
material. These particles had to migrate from another component
because the only O-ring failures in this valve were not in the
E flow path. The static O-ring tha_ fits on the retaining spool
(Fig. VIII-52) was chipped in one place for approximately 0.25
in. on the outside diameter. This failure is attributed to
assembly problems.
The static O-ring on the support seat was nibbled in a
manner similar to that described for valve S/N 399.
Hydraulic Cylinder (75MO65067_ - The sliding surface of
the V-cup seal on the piston head was worn around the periphery
of both seals. Large pieces of V-cup seal material were observed
in the piston head V-groove, and large particles of metal were
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imbedded in the V-cup seal. A few longitudinal scratches were
observed in the brass piston head, Although the cylinder leakage
did not increase as a rc_sult of the contamination tests, all.of
the above anomalies can be attributed to contamination.
No scratches were, visable on the cylinder bore, but the
entire bore was coated with many fine particles of contaminant.
Many particles that appeared to be chevron seal material,
brass chips, and test contaminant were observed on the retract
head.
The chevron rod seals showed normal wear except for the
last seal which was badly chewed up on the outside diameter,
This seal lies next to the gland nut, and it is believed that this
seal would be damaged every time on assembly because of the design
(Fig. VLII-52). Very slight scratches were observed on the cylLn_
der rod.
Hydraulic Accumulator .<75MO88!A-I, S/N 33007 - Both heads
of the accumulator were very heavily lubricated with a black lu-
bricant (Fig. VLII-59) in the threads and on the static. O-rings.
Large slivers of O-ring material were observed in the thread re-
lief. A Large quantity of fine road dust, lamge teflon, brass,
and metal particles was observed in the oil residue remaining
in the lower head, which is the side seeing the injected contam-
inants.
I"_ The static O-rings on both heads were badly nibbled onthe entire outside diameter (Fig. VIII-60). The O-rlng failure• could be due to one of two causes: (i) pressure pulsations and.... incorrect groove design, or (2) cutting by the threads upon assem-
bly-disassembly.
The barrel of the accumulator contained many deep gouges,
spaced at very equal intervals (0.125 in.), that could be a re-
suit of tool marks or contamination. The cylinder wear pattern
is sketche& on the following page and shown in Figure VIII-61.
The sketch shows only the relative position and lengths rather
than the exact number of gouges. The clearances are actual mea-
surements between the piston and the barrel. The variation in
, clearances is due to some "egg-shape" in the barrel, as measured
'i at 90 deg to each other. It should be noted that the leakage in
this accumulator decreased during the contamination test.
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Cl_aranc_s
Top
0.001 - 0.0055 in, '..............
IIIIII I IIIIll,m,
!Ill '- b0.0038 - 0.0043 In. I
0.004 - 0.0045in.
Sotto_:_.............
Some very sllgbt scratches that may be due to_contaminatlon were
observed alL.around the inside dlame_er_ The barrel walls were
co_ted, wi_h fine particles that appear to be teflon, fine dust,
and O-ring slivers.
The _op land of the piston shows some wear and approx_-
merely 15 l_ngitudinal scratches some of whlch m_y be due to the
gouges in,he bore and some to the contaminant. The extent of
eeeh cause is impossible to determine (Fib. VIII-_2). The top
O-rlng showed n_tma/ wear_i£h some ro_king action. On the side
of the O_=ing opp_slte the backup ring there were approximately
26 pits in the O-rlng tkat appear to be caused b_.laminatlons in
the molding process. The pits were nmt on the sealing surface,
even considering the rolling actio_ and were not due to contam-
inat_n. The top backup ring was badly scratched around the out-
side diameter in.a longitudinal direction_ The scratches are a
result of contamination with some effect due to the gouges in the
bore (Fig. VIII-62).
Th_ bottom O-rlng on the piston looks very good with some
very slight longitudinal scratches on the wearing surface. The
condition of the bottom backup ring was the same as that of the
top land. The bottom land showed normal wear with some slight
burnish marks but no scratches or gouges.
Many particles of teflon, road dust, metal, and rubbur
were observed in the O-rlng grooves and on the O-rlngs.
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Hydraulic, Accumulato_r (75Mo8814-1m S/N 3299) - Both heads
of the accumulator were heavily lubricated and contained consid-
erable contamination similar to S/N 3300 (Fig. Vlii-63). The
statiu O-rings wt,re nibbled similarly to S/N 3300, but the ribbllng
was mot as s_,vrr_,(Fig. Vlll-60),
The accumulator bo_o cent;tined one deep gouge appro> h.,:utc.ly
12 in. long lot,arealin the middl_, of the stroke. There wa_ indi-
cation that the bore had been polished or honed in _hls are,a after
machining in an attempt to ellmlna_e the scratch. Except for this
scratch the bore was perfect, without even minor scratches (Fig.
VI11-64).
The top O-rlng on the.piston was n_bbled all around tht,
outside diameter. On(: area (0.625 in. 10ng) was nibbled out badly
(Fig. VIII-62). The nibbled inclusions were shiny in appearance,
indicating lamination problems in the manufacturing process. The
leakage on this accumulato_ _ncreased during the t_.sts, and is
probably a result of the deep nibbling that occurred in one area
of the O-ring. The top land had approximately nine longitudinal
scratches. Both the top and bottom backup rings contained longi-
tudinal scratches, but not as many as on S/N 3300. The bottom
O-ring was spiraled but showed normal wear with no pits or nib-
bling. This O-ring was on the contaminant sf'de of th_ accumula-
tor. A considerable number of particles of all types were en-
trapped in both O-rlng grooves.
The m_,asured clearances for the piston and accumulator
were :
:' Top Clearance = 0.0024 to 0.0029 in.
Middle Clearance = 0.0024 to 0.0027 in.
Bottom Clearance = 0.0021 to 0.0024 in.
Orifice -This orifice (0.020 in. diameter) plate was con-
structed of aluminum and was placed in the system to determine
the effects of clogging and erosion. The contaminant injected
into the system contained particles as large as 750 microns and
: fibers up to 4000 micron, whereas the 0.020-in. orifice represents
500 microns. The inlet edge of the orifice was rounded to a
radius. The inside diameter of the orifice contained gouges that
appeared to be the result of hard particles passing through the
orifice. The orifice was not plugged with particles,
k
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CATEGORIZED COMPONENT LIST
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SPECIFICATION F_ND NUMBER CATEGORY
NUMBER ITEM LOCATION
A B
,[I ....................................... J ........... _-- rl
B75M05_65 Check Valve _L_I8 (1-8) X
_,+41(i-8) X
54+B4(4-8) X
5651(4-7) X
9680(_,-7) X
347_ (9) X
)_.756(9) x
)475?(9) }
5476Q(9) X
}W?6) (9) x
)_+8al(9) X
t
79M06116 SolonoidValve 34701(9) X
7_406118 Check Valve )4_03 (9) X
7_406201 Flow Control Valve 5521 LI-8) X
79M06390 Pamp 9306(HO_-l-a) X
75M06506 Cylinder, Hydraulic 5702 (4-7) X
75M06597 Pump .5309 (HCU-I-2) X
75M06604 Check Valve .5)14 (HOU-I-2) X
h.
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SPECIFICATION - FIND NUMB_ CATEGORY
NUMBER I'11_ _,UgA'I'iuS --
A B
_ - J, ._ ,L
75MO6605 Relief Valve 5308 (HCU-I -2) X
E 75MO6b06 Filter 5307 (HCU-I -2) X
: 75M06607 Filter 5304 (HCU-I -2) X
75MO6660 Relief- galve 5316 (HCU-I -2) X
75M06706 Snubber 5341 (HCU-I-2) X
75M07505 Pressure Switch 5342 (HCU-I--2) X
75M07725 Cylinder, Pneumatic 5894 (2) X
75M07998 Cylinder, Pneumatic 5811 (6-7) X
75MO8053 Filter 5395 (1-8) X
29692(3) x
34747 (9) X
75M08142 vmlve, 3 Way 29694 (3) X
I"
_- ' O0000004-TSD01
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SPI_IrICATION FINDNUMBER OATIX}OR¥ -
NUM_ ITEM LOOATIOM
A B
J |. l __ _,
75M08231 Cyllnder 558_ (4-8) X
75M08323 Pressure Switch 5432 (1-8) X
5_11(i-8) x
5533 (4-8) X
5691 (4-7) X
5767 (6) X
5795(7). X
5852(4-8) X
5883 (a) x
5908(2) x
5944(l) x
5991(43 x
6033(4) x
6072(8) x
61o4(83 x
6132(8) x
6377(7) x
29741 (6) X
" 79_o8325 C_,,,,:kV_vo 5461(1-8) X
5561(4-8) X
5687(4-7) X
5710(6-7) X
5776(7) X
5823(4-6) x
5888(2) x
5917 (2) X
5953(i) X
5978(4) x
6036(4) X
6045(4) X
6060(8) x
6082 (8) x
_: 6092 (8) X
6142 (8) x
6143 (8) X
6387 (7) X
6399 (7) X
6419 (7) X
29606 (7) X
29607 (7) X
29875 (4-6) X
,34802(9) x
I
I
..... | ., ,
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SPECIFICATION FIND NUMBER CATEGORY
NUMBER ITS4 .... LOCATION A B
75t_)8t26 Cheek Valv_ 578a(7) X
297_5(6) X
7_08_o9 sn_e_r 5_31.(i-8) X
_StO(i-8) X
553_(_-8) X
5690(_-7) X
5763 (7) X
5766(6) X
_849(4=7) x
588t(2) x
' 5907(2) x
59#3(i) x
6o31(4) x
6o7o(8) x
61o2(8) x
613L(8) x
6379 (?) X
29739 (6) x
34693 (9) X
_7a6 (9) x
75M08414 _leterin_Valve 5924 (2) X
5957(1) x
_78 (l-8) x
6a_ (9-) x.
i
, 75M08415 Relief Valve 5476 (1-8) X
: s486(I-8) x
5727 (1-7) X
._896(2) x
29691(3) X
29693 (3) X
29774 (4-7) X
34_5 (9) x
3468o(9) x
,,, 34753 (9) X
34754 (9) X
34797 (9) X
00000004-TSD03
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'i .... --, .......................... ._.,i .......
75M08617 Check Valve 5610 (5-?) X
75M08814 Accuaulator 5468(i-8) X
56_4(4=7) X
75M08819 Counterbalance Valve 5502 (I-8) X
550)C_8) x
)4808(9) x
75M@SB20 Pilot OperatedValve 5481 (i-8) X
_82 (1-8) x
29679 (i-2) X
29676 (l-a) x
_767 (9) X
)_768 (9) x
3_77l(9) x
)4774 (9) X
)4776 (9) X
._778 (9) X
3478o (9) x
34783 (9) X
75M08821 Pilot OperAtedValve, 5513 (1-8) X
:: 75M0882_ Pilot OperatedValve 5537 (4-8) X
75M08823 SolenoidValve 5417 (1-8) X
,. 5_2o(1-8) x
_6o (i-8) x
556O(4-8) x
5578(4-8) X
5_5o(4-8) X
:.. 566? (#-?) X
,:. 5707 (6) X
: 5977 (4) X
_' )4814 (9) X
_,4822(9) x
i i
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SPF_IFICATION FIND hUMBER
NUMBER IT_ LOCATION CATmONY
75M08824 Solenoid Valve 5787 (7) X
5_37 (4-7) X
5887(2) x
5914(2) x
5952 (l) X
6O23(4) X
6o58 (8) x
6o9o(8) x
6138 (8) x
64oo(7) x
29731(6) x
75M08825 SolenoldV_ve 5507(1-8) X
5528(b,.8) X
5688(4-?) X
576,?.(4-?) X
5792(4-?) X
5844 (4-7) X
5879(2) x
5895(2) x
59O4(2) x
594O(1) x
5985(4) X
6o28(4) x
6O66(8) x
6099(8) x
6X28(8) x
6382(7) x
29736 (6) X
75M08826 Pilot Operated 5663 (4-8) X
6o81(8) x
61x3(8) x
6368(7) x
6_05(7) x
753408827 Pilot Operated Valve 5730 (4-7) X
I
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BPF_I_'ICATION FIND NUMBER CATEGORY
_K%ER ITB4 LOCATION •
A B
_ L......... ,,.... qLJJ._ , ...._, ,,, _ J ! ,
7_M0882.9 Re_tor 5785 (7) X
5835 (_-?) x
5886 (2) X
5913 (2) x
5951(_) x
595(,(I) X
6o22(4) x
_o57(8) x
6089 (8) X
6136(8) X
_Ol (?) x
29730(6) x
3_?o5(9) x
75M088_O Re_lator 5419(1-8) X
973_ (9) X
75M08831 [_,_ulator 6o75(8) X
61o8(8) x
63?3(?) x
641o(7) x
75M08836 Automatic Valve 6596 (7) X• 6374(7) X
,,i.,: 75MO88_9 Solenoid Valve 5439 (1-8) X
7_o8841 Sole=olaWlve _79 (1-8) x
62_ (9) x
6296(9) x
29677(i-z) x
_+6_ (9) x
34661(9) x
34769(9) x
_772 (9) x
.:. 3_779(9) x '
, 34784(9) x
, ,i,
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SPECIFICATION FIND NUMBER CAT_OR¥
NUMB_ IT_ ... LOCATION ...............
A B
L_ _ _ ...... i ........................
• 751'109007 Check Valve 5479 (I-8) X
5553(4-8) X
34698 (9) X
_4770(9) x
34773 (9) X
34775(9) x
)4777(9) x
)4809 (9) X
75M09014 Cylinder 6007 (4) X
' 6o18(4) x
?SMO928) Level Switch 5470 (I-8) X
5656 (4-7) X
62_9(9) X
6250 (9) X
6290 (9) X
6292(9) x
75M09285 Solenoid Valve 5642 (7) X
58o9(7) x
58a9(4-7) x
5860(4-7) x
5858(4) x
5871 (4) x
5923(2) x
6O#O(4) x
6049(4) x
6o53(4) x
_54 (4) x
6147(8) x
6z5o (8) x
6_l_ <4--7) x
_20 (4-7) X
29753(6) x
7_09362 Cylinder, Hydraulic 5492 (1-8) X
5497(l-8) x
,.
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SPECIFICATION FIND NUMBER CAT_;'_ORI
NUMBER ITeM LOCATION .................
A B
75MI0090 Solenoid Valve 5770 (6) X
75MIO272 Regulator 5611 (5-7) X
75MI0807 Cy].ind_ 5626 (5-7) X
75MI0992 Filter 5588(1-8) X
5590(I-8) x
5965(4-8) x
5613(4) X
34748(9) X
)4749(9) X
75MI1428 Selector Valve 5612 (5-7) X
75MII149 Air Motor 6122 (8) X
639O(7) X
75MI1558 Metering Valve 6)91 (7) X
75M12157 Cylinder, Hydraulic 34825 (9) X
' 348a7(9) x
751'112560 Rotary Actuator 34840 (9) X
_845 (9) x
75M12665 Accumulator 6244 (9) X
6249(9) x
6246(9) x
'6247(9) X
" 75M13255 Regulator 34964 (9) X
L
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SPECIFICATION FIND NUMBER CATegORY
NUMBER ITeM LOCATION ..............
............. A B
75M16990 Solenoid Vslve 34755 (9) X
34758(9) X
34759 (9) X
34761 (9) X
75M21479 )rif_ .... 9872 (4) X
_8?_ (4) X
75N51383 Regulator 5459(I-8) X
5599(4-8) X
5bb6 (4-?) x
6200(9) x
75M516)O _heck V_ve 549_9(9) X
)4944(g) X
34954(9) x
34956(9) x
)496o(9) X
5496)(9) x
34972(9) X
)4974(9) x
54981(9) X
' }4984(9) X
75M51766 'reasUreSwitch }4699(9) X
)4724(9) X
76KOO187 _olanoid Valve 34704 (9) X
'6KOO188 rilter )4863 (9) X
_86_ (9) %
_-" }4855(9) X
............. _,4866(9) X
,, _867 (9) x
_',4868(9) x
76Koo189 )rific_ 54?62(9) X
)4765(9) X
)5730(9) X
357)I (9) X
A
. , , • .............
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' _PF_IFICATION FIND_MB_ CATegORY
76KOO2_I Valva, Deo_ler_tlon 148_9 (9) X
_4849(9) X
i 76K032_0 Oy_ndor }4934(9) X549_5(9)
76R0}578 OtiS'Ice. }W99Z(9) X
34971,(9) X
_4989(9)
76K0_824 Cylinder, Pneumatic 14952 (9) X
_6KO3825 CTZi=der, Pneusatie _4988 (o) X
BZO4a57Ol SolenoidVslve 54937(9) X
5W938(9) X
)4949(9) X
)495}(9) x
}4999(9) X
)4999(9) X
)4961(9) X
,: )4962(9) x
: )4969 (9) x
3497o(9) x
34973(9) x
34983(9) x
_985 (9) x
)4986(9) X
" BI0425928 CheakValve 34987(9) X
B1042669_ Check.Valve }4990(9) X
" ...... O0000004-TSDIO
,i, A-14
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,,,, ............. I.___ ........ .JL.I l l II I , i
Ve.dorP/N Check Valve 5B66 (4) X
_oo_62-19 5869(4) x
M_ott_ 59?_(4) X
5974 (4) X
V.e_dO_/_ Cheok Valve 586_ (9) X
aoqoo_-19 6a.5_(6) x
Vendor P/_I Soleno:LdValv_ .................11190 (6) X
Mv58_
Marol;ta
J
Not Known OrificePlate 5594 (V) X
75M24511 OrtflcePlate 29727 (6) X
7_2451a
?_2451_
TOTALS 137 194
I
, I
I ....k
r.'
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APPENDIX B
COHPONENT ANALYSIS SIIF,ETS
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• COMPONENT ANALYS IS
COMPONENT Check Va Ive
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M05365 (-4, -6)
VENDOR James Pond Clark
VENDOR P/N (-4) 277 TI-8NN (-6) 277 TI-12NN.
FIND NUMBEEB/CATEGORY A5418(I-8)/B, A5441(I-8)/A, A5484(4-8)/A,
A5651(4-7)/B, A5680(4-7)/B, A6185(9)/B,
A6226(9) IA, A6230(9)/S, K6252(9) Is,
A6273 (9) IB
FAILURE MODES i) Leakage - System Malfunctlor_
2) Stuck Open " System Malfunction.
3) Stuck Closed - Eystem Malfunction
ANALYSIS These check valves are the James Pond Clark standard
200 series check valves as shown in the James Pond Clark Catalog.
It is a poppet type check valve constructed of 303 SS material
and Buna N seals. Cracking pressure required.to open is .5 to
i psi. The valve is required to have zero leakage up to maximum
operating pressure. The check valve has a well guided, tapered
poppet with a clean flow design such that norm_l flow paths of
contaminant particles wiil flow through the valve without being
trapped or causing damage to the seals. T_e James Pond Clark
Engineering representative stated that these valves are used in
commercial cleaned system without problem_, as the poppet design
is tapered to make it "self-cleanlng". MMC has used many of these
check valves in the Titan systems without any known contaminant
probIeros.
ACTION Recommend the check valve not be considered for test.
I
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONE_ SoIenold Va ive
SPECIFICATION NOj 75M06116
VENDO_R Marotta Valve Corp.
_S_ P/N n5884 mV74W)
FIND ,NUMBERS/CKT,EC,OR¥ A34701(9)/B
FAILURE MODES De-energized - Csn't check sys. press.
transducer
Energized - No system readout;
cons rant charge
Leakage - Possible erroneous zeadout
ANALYSIS
This valve for analysis purposes according to Marotta
engineering is similar to 75M08825.
ACTION
Recommend that 75M08825 be tested.
L mi|i| i i
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Che_k Va lye
S_PZC_ATION No. 75M06118
VENDOR James Pond Clark
,VENDORP/N KP279T1-8NN
FIND NUMbERS/CATEGORy A3470(9)/B, A34703(9)/B
FAILURE MODES Same as B75M05365 (Item I)
ANALYSIS Same as B75M05365 (_tem i)
ACTZON Eecommend the check valve not be considered for test.
_-_ . , ,, , , .
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COBPO_,N _ Decelerat ion Valve
S_ECZ_;CATZON, N0. 75M06201-I Modified to 75M21842-1
,VENDOR Racine
vz=gZ,
FIND _RS./,CATEGORY A5521 (I-8)/A
MODZS
Blocked---_lo Acm Retraction
Erratic - Loss of Arm Speed Control (Auto)
ANALYSIS
The deceleration valve is a composite of s relief valve,
a sequence valve, a pressure compensaEer valve and a cam operated
variable orifice spool. The sequence valve and pressure compensator
valve are to be removed after test and. retained in a parts kit. This
leaves the valve as a mechanical variable orlfic_ with a flow range
o_ 60 to 120 gpm _nd a full flow relief valve. EC2..0258 provides for
this modification.
_eal Material - Viton A
Leakage
Externa/ - None
" Lubrication - _I-F-90 Grease
Cleaning - Racine does their own cleaning of this component.
The component is checked for .cleanliness to NASA
Specs by sampling the effluent after the functional
test.
Tolerances - All moving parts have c_arances from .0006
to .00_.I--0/_an inch.
The Racine Technical Representative felt this component
would function with no problem in industrial level cleaned hydraulic
fluid. Stability problems were given as the reason for modification
of this valve.
w
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The variable orifice spool is the only part in this..valve
which is chrome plated and the rest of the valve is made from
hardened steel. The parts used in the valve have a rust
prev_ntitive on them and it is removed prior to assembly.
Unless the valve is protected from moisture iBtrusion prior to
installation there may be a corrosion problem.
This valve is not considered contamination seaslti_.d_e to
the following reasons:
I. The tolerance on the vsrlable ori£1ce spool is fairly
tight but the spool is operated by a mechanicaa can which
should overcome any sticking due to contamination.
2. Previous failure history of. the valve.
3. Recommendation of the vendor.
4. Valve noC considered to be a contamination generator.
ACTION
This valve is not recommended for test.
O0000004-TSE05
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COMPONENTANALYSI8
c Pump
SpEO_"I.CATION NO. 75M06350
Commercial Stamplng & Shearing Co.
VE OX P 15a300a xxlO-X6
FAILtrRE MODES Inoperative - Possible hydraulic failure
mu.Yszs
The £ixed-dlsplacement, gear type, supercharger pump draws
fluid from the reservoir through a 140 micron (nominal) filter
and supplies the malnstage high pressure pump with II gpmst 30
pslg. The excess fluid from the supercharger pump is diverted
through a low pressure relief valve and back to the reservoir.
I
The discharge fluid from the supercharger pump is filtered through
a I0 micron (nominal) filter to protect the high pressure pump from
contamination.
The gear type pump does not appear to be contamination
sensitive an_should be _ble to operate satisfactorily o_ a
i contamina_io_ level at least as dirty as the high pressure pump.
The high pressure pump was designed to operate satisfactorily on
' fluid cleaned to NAS 1638 Class 9. The gear type pump does not
. appear to be a large contamination generator and any contamination
critical to the system should be removed by the 10 micron (normal)
filter Just downstream from the pump.
ACT_0N
This fixed-displacement, supercharger pump is not considered
: contamination sensitive or a high contamination generator and is
_ not recommended for test.
u"
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COMZ'ONE_L'ANALYSIS
,CO_O_E.l_ Cylinder, HydraulLc
,S,PECT.yZCATZON..NO. 75M06506
V_X)IL_ Pa_ho= Mfg. Co.
PAIL_%E MODES St=ck No carrier withdrawal
Leakage Possible wlthdrawal malfunction
-
Seal MaCerlal - Bmm-N per MIL-P-25732, Viton A per MIL-P-25897, or
Polyurethane, backup ring per MIL-R-8791
Leakage -GN, around barrel - none
Roe end i0 cc per 25 operating cycles ,internal piston
by-pass 5,.25 c_/mln
; Eyd.. around b_rrel - none
I.= Pad- end I d_op per 25 oper_tlng cycles ,internal piston
ii by-_ss = 5 cc/_n
L
Lubr/_atlon- The spa= calls out M_L-R-5606 for hydraulic cylinders
>" and Ke1-Y-90 for pneumatic cylinders, but according to the Pathon
• Teehnleal Representative it was going to be changed to Some other
'i lubricant. The lubricant may be Atlantic Refining Co=pany #54
Lubricant. A problem with "0" ring spiraling on accumulators was
evidently solved by using this lubricant.
ii Tolerances on cylinders between piston and barrel ranged from .0025
_ to .0095 _n. on an 8 in. bore and .003 to .009 in. on a 3 in. bore.
The hydr&ullc cushion which is used on some cylinders does not
appea/: to be eontamlnation sengltlve.
Leakage at the rod end seal would probably be the moJt common type
failure once a cylinder is Installed in the system. A metal w£per
is used on the rod end to prevent contamination from entering the
cylinder. Teflon or some other softer material would probably be
O0000004-TSE07
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more effective in keeping contamination out. of the cylinder but
temperature requirements prevents thelr use.
Most of the cylluders now or soon will have stainless barrel_ and
rods and_ improved seals. This should reduce the problem of cor_tamhm-
tion gev.eration and make cylinders less sensitive to contamlnation.
AcCording to _he Pathon M_g. Technical Re_resen_ttlve they clean
thei_ cyllnders to an. industrial 1_vel_ They petrol= the functional
and proof pressure test using hydraulic o:LL M_L.II-5606 and: then send .............................................
the cylinders with minimum seals to their cleaning vendor, TMC
(Technical Micronlc Control), to be disassembled, cleaned to NASA
Specs., seals replaced, reassembled, and functional cheaked. The
approximate-coat-_or this cleaning was $200.00 _or a .75-MO 7362
cylinder.
The hydraulic and pneumatic cyl£nder_ built.by Pathon M_g._ Co. are
not considered to be contamlnatian sensitive.. The contamination
generation is not believed to be high due to the smooth finish .re-
qutrements and improved seals used in cylinder construction, but
testlng__Sy be required for verification.
Cleanlng_ assembly and test procedures or methods-will be further
r_view_d-to detennine if the cylinders are meeting the rellabillty
requirements without undue effort__.
i" Pathon._s Technlcal Representative said. that-kydraullc cyltnders
could stand more_ contamination than the pnet_ma_ic cylinders because
_" hydraulic fluid lubricates the contamln_nts and allows them to
"slide around # rather than causing wear which could happen in a
dry pneumatic cylinder.
ACTION
This valve is not particularly contamination-sensitive, but
does represent a broad category of components of the Service
Arms. Recommend--test.
o-
k_
m| i |
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Pump
gPECIF!C'Ao.TION Ng'_ 75M065 97
VJ,;N_(')R lh.,r, Jtt_ort D_vlslon, Abex Corp.
W 0,R  vo5.oo6-3iz-o
rAn. MODES
Inoperate - Loss of HydrauLic Pressure
Erratic - Possible Hydraulic Failure
ANALYSIS
This is a piston type variable-displacement, pressure compensated
pump capable of 9.5 gpm flow at 2750 psi. With no flow demand the
press is 3000 + 150 psi. The supply to the.high pressure pump is
received from a boost pump at" 30 psi. Ten micron (nominal) filtration
is used at the inlet to the high pTess_re pump and at the pump case
i drain. A differential pressure gage is u6ed on the filter, which
I. is at the high pressure inlet, to i_d'icate when the filter is clogged
}' or dirty and requires replacement of the filter element.
_,. The Dennison Division Technical Representative was contacted
:/' and the following information was obta.lned:
i i. Use clean oil. Ten micron filtration which is used on the
suction side of th_-_ump is completely adequate.
2. Change filters regulaEly.
3. Maximum level of contamination that the pump can stand without
'_ excessive wear is NAS 1638 Class 9. The test stands used by
Dennison Division are required to meet WAS 1638 Class 8. The
;. table below was given as the level of contamination the pump
. could stand and still function properly without excessive wear.
O0000004-TSEO9
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1
5-15 128,000
15"25 22,800
25"50 4,050
50-100 720
i00 + 128
The pump is not considered contamination senslt_ve as long
as the contsminstion _evel does not exceed NAB 1638 Cl_ss g and .dequate
filtratiDn i_ used. Evaluation of the failure history of this
pump shows that there were not any contamination problems.
Ae__rzo__
Recommend the pump (75M06597) not be considered for test.
.,,'
.,,i¸
i ....-i
_., , l i| i ml i i
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COMPONENT ANALYSI S
COMPONE_NT Check Valva
sP_ciFicA_msoj 75Mo66o4
VENDOR R_pub iIc Mf_. Co.
YEI_:)E P_N 497-12Y-2
FInDI_'_SS/CAT_Ry AS_14(HCU-1,2)/B
FAILURE MODES .................. _Open - Motorize hydrau_£c pump in back-up
system- loss of hydraulic press
Closed- No effect
Leakage - Possible hydraulic mal£unction
_,m_Ys_s
This is a standard Republic poppet type check valve and is
used to prevent high pressure back flow into the HEU stage not
being used. The body is aluminum alloy and the poppet is stain-
less steel, type 440. The seating surfaces are metal to metal,
and the seals are Teflon and 5una-N. Leakage requirements are:
external - none, internal - ] drop per 2 minutes. There have
no_-been any f_ilures reported on this valve.
ACTION
: Zhls eh_ek valve is ruggedly made for high shook, continuous
service in high velocity hydraulic systems. The check valve is
not considered contaminant sensitive and is not recomnended for
test.
O0000004-TSE 11
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Relief Valve (Hydraulic Check Valve)
SPECIF ICATXON NO. 75M06605
Republi=- Mf£. Co.-
F p,m mZRS/CATEGORYA5308(SCU-I,2")/B
u
FAILURE MODES Closed - Possible high boost pressure
Open - Loss of hydraulic pressure
Leakage - Possible hydraulic failure
ANALYSIS
This is a standard Republic poppet type check valve with a
cracking p;essure of 35 psi +_.6. The excess fluid from the low
p.ressu_e boost pump is diverted through the relief valve and
back to the reservoir. The body is aluminum alloy and the poppet
is hardened stainless steel, type 440. The seating surfaces are
metal to metal and seals used are teflDn, and Buna-N. Leakage
requlremer_ts are: external - none, internal - 1 drop in.2 minutes.
There are no reported failures on this relief valve.
ACTION
:" This relief valve (check valve) is ruggedly made for high
shock, continuous service in high velocity hydraulic systems.
• The relief valve is not considered contaminent sensitive and Js
not recommended for test.
O0000004-TSE12
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COMPONENTANALYSIS
COMPONENT Filter
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M06606 (Ray. C)
: VENDOR Fluid Dynamics
VENDOR P_,N 002922
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5307(HCU-1, -2)/B.
FAILURE MODES
Clogged -Loss of Hydraullc Sup_E!yl
ANALYSIS
This filter is a Fluid Dynamics i_ micron, nominal T-type
filter with 304 SS element. The unit is cleaned to NASA
specification by an outside cleaning facility. The element
has 230 square inches of effective filter area with a specified
flow capacity of 20 GPM. A FluidDynamlcs representative
indicated that all units they supply a_e tested to verify
bubble point, full flow, proof pressure, and _eakage require-
ments. He also indicated that tilesa_le unit can be modified
_: with a finer or coarser m_cron, rated element, if required.
It was indicated that the only problems to date with the subject
filters were incorrect handling procedures by some of the
outside cleaning facilities during cleaning operations. The
absolute rating of this unit is 25 micron and has a 1500 psi
differential collapse pressure. The Fluid Dynamics representative
also stated he has seen some of these elements completely
collapsed without allowing any contaminants to escape into the
- system.
ACTION i) Recommend bubble point test on element after cleaning.
. Specification does not call out a bubble point test.
_ 2) Investigate use of a finer micron rating element.
3) Investigate use of a AP indicator on the unit to
provide inuicatlon whey the _lement requires
replacement.
_=.. , , ....
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COMPOI_NTANALYS
COMPONENT Filter
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M06607
VENDOR Mar+el
yENDOR P/N. M2449
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORy A5304 (HCU -I, -2)/B
FAILURE MODES Clogged - Loss of hydraulic pressure
ANALq_IS
This filter is a I00 mesh (144 micron) sump type filter
with • flow capaclty of I0 GPM and filter area of I00 square
inches. The material construction is _03 stainless Steel with
a monel wire mesh screen. The suction from the 30 psi low
pressure pump will mot collapse the filter. The filter is
reclean_ble.
The purpose of this filter is to protect the low pressure
boost pump from contamination end remove the large contsmlnant
particles which would clog the I0 micron filter Juet downstr_
from the low pressure boost pump.
The chances of the filter becoming clogged ere very remote
because once the hydraulic fluid has been cleaned by recirculationj
the contamination lev_l in the reservoir should be low. Good
maintenance policy, such as changing the filter st regular In-
tervals and preventing contamination from entering the reservoir
would help to insure the filter does not become clogged.
ACTION
The sump suction filter is consld_red adequate for the
system end is not considered contaminant sensitive.
O0000004-TSF02
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
cOMPONENT Relief Valve
SPECIFICATION NO ...............75M06660
VENDOR Den_son Division, Abex Corp.
VENDOR P/N RIV 12-$45- $6
FIND NLrMBERS/CATEGORY A5316 (HCIJ-I,-2)/B
FAILURE MODES Open - Loss of Hydraulic Pressure
Closed - No Effect
Leakage - Possible Hydraul_c Failure
Ths system rellefvalve is a variable pressure, spring" loaded
poppet-seaUtype valve. It has a flow capacity greater than the
maximum flow of.the main stage high pressure pump. The relief
valve provides the system with a fluid unloading capabillty to
prevent over pressure, from the msln stage pump during a malfunction
of the pressure comepnsator.
Seal Material - Buna-N
Lubrication -K el-F-90
Leakage Allowed
External - None
Internal - 100 cc/minute
Flow Capacity - 30 gpm
The Denison Technical Representative said they had no con-
tsmination problems with this valve and that it would operate
properly in industrial cleaned hydraulic systems. He felt this
valve was less sensitive to contamination than the mslnstage
pumpj which is designed to operate on fluid cleaned to NAS
1638 Class 9. Failure analysis has revealed no failures due to
contamination.
ACTION
This relief valve (75M06660) is not considered contamination
sensitive and is.no_ recommended for test.
L ._ ,......... , , , =
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Snubber
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M06706
VENDO___R_Ope_ati.ng &Maintenance Specialty Co.
VENDOR P/N I1316-2-I-F
FZ_D _v_BERS/CAZECOR£ A534t(HCV-t,-2)/B
FAILURE MODES
Blocked - No SystemPressure Indication
Vented - Possible Ernoneous. Indication
ANALYSIS
Catalog information supplied on these specific snubbers--
stresses the point that thez_e snubbers are designed to be
"self-cleaning't to the point of operating in systems with
dirt and pipe scale. The vendor states that the unit contains
no filters, porous metal discs, rubber or plastic parts to
replace on clean. The above specifications along-_ith the
use of these snubbers in low flow requirements systems indicate
these parts will not be considered as a contaminant sensitive
part in-the system.
ACTION
Recommend the snubber not be conslder_d-for test.
O0000004-TSF04
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS .....
COMPONENT Pressure Switch
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M07505
VENDOR Custom Components Switch
VENDOR P/N 603G-C9-7S
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5342(HCU-I, -2)/B
FAILLrREMODES
Open -No System Pressur_ndlcatlon
Closed - Constant Indication
ANALYSIS
This switch is actuated by a Belleville disc spring.
The Belleville disc is the only pgrtlon o_ the unit contacted
by the fluid media and there are no other moving parts. There-
fore, this unit will not be considere_ as a contaminant sensitive part
of the system_
ACTION
Recommend the pressure switch not be considered for test.
_I ii| , m
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
. COMPONENT Cylind¢'r, Pneumatic
SPECIF_CAT ION NO. 75M07725
VENDOR Pathon Mfg. Co.
rE.OR P/N c-in47
FIND NUMB.ERS/CATEGORY A58 94 (2)/B ......
FAILURE MODES Stuck - No. tray withdrawal
Leakage - Possible withdrawal malfunction
ANALYS IS
The pneumatic withdrawal cylinder contains a cylinder body,
two heads, a piston, a rod, seals, two adjustable cushions, and a
wiper ring. The bore diameter is 2 inches_ stroke 20 inches and
rod diameter 1 inch.
This cylg.nder is similar to 75M06506-I and reference is to
be made to that analysis.
This cylinder is not recommended for test.
L I I I i I
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COMPONEI_ ANALYS IS
COMPONENT Cylinder, Pneumatic
S_[PECI2I_%TION NO, 75M07998
VENDO R .... Pathon Mfg. Co.
FI_D NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5811 (6-7)/A
FAILURE MODES Stuck - No tray withdrawal
Leakage - Possible retraction malfunction
" ANALYSIS
The pneumatic cylinder contalns a cylinder body, piston,
rod) seals and two end heads.
This cylinder is similar to 75M06506 and reference is to
be made to that anaLysi_ ....
ACTION
•. This cylinder is not recommended for test.
O0000004-TSF07
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Filter (10 Micron Nominal)
SPECIFICATION NO. _ 7__5.M08053(Rev. E)
VENDOR .Fluid Dynamics
VENDORPiN FXI802
FIN_ NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5395(I-8)/B, A34747(9)/B
FAILURE MODES
Clogged - Loss of 3000 psi Hydraulic Supply
ANALYBIS
This filter is a Fluid Dynamics I0 micron nominal filter
similar to 75_6606 (Item lO), the. only difference being operating
pressures, 3000 psi differential collapse pressure, 150 square
inches of effective filter area and-has 316 SS housing rather
than.aluminum housing. The element is the same 304 SS wire
mesh with the same flow capacity of 20 GPM of hydraulic "oil.
i
I I) Recommend bubble point test when elements are cleaned.
[. 2) Consider smaller micron rating element.
3) Similar to 75M06606
O0000004-TSF08
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COMPONENTANALYS%S
-. COMPONENT Cylinder, Pneuma tic
SPECI_C&TION NO. 75M08231
VENDOR Pathon MfE. Co.
VE_ORP!_.
_.z_ _._IC_,TEC@,RY A5583(4-8)IA
:: FAILURE MDDES Stuck - No arm retraction
Leakage - Possible ratract malfunction
The hydraullc-_neumatic-cylinder contains a cylinder body,
piston, rod, seals, and two heads_ The bore diameter is 7 inches,
stroke 52 inches, and rod diameter 3.25 inches.
This cylinder is similar to 75M06506-I and reference is to
be made to that analysis.
ACT ION
This cylinder is not recommended for test.
i ,, , | m ,, .....
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Pru ss,,rc_Switch
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M08323 (-2, -3, -4)
VENDOR Mel_t rol_Corp.
__ENDOR P/i 372-95-252, 372..135-246, 372-215
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5432(I-9)/B, A5511(I-8)/B, A5533(4-8)/B,
A5691(4-7)/B, A5767(6)/B, A5795(7)/B,
A5852(4-8)/B, A5883(2)/B, A5908(2)/B,
A5944(1)/B, A5991(4)/B, A6033(4)/B,
A6072(8)/B, A6104(8)/B, A6132(8)/B,
A6377(7)/B, A29741(6)/B
FAILURE MODES
Open - No Recharge Capability
Closed - Constant Recharge Attempt
I ANALYSIS
_, This pressure switch is a bourdon tube actuated switch.
As the only portion of thls unit that wlll be contacted by the
fluid media is the bourdon tube, there is no moving parts
within the unit to be contaminant sensitive and, therefore,
will not be considered as a contaminant sensitive part of the
system.
ACT ION
i Recommend the pressure switch not be considered for test.!
I
!
i
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Check Valve
¥
SPECIFICATION NO. 75M08325 (-1, -2, -3, -5, -6)
VENDOR James Pond Clark
VE,NDOR P/N 279TI-4NN, -6NN, -8NN, -12NN, -4_4
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5461(I-8)/B, A5561(4-8)/B, A5687 (4-7)/B,
A5710(6-7)/B, A5776(7)/A, A5823 (4-6)/B,
A5888(2)/B, A5917(2)/B, A5953(I)/B,
A5978(4)/B, A6036(4)/A, A6045(4)/A,
A6082(8)/A, A6092(8)/_, A6143(8)/A,
A6387 (7)/A, A6399(7)/B, A6419(7)/B,
A29606(7)/A, K29607(7)/A, A29875(4-6)/A,
.A_34.80.2(9)/B.
FAILURE MODES Same as 75M05365 (Iten I)
ANALYSIS Same aS 75M05365 (Item I)
ACTION Recommend the check valve not be considered for test.
i_
L
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Check Valve
VENDOR James Pond Clark
.VENDOR P/N Z79 TI-4NV, -6TB-I
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5782(7)/A, A29745(6)/A
FAILURE MODES Same as 75M05365 (Item I)
ANALYSIS Same as B75M05365 (Item I)
ACTION Recommend the check valve not be considered for test.
"-' ' O0000004-TS F12
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COMPONENT ANALYBIS
COMPONENT Snubber
SPECIFI.CAT.3.ON NO,_ 75MONA09
VENDOR Op_ratln_ & MainCen_nce_p_t_Ity Co,
V_NDOR P/.N. I1316-2-I-F and 75316-2-1-F
, FIND NUMBB.RB/CATEGOR..Y' AS431,(%-8)/B, A5510(I-8)/B, A55324-8/B,
A5690(4-7)/B, A5763(7)/B, A5766(6)/B,
A5849(4-7)/B, A5881(2)/Be AS907(2)/B,
A5943(1)/B, A6031(4)/B, A6070(8)/B,
A6102(8)/B, A6131.(8)/B, A6379(7)/B,
A29739(6)/_K, A34693(9)/B, A34726(9)/B.
FAILURE MODE@
Same as 75M06706
ANALYS IS
Same as 75M06706
ACTION
Recommend the snubber hot be considered for the-test.
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS_
Cp_po_ _t_rlng Valw
SPECIFICATION NO_. 75M08414 (-2, -3)
VENDOR Robblns Aviation
VENPOR p/N SSEG-375A-6C-768, SSKG-375A-8C-768
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5924(2)/B, A5957(1)/A, A5478(I-8)/A
A6251 (9)/A
FAILURE MODES Plugged - Possible retraction ml£unetlon--_--
ANALYSIS
Metering valve is a Robblns catalog stamlard metering valve
described as follows"
Operating pressure vacuum to 6000 psi, Jafety factor 4:l,
Cv = 0.90, zero external and internal leakage, orif,ice diameter
0.312 in., body materlsl 303 stainless steel, Burm-N seals,
approximately 6 turns to full open position. Robblns valves
have been widely used in industrial type applications. They
are not considered as a contaminant sensitive component for
this analys_s providing it i_ opened sufficiently to allow-
contdmlnants tO pass through the valve. Ope_ condition of the
valve _t time of this analysis has not been determine@. Galling
problem of threads has been attributed to impDoVer choice of materials
for bonnet and stem.
ACT ION
_lis valve is always fully open or fully closed, and is not
recommended for test.
/"
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CO_Ot_2_T Rel£_£ Valve (Hydraulic and Prteur_atfc)
I
_IF_AT_ON _O. 7_0A4t_ (-_, -2, -_, -SH, -_0H)
_._ Anderson Greer_d
_____ 2_o_a (-I, -2, -3, -sn etc.)
F.,I_-_S/CAT_GOtt¥ A5476(1-S)/A, A5486(1-8)/A, A5727(1-7)/B,
A5896(2)/]_, A29693 (3)/B, 29774(4-7)/B,
A34665 (9)/A, A34680 (9)/A, A3475:) (9)/B,
A34754(9)/B, A34797 (9)/A
YAILUI_ MODES Open - No arm retraction
Closed - No effect
Leakage - PosSible retract£on lnalgunction
_ALYS_
The relief valve consists of a stainless steel, body (303SS),
teflon and btma-N seals and a Delrin-seat. There have been 19
_aport.ed failurea en this valve and many of the failures due to
a Kel-F seat which was changed to Delrln by ECPO070. One failure
was noted as he_ caused by a contaminant Imp£nS/ng on the seat,
AC_IOM
The relief valve is not considered contr._inant sensitive and
is not recemmended f_r test,
i
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COMPONENT-A_ALFSL_
COMPONENT Check Valve
SP_CIFIC..,ATIONNO, 75M08617 (-3)
: VENDOR _ames Pond Clark
VENBOR_/N 5_9_t-SD-4
i
FIND NUMBERB/C_k_TEGORY A5610(5-7)/B
_AILURE MODES Similar to Item 1 75M05365
ANALYSIS Valve design not conaldered to be contaminant, sensitive.
This item similar to 75M05365 (laem I) and vendor =epresentatlve
classed this, design as n_a-contamlnant sensitive same aso-the 200
series type check valves.--
ACTION .Recommend the check valve no,-be consi_er.e_..for _est.
,/
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_0_0:_ Accumul. t or
_-_LQ,. 75M08814 (-2)
Vg_DO_, American Bosch A_a Corp.
V_OR P/_ ZCS41=414
FZ_. NL_H_E_/CATEGORY A5468(I-8)/A, A5654(4-7)/B
' _A_L._RE.MODES Stuck Piston - No hydra=lle supply
Leakage - Possible hydraulic failure
A_ALYSI
The accumulator contains so pCsCon, c)'li_tder, and two end
cap_, one for GN2 input and the other for hydraulic fluid input.
The GNp input forces the piston downward, exerting pressure against
the hy_raulic fluid. The p_ston moves up ot down according to
the pressure relationship between the hydraulic fluid and C_2.
Attached to the accumulator, at the GN2 end, is a level switch
which indicates the position of the pi_ton__Jrnd__hento recharge
the hydraulic end.
Seal Material - Buna-N _p_r.HZL-F-25,73Zor equ_l
Lubrication---L-TheSpec calls o_¢ Kel-f-90 grease or MZL-H-5606
hydrauli_ fluid. Atlantic Refining Co. #54 lubricant
wlll be used and the Spec change.
Leakage Allowedz
External - Bubble tlg[_:
: Internal - i0 drops per_,15 minutes (hyd)
. 5 cc per mln_te.(QN2)"
Clearances - 3 to 6 thotmand_hs between piston and barrel
,)
¥1nish - I0-14 micron-Luc_-RHS.
According to the American Bosch Ai_naCorp. Technical
Representative, thei_ normal clean/n@ process was to mechanically
_ brush the components using a soft bristled brush and flush using
a compatible solven_. _ey per£o_ the £u_ctional, _eak, and proof
pressure test on all a_sembled eccumulators. The accumulators which
are required to meet NASA cleanlr_ specs are then sent to the cleaning
00000005-TSA06
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vendor (ConTac or Wiley LaJ_) before h_ug installed in the
; 8arvlce Arm flystam. The accumulators are dlsasaambled and cleaned
aceordlng to spaelflcatfon control dcawlng eleanllueas requirements.
Then they are reassembled using new seals, leak checked and functionally
tested.
There ha_e bean s_var_l f_i_urea of accumulators af_4_r only a
few cycles oK oper_io=_nd it was appa=ently duc to tSa cl_anip4_
pVocass.-us_d _y the cleaning ve_do_,- The main failures, wage d_ to
O-rlng _plralLng, bare surfec_ deterioratlon_ an_ O-rln$ damage
upon insta_ation. There were several recommended changes, to be
made to the S@ecificatien Co_ol Drawings according to NASA internal
report number 5-6250-H-614 Dated 17 September 1968.
_t was the opinion of the Bosch Technical Representative that
the accumulators were being "cleaned to _e&th". Changing the cleaning
methods may well improve the ore=art system cleanliness and =ellabillty,
in addition to dec=easlng the accumulator failu=_-4mte.
An unsatlsfa_tory c_ditlon report (E8C400720 dated 9-2&-68) was
just received and ir_icated an accumulator had O-=ing damage and
scored inner walls, which was eviden_ly caused by an eccentrlc
loading frem ire leve_ switch to the piston. Also, upon replacement
of the soft go_s o_ all of the accumulators-from mobi_ launcher I,
due to intern_l damage and leakage problems_ an accum=lator was found
that h_d ap_ro_inmteiy 98 percent of the plating go_e from inside the
cy_inde_ and the-Oaring se_ling surface was scored.
Due to the-above emtlysls the accumulator is not considered
contamlnatlon sens_tlve. Contamination generation _ay be a problem
unless the recommendations in report 5-6250-H-614 are approved and
solve the problem e_ cleaning the _ccumulators.
ACTION
Although not considered to be contamination-sensltlve,
failure history would indicate the need for test. This compo-
nent also represents a major category of components on the
Service Arms. Recommend this accumulator be considered for
: tee t.
,?
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
_. Backpressura V.ivo.
Rl'w_tt.
VENDOR P/N. 22'16A
FZNM NIIMBEF.S/CATEGORY_ A,q_O2t'I,.R)/A, A 5_o'_,(:t-_)!AN.. A34P, O_',(9)/A
FAXLtrRE MODES Closed - Arm w£1] not retract
Loakagc_ -PossJbl_, I_£I; hydraul.[,c !_y_;t_m
The backpressure valve consists of two bodies mounted on a
subp_ste assembly. Each body contains an adjusting screw, spring,
spool, and a seat. The valve maintains a constant backpressure
in the hydraulic return llne.
Seal Material - Buna-N per MZL-P-25732
Lubrication - MIL-H-5606 Hydraulic Fluid or KeI-F-90 Grease
Leakage - Internal - 5 cc/minute
External - None
Flow Capacity - 120 gpm at 60 spl pressure drop
., Set Pressure - 80 • 5 psim-i
The only moving part in this valve is the spool, which moves
off the seat to allow fluid flow. The radial clearance between the
spool and valve body is .003 to .006 of an inch. Failure due to
the spool stlcking open or closed is considar,'_dvery unlikely.
, Also failure due to l_akage caused by contamination is unlikely
_ because the seat area is large and the seat is made of Buns-N,
• which is a good, soft sealing material.
One £ailure was reported on this valve, which indicated internal
,.. leakage was caused by deformation and contamination of the soft seat
, sealing surfaces. This type of failure is not considered critical
to the system because the fluid lost would be replaced by the
backpressure system and a positive pressure maintained. Also, the
' chances of this failure happening are rather remote.
' ' ' 00000005-TSA08
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MCR-69-484 B-37
COMPONENT Pilot Operated Valve
S_ECIF t_AT ION NO. _5M08821
FiND _MBF_S /C_,,TE_Ri A5513 (l-8)/A
F.AmU_ mD_S
#I or #2 Deenergized No Arm Retraction
#I or ¢#2 Energized Possible Semi Extension Malfunction
#1 o= #2 Open Possible Extension Malfunction
#I or #2 Cloaed No Arn_ Ratractlon
#i or #2 Leakage Possible Retract Malfunctlon -
ANALYSIS
The pilot operated valve is a two-way, two-position valve
wtt_..his exterrmlly operated by solenoids. A detent mechanism
locks the ball in the frillopen or closed position. The valve
consists of.solenoids, piston, rack and ball. The solenoid valves
consist of a poppet and seat assembly. W11en the solenoid is
energized the inlet is open to outlet and de-energized the inlet
• is blocked and the outl_t is vented.
Seal-Materlal - Buna-N per MIL-P-25732
i'. Lubrication - KeI-F-90 Grease
Leakage Allowed
External - None
Internal - None
Cleaning - Flodyne does their own cleaning to MFSC-PROC-166D
Solenoid Valve Specs
: Solenoid Pull - 25 Ib
:, Spring Return - 8 ib
Solenoid Stroke - 0.005 in.
Orifice to Piston - 0.060 in.
- - O0000005-TSB01
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Piston to bore clearance 0.060 _,
Displacement per Stroke 0.6 in,
Th_ Flodyne Technlc,l _pres_n_iv_. said they had no _o_-
tamlnation problem with this ¢om_o_t,. li_ said _ _o_enoid
valve portion of this component would b_ th_ most sen_L_ive to
contamln_tion. An Inl_t filter i8._t u_ on the p_euma_ic-
solenoid valve used on this comp_uenL, b_t.F-1odyue doe_ use inlet
filters on o_her so_enoid v_Lv_s-whlch they bBild.
This valve is the ,_a.me as. th_ hydraulic p.:l,,lo1_ open,ted valve
(P/N 15C150) except that th_s one has two solenoids. _he valve
is 'considered not to be contaminet£on s.ens£tive except for.the
solenoid portion, The flow thro_$h the soleno.£_ £n one cycl_
is very small and tends to reduce its ¢ontsmin_ion-aens£tlvity,
Further study will be conducted to dete_nine ££ the s_lenold
portion should be consi_lered for test,.
AC T£ON
2he soJ.enoid is used in a low flow application_ This valve is
not recommended for test.
O0000005-TSB02
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_EC_F._I_TI01¢NO-, 75M08822(-i, . 3)
' YAV.L_., ,NOI_S. 't_akase-- _ossLble pre_ture retra_t.ion
Closed - N_ a_ retraction
Open ,. No effect ...........
ANALYSIS
The.val_e, is a.p.Llotoperated valve suppl-led by Kemp
Industrles.to meet.the.75H08822-spe¢i£1cation. The valve is
opeTated by two solenoi_ v_Ives.,one to o_en the valve and the
other to release th_.Lockln_ fingers whLc_hold, the vaLve and
allow,it.to close by.spring _0¢ces which allo_ .pilot.pressure
to vent and t_e main.poppet to.clGsa, Tha valve £s des_d
for.o_eratlng .p/es6_reo£ 3000_ps£g.gasecem, nitroge_-wi_h,a.
flow.fa_.to_,- of-.2..O SL_/.I_SIA. The body macarLal is 202A-.T_,.
aluminum allz_y.(_nod_ze_> an& trim.ma_rials, aL¢o_a_:a20_-_
&lumi_um,_ Elas_me_s are:Del_i= or Btma_N-.(b_4:h.shawn,i= Kemp
draping-).. _he valvP,_has,no failure,hls.torycom_ccecL wlch.__
contaminant p.robl_m_. The.valve will remain in its l_st
er_er._£zed,poaltLo_.wi_h a _ower lo_s to.hott_solenoids. This
vaLve.-conr_ins: no. small ort£tces er. exceptional _i_h_ tolerances
as it is.all standa=d "0." ring design wLth. Kel-P.90 grease £_r
lubnlca_i0n,- _he pilot v_nt is sc-ceen_d for _ro_ectlon from
ex_ma5 contamina_e. K_np representatives cons.lder,the valve
is not contamina/Itsensi_i'-eand would pre£er _ sup@Ly the
valve cO._IS/I y clean=_, such tlmt. the/ cGu/d clean and. test
the-valve-£;,.their ow= facility._ For"_hi_ ana_ysis_ the valve
is: not considered,t:o. be _e_aminant sensitive and w_L_ not be
cons/dared a cand/date for t_st_
ACTm_
Recomme_i th_.v_Ive n_¢ be considered £o¢.-test_
O0000005-TSB03
OC_II)ONENT.a,NAL¥8_.
VE_I_OR.P/_ 806097._5.10_- _)
?_ m_m_s/cAZ_r As4_?(_-s-)IS,As4_0(_a).l_,AS4_O(_.S_./.B,_
AS_60_4_-_)./-B, AG_78_4-8)./A,..AS_50(4.-E)L_
A_m_(O/s,As_._(4)/a.,_4s_4(9.)/A,
A348 22(9) lB
_LURE, H0_8 De-enetZ£Ze_ - No precha_ge_ no. r.et_ac_on,
system ma1_unct£on ..
Ehe_g_zed - System mlfunction.
Leakage - Poss£ble system malfnnction.
Th£s valve £s a _a:ot_a soSeao£_ v_tve_. 2-way, 2 posLt_on_
noranalAy _losed_. wAth. 1/2" £nch. male. _£tt£ngs. The valve is
des£g_ed £o_. 3000-ps£ gaseous n£trogmt, o_ _y_au_£c. fLu£d operat_n_
t_ss_e with _ 0.20 inch.ESEOD. (CD:= _. 6).,.Res@.onsetime £s 15.
mtlt£-seconds mexi_mm_ t_tet_ts_ i_t. the val_e-aze 30_.ser.tes.
s_inles_ sr_1, nylon,seat,_and.Buna-N..seals,.&nd KeI-F.:grease ....
_o_ lub_i_tio_..o TJae-op.erat_on-o.f the-va_v_ £s very. s£mila:" to
the-7"5M08825except £t is a ts_a,.way valve..,and.is I_2"£nch tuba
sLze..rathe_ tbAm. 1l_ £n_h tube size.. Therefore, _h£s. valve is
also conside_edo not to be contam£nant sensLtive but w_l_ be. g.£ven
£_rA:h_ conalderatiou,as a .-tes_candidate.. Th£a valve i_ s£milar
t_ vaXve used,by Martln-ln gaseeus-nitroger_system clea_:_<L tO
I_PS50405level Co
A_OS
Vzlve was--u.sed in--_ests' to complete the sy_.t.n_£n.
.... O0000005-TSBO
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COMPONENTA_LYSlS
COMPONENT _oleno _d V_Ive
s__cz_!C_T_p_no. _ae24C._, -2)
VENDQ_...__R Merotta VaLve Carp_ .......
_N_z__,/N 22eL_4-_z, -o5
_'Z_D"T0Z_g.-_S/CA'_.GO_¥A5787(7)/B, A5837(_-7)/B, ._887(2)1B,
A59Z4(2)IB, A5952(l)/_,AeOn3(4)/e,
A6038(8)/B, Ae090CS)/B, A6135(8)I]_,
A6400 (7)/B,...A29731 (6)/B
_AZLUgE MODEl De-energized - No bottle reehar_e
-- Enersized - Constant re_harSe attempt
Lea_g._ - Constant recharge attempt
,Azq_YSzs
Thls valve for analysls purposes according, to Marotta.
engineerln 8 is similar to 75M08825. The valve is a two-way,
two posltiOn,, norms.fly cl_sed, valve for use with. 3000 psi
gaseous nit :_gen.. The valve has a 0.i_ inch _SEOD, I/_. inch
pert.. The remainder e£ the analysts will be _e sam_ as for
This v_ive was used in tests to complete the system circuit.
............. 00000005-TSB05
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COMPONEN_ _,a_YSX8
_;PF.CIFICATIONNO_:. 75M08825(-2)
v_ZKDj?R tm_ottaWlv_ c_p.
.=
225BB4(-02, -0_)
_FIND._fMBERS/CATEGOR.Y A5762(4-7)/B, A5792(4-7)/B, A5844(4-7)/B,
A5879(2)/B, A5895(2)/A A5904(2)/-B,
A5940(1)/B, A5985(4)IB A602B(4).IB,
A6066(8)/B Abft99(B)/B A6128(8)/_,
A6382(7)/B, A29736(6)/B
FAILURE MODES De-energlzed - Can't check traneducer
Energized - No system readoat_constant
chaxge
Leakage - P_ssible eironeous readout
ANALYSIS
This is a Ma:otta solenoid vaLve, 3 way, 2".positiott,2 inlets
;_nd1 outlet with I po;t (closest t_ s_leztoLd,), n_mmt_ly sprin_
closed. The unit is designed for 3080"ps.iope_=&ag pressure _elth
gaseous nitrogen and bubble tight leakage. The valve has aluminum
body (anodized), 303 S$ stem, rwlon seat and Buna,N.seals. The
unit has 1/4 inch tu_,:size male fltclugS. The str_okeon.the
Marotta solenoid valves is approximately ._20 itch.. The valve is
standard "O" ring type design with balanced poppet con.figuration.
The valve has no small orifices o_ pilot,ports, etc._ whleh might
become clogged from normal system contamlnants.. The valve for
this analysis is considered not to be contaminant sensitiv.e,
Marotta project engineer indicated they f.eel,thair s@lenold vah,es
would operate satisfactorily under their comme=cial clean, conditions
which they estimate to approach the MSI_ 164 specification level.
T/aesevalves will be given further consideration as test candidates.
,, .ACZZON
Valve was used in test circuit.
II I I IIII H O0000005-TSB06
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cOMPO_ ANALYSIS
COMPONENI' Solenoid Valve (Pilo_ Opcratod)
7s 0ss26
VENIX_..._R garotte-Valve Corp
V_I_X)R ,P/N 227154 -2, -4
FIND NUMB_S/CATEGORy AS663(4-8)/A, A6081(8) /A, A6113 (8)/A,
' A6368(7)/A, A6405(7)/A
FAILURE MODES De-energlzed - System MaL_unction
Leakage " '_-
GN 2 Cloeed - " "
ANALYSIS
This valve is a Marott_ three way, two pesltlon valve With
tn¢o pilot valves. The pilot valves are solenoid, valves, two way,
two position, nez_ally closed valves. The valve is desLgned for
gaseou_ nitrogen or hydraulic f_uid usage. Design operating
pressure is 3000 pslg inlet, atmospheric vent, and 600.to 1500 pslg
actuating port. The valve has 3/4 _nck fittings with a 0.500 inch
ESEOD. The valve materials are 300.series, st_inles_ steel, nylon
sea_s, Buna-N seals and. Dow _o_nfng. F_:I2EI lubrication. The, valve
has a screened port and cheek -valve in actuation p_essu_e inlet.
There is an app_oxlma_e .020 in¢l_dlame_er po_t in t.he bleed side
to the vent solenoid. This solenoid has been replaced with an
orifice in the -4 conflgu_atlon. Stroke on both poppets is
approximately .I00 inch._ Although this valve is more complex with
two solenolds, two mai= sears, etc., the valve is sti.ll considered
by Mazotta not to be contamlnant sensitive and indicate they could
operate the valve satisfactorily at their commercial clean level,
This val_g-is not gocoaaaended for tests.
I I i , , ,
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,__P_OI_'_(:AT_O_I_)-t 75MOR82"L---
,FEN_R. HaroCta Valv-_C_=p.
VE_IX_ P/b] 227404- 2
_._ mJt_RS/fA_b"_Y A5730(4...7)/A
FAILURE MODES De-energized -Syscem M_l_uncCion
Ener.g£zed - " "
t! *!
Leaka, ge
Neu_ra i.Po_. - " ""
Normal Pos, - " "
AN_LY8_S
_ _ i i i....
For analysis,purpo#es this valve is slmilar_to 75M08826,. This.
valve is a four-way, three posltlo= valve and ¢on=aSns two pilot
valves, £ndi_ating-switch, _wo-stems_ tw_ poppet a,semblies, two
springs and r pisto_ The. valve is- desiog.ed for. use wi_.gaseous
n/trogen an_ h_drmullc fluid,. Operating _essu_s o._the valve are
750 psi 8 1,_ p.t'es.su,_e in.let:,. 3000 t_s'ig bi_ pressu,te i'_et, a_.d
600 to 1500 ps_. au_ua_£o_ p=essure.. The valve has 3/4 Ineh
fittings an_ 0-.500: inch ESEOD. Actu&_ion.por_ is _/4 inch..
M_te_lals are 316-stainless-_eel bod_, 304 s_inless steel poppet,
nylon,s.ea_s,and Buna-N Seals., Kel-¥ 90 grease is _ for
lubricatlo_. The ae_u_tion port ¢ontain_ a screen and a check
valve sam_ as the 75M0882_ valve.. The remainder of the ana_ysls
for _hi.__.valvewill be the same as for 75M08_26. _
ACTION
_his valve is no_ recommended f_r test.
-. " 00000005-TSB08
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
.COt_pNENT RogL,I-ator
S_B_Z_QAT].ONNO, 7_M08829
y_)R Ma_o_.,=Valvecorp.
227464-Jtl
: FZND N_ZRSJCATSGROY AS785(7)/B, ASf35(4-7)/B, A5886(2)/B,
AS913(2)/_,ASgSI(1)/B,AS956(1)/A,
A6022(4)/B,_A60ST(S)/B,AS089CS)/B,
A6I_(f)/B, AS40t(l)/B,A29730(6)/B,
_47oscs)/s
_A_LU_ MODES
Closed - No Recharge; NO Withdrawj Reconnect.
Erratic - Possible Low Charge
ANALYSlS
ThiJ Marotta hand operated r_tgulator is for GN 2 usage.
A=eor..d_r_ to Mora_a1"s re_esenta=ives =he design is similar
to a unit used by MM_ (MMC pa-rtN_. PD48g0124-109). The unit
_s aJsemble_with _it=ing filters in the inlet_ outlet, and
vent ports. T_e moe= s_g_ificant _ ":_:ence betwee_ the MMC!
U_t_t an@ this unit is the MMC unit uses omnlseals rather than
" "_ rings and has a large sensing piston for tighter accuracy
requi=ements, There has been. no failure history of these parts
in the l_IC level "C _ _lean _ystem. T_lerartces and clearances
of the MM_ and subject part are essentially the same according
=o Marotta!eenglneer_8 representatives, This is not a high
flow device as i=s normal use is to pressurize the dome of a
higher flow dome _egulator.. The flo_ past the poppet and seat
would be the critical area for conEa_ina_ts to cause leakage
problems Which is p_otected against by use of the fitting
• filters descrlbed-above. As these parts are required to perform
., with a certain accuracy in the system they will be considered
as a possible test candidate to be tested during the new proposed
cleanliness level test program,
Recommend that this regulator be considered for test.
O0000005-TSB09
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COMPONENTANALYSIS
VENDOR Mnrotta Valve Oorp.
VENPoR_/N 219oo_(-BISS,.J151)
FIND NUMBERS/OATECd_¥ A54t9(I-8)/l_,A34734(9) IB
PAILURE. MODES Closed - Loss of hych sys. back pr,_sllur¢,
standby hyd, press.
Erratic- N_ effect. Gould cause hold
early in count} soft standby sy_J,
A_%LYSIS
This regulator is sim£1ar to 75M08829 except for lower
operar.ing pressures. The 75M08829 was designed for i0,000 psi
Lnlet and 3000 psi outlet. This r,'Eulator is designed for
3000 psi inlet and 0-150 psi eta,-,: ,'ith a factor of .05 SCFM/PSIA.
The unit is designed for use wilL1 gasser,s nitrogen or hydraulic
fluid. Materials used in cortst_uetion of the regulator are 2024-T4
aluminum body, 300 series staln1%ss steel poppet, nylon seats and
Buna-N seals. KeI-F 90 g=ease is used as lubricant. As these
parts, llke t};e 75M08829, a_e Eequlred to operate automatically
with a certain _ccuracy, these parts will be considered as possible
test candidates. Marotta engineering has indicated they can
operate these regulators satisfactorily at their commercial clean
level which approaches the MSFC 164 level. Martin has used similar
regulators in ground pneumatle systems for a number of years with
EPS 50405 level C cleaning wi_h no contamination problems.
.ACTION
Recommend that this valve be conslderecL for test.
.----,
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lqP,R-6 9-h 84
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t_(IHPONI'NTANAI.YSTB
I-,i,_I[._(_(,'...'.Ir,J_.'_;_!L /r.l,lOl_,H3](.2)
.q,h!_. fl_J,,ll:.Vn]_Ip LIorp,
,vJ':l-_!_j,_!.!!1!! 2,:10904(-1] ) _VT_
]'I'.;i_ ill . ." _,, " ' ' •
.........9ihL,:,,,.J_,ALI,,_,"._2_J ,_mlTS(IOIA, ASIO_(P,)/A, A6373('I)IA,
An4]O(7)IA
l:All,iIIJ,1,', I,IO1_1,;I-I Cl._(_d - No withdrawal
Err,,iti.c - Withdrawal r_ll, functton
ANAL_.S I_o
. .=_=,
'.l,'llj_; 1':(.,l_uln_nr J.fl _! three way, sprillg re,ere, need t preset
prt'_;m,re r_l;ulator. The regulator is dasigned for use with
[_1:-;0.011'_ll'il'l:'OI;ell. The unit is designed eo mintain the outlet
prr,,,;_.'.rc, (_itber by flow from inlet to outlet to increase
pre.,;v,.r¢, ov by J lo_ _,I't.n ol_l'let to vent to reduce pressure to
1-13¢:l,re,_t,r i-,ross_re level within a certain accuracy. The unit
iS d,,';igrt_,t-1 for an inlet'pressure of 4500 psi maximum and an
(_tl|.]t,/ pressttre range of 50-190 ps£, The valw_ has a flow
latter of 0.5 scfm/psi. The inlet port is 3/8 inch and the
outlet pert is 1/2 inch. The unit does have a screen around
the i_lel:p3rt of the poppet to protect against contaminant_
i(appr_x. 157 m eron), As the un_e. is not subject to contaminant
damage undur .orm._l operation, it is not considered contaminant
sensitive. Marotta engineering £mdicates the unit should work
satisfactorily in their cormmercial clean condition. This
regulotor is _ standard Marotta regulator design, and similar to
Martin part number PD4880124-179.
ACTION
Recomm_,nd that this valve be considered for test.
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COMPONENT.ANALYSIS
.COMPONEI_I_r__. Automatlc Shutoff Vslvo
9P_C!FlCAT.!ON NO_ 75MOSS36(-i)
VENDO.R M_rottn Valve Corp,
232744-3 (FVA 12)
FIN_DNUMBERS]CATEQORY A6374(7)/A, A6396(7)/A
FAILURE MODES Closed - No effect
Open - No withdrawal
Leakage - Withdrawal malfunction .............
ANALYSIS
This v,_Iveis an automatic shutoff valve which operates
with 45(}0psi n_troger_gas, The valve remains open untll
.. pressure drol.across valve increases to 40 .p&i. The materials
are 303 CRES, nylon seat, Buna_N.seals and Zel-F 90.g_ease for
lubrication. The.valve has 3/4 inch ports, As the valve is
only for £tow control, and £1ow _e such that _arttcles should
flow through valve .easily, it is not considered as contaminant
sGnsit£ve and will "not be considered as a tes_-candfdate.
ACTION
Recomuend thi_-valve not be considered for
........ ' " ' ...... 00000005-TSB12
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Solenoid Valve
SPECIFICATION NO, 75k/_839
VEMDO___.__R ITT Aernspace Cbnt 2"0Ls-.<Former ly Genera i _ont roLs)
AV.14al163
 ¢S mRS-/C TEV,0 Ya54 9(1--_a)/A
FAILURE MODE6 _q or #2 Deenerglmed - So S_-Auto Retraction
#I or #2 Energized -No Sem'_-Auto Retraction
Leakage - Nn_Ef/ect
ANALYSIS
The. solenoid valve is a _ydraullc_ pilot operated_ 4.way, 3
posltlon._y_llndeL lock v_ive,. In, contains Z end..cap_, _ Detainer:
and plato,, assembly, spool assemSly_ two..solenolds_ seet and ball
"assembly and. filter assembly. Up_ energlzLug aolenold No. 1 or
No. 2+ hydraulic fluid flows through the ball and seat.assembly to
the _is_on assembly which causes._he spool-_to shift and dlre=t
hydraulic pressure to Port No.. i or No, 2, All pgrts a_e blocked
whea the salenold is not energized.
Seal Ma_erla_ --Buna-/%per MIL-P.-.25_32and MIL-P-5510
Leaka&e = External --Btd_1_le;tight.
In_ernal - 5.cc per minute
Lubrlca£1on - KeI_F-90 grease.
Clearances - Spool to sleeve clearance +O0005 to .0001 of an
inch based upon leakage allowance
Filter Assembly - 50 micron
The solenold is protect_ agalns_ contamlna_t.on in the.ball
and seat assembly by 50 micron filtration an_ the forces on the
spool are _uffleien_ to pr_venE sticking... There. have Been rio
_epo_ted fail_rea due to _outa_nattuat£_n and Only one failure
due to £n_e_al l_a_e,. _ valve i_ ve_ gimilar to the
Sterer 75M08841 solenoid val_e but t_ forces to _rate the
spool are such _eater,
o.
UUUUUUU_ lO_,.,u I
B-50 MCR-69-484
AC_IOI;
m
This valve is not considered contaminant ee_itive a_t-is
not _ecommeaded for.test.
00000005-TSC02
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COI_ONENT ANALYS_S
COMPONENT Solenoid V_Ive
SPECIFI__T:[ON NO. 7,";MO_41 (-1, -3)
VENDOR Starer l_ngineering Company
y_R p/N 26370-2 (37890 - new part per Starer Eng Rap)
FZND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5479(1-8)/A, A29677(I-2)/A
A34660(9)/A, A34661(9)/A, A34769(9)/A,
AB4772(9)/A, A34779(9)/A, A34784(Q)/A
FAILURE MOBES Stuck Straight No arm. retract
Stuck crossed No Qffect
Leakage Pussible retract malfunction
ANALYSIS - The solenoid valve is a fottr-way, two-position, double
solenoid, hydraulic selector valve. The solenoid contains a spool
and sleeve assembly that is operated by energizing the solenoids
The movemovement of the spool and sleeve assembly allows hydraulic
fluid to flow through the ports. The valve has a mechanical latch
which allows the valve to remain in its last energized position.
Seal Materlal Buna-W per I_L-P-25732 or equa.1
Lubrication - Kel-f-90 grease or MIL-H-5606 hydraulic fluid
Leakage allowed - External - No leakage
Internal - I0 cc pe_.r_m!ng_e
Critical tolerances - Spool to sleeve clearance ,00005 to .0001 of
an inch based upon leakage allowance.
Solenoid Pull - 12 lb. (50Z greater for new P/N)
Solenoid Travel - .065 of an inch
The Sterer Technical Representative said that 75M08841-I (P/N26370-2)
was changed to 75M08841-3 (P/N 37890)o The basic change was ID the
switching mechanism and addition of a solenoid with approximately
50Z greaterpull. The Sterer Technical Representative al_o felt this
valve was not contamination sensitive and slmilar spool type valves
are used widely in aircraft systems which allow much more contamina-
tion than the NASA Specs. now imposed on this valve. He also said
00000005-TSC03
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a statlstical anslysls as to this valv_ st£Qklng or malfunctioning due
to contamination would b_ enough to scare a pe_son--bu_ that the
valves d_-work,
i Many repozts h_v_ boon w_itten on se_vo valv_s_whJ.oh hsve _ spo_l,
i wh/ch have cleazances as tlgh_-.and tIgtt_er than this valve, and in
o=_e= _ /_£I. the.spool by st£cki_t_ the eonrmmln_tt_r_ levels h&_ _=
be ext=_e%y high,. Levels. ttigh_s tha_ NA$ 1638 class I0%, whlek is
tho dirtiest l_el in this. spec, we=e r_qut=ed in order, to cause
the spool to stick, r_hecor_ta_taatlon was actually so high that
convan_io._l methods could not be used for checking contamination
levels._ T_me was a facto= and spools would wear at much cleaner
levels. St_¢king was caused by eil_ing of small particles which_get
in-between, the spool a_ sleeve assembly.
This particular val_e is used for supplying p.ilot pressure_to the
F_odyne pilot operated ball sh_t-off valve and the volume og flow is
ve=y low (app¢ox£mately 6/I0 of _ cubic inch). This low flow will
reduce the chances of the spool sticking due to silting if the oll
contains high contamination levels.
ACTION
Vendor expe_ience and-very low float toes not £ndicate the
need for tests.
.., ,'_
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.CpMPON ANALZSZS
COMPONEN_ Cho.ekValve
secj!r,A'r 1.9.N...pp;, 7 oo7
%_NDOR Republic M£g. Co.
,VENDORP/N 455-3288 & 9.'663"Z
FIND NUMBERS/CATEC_)RY A5475(I-8)/A_ A5553(4-8)/A, A34698(9)/A,
A34770(9)/A, A34773(9)IA, A34775(9)IB,
A34777 (9)/B, A34809(9)/A
FAZLURE MODE..S Open.- No retraction
Closed - No effect, poss£b$e extend
malfunction, no a_m extend or
retract
Leakage - PoSsible retract mal£unction,
extend malfunction
ANALYSIS
This is a standard Republic poppet type check valve, except
fo= the gr_ylo¢ fittings. The check valve has a 1 1/2 diameter
amd a £1ow capacity o£ 120 gpm at 28 psi pressure drop. The body
is stai_less steel, type 303, and the poppet is hardened stainless
steel, type 440. _he seating surfaces are metal to metal and
seals used are Teflon and Buna-N. Leakage requirements are."
external - _ero and internal - 1 drop in 2 minutes. Two failures
were repo_rtedon this check valve; both were external leakage and
were not-c_d by cQntamlnatlon.
" ACTION
This check valve is ruggedly made for high shock, continuous
s_rvlce in high velocity hydraulic systems.. The check valve is
not conBidered contaminant sensitive and is not recomnended for
test.
m I II I I I I I ,,, , , , ,m
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Cyl lnd er
SPECI_%CAT_QN NO. 75M09014
i _ Pathon Mrs, _o.
VENDOR_/N
FIND NIR4BEILq/CA,.TEOOR_, Ae00?(4)/A, A6018(4)/A
FAILURE MODES Stuck - No LO_ cylinder wlthdzawal
Leakage - Possible withdrawal malfunctiu4z
A_,.LYSZS
The 75M09014 becomes the 76K00084 by r.epla_emen_ of u-cup
seals with "o" ring seals.
The withdrawal cylinder.contains a body cylinder, piston,
rod, wiper ring, seals, two head's, and an adjustable cushion.
The bore diameter is 3 inches and rod diameter 1.125 incheS.
The cylinder is similar to 75M06506-I an_t reference is
to be made to that analysls_
ACTION
See 75M06505 for action analysis.
" "' " ' ....... 00000005-TSC06
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qom?p ANAL,Y SZS
COMPONE_ L_v_l Control ,qw:[l:chA_.r,mbl.y
sPc;_n:C_A//pNN_0. 7 M092s3
VENDOR Hayep Aircraft Corp.
v,poz
F_ND NUll, _:_s/CA'.rE=ORY A5470(I-8)/B, A6249(9)/B, A6250(9)/B,
A6290(9)/B, A6292 (9)/B
FA._LVR_ MOD_ES Open - No accumulator recharge
Clogged - Constant recharge attempt
Leakage - Possible hydraulic malfunction
The level control switch assembly is s.single pole,
double-throw, mechanically operated switch assembly. The level
switch contsias d harness assembly with a switch, s piston which
actuates the switch, s vent valve, end s_ntered, restrictor. The
level control switch indicates the position o£the accumulator
piston and activates the hydraulic chargin8 solenoid valve to maintain
the pl'oper hydraulic level In_the aecumulecor_ .....
Lubrication -Dew Coming DC-55 Silicone Grease on packing
s=d sliding surfaces.
Seal Material - Buna-N per MI_5732
Leakage - External None
S trok_ - 2.06 inches
The level switch has a sintered restrictor which regulates
nitrogen to purge the switch end proteot against explosion and
fire hazards.
The only _ovlns part of the level switch assembly exposed
to the pneumatic/hydraulic system is the piston, which protrudes
into th_ pneumatic end of the accumulator. There has been a
failure of • level switch when it required 750 pounds to actuate,
but it does not appear to have been caused by contamination.
ACTION
The level control switch is not considered to be contsmlr_nt
Sensitive end is not recommended for tedt.
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COI_.OI_I_ANALYSlS
COMPONE_ Sel_no_d Va$v_
VENDOR Ma=o_t_ V_Iv_ Col:p.
eZNDNU_,,m_/Cruz,_m_ _2(7)/_, AS809(7)/A, Ase_(4.7)/A,
A_1_60(4-7)/A, A5868 (4)/A, A5871 (4)./^,.
A59n(2)/A, _0(4)tA, Ae049(4)/A,
A60S3(4)/A,A6054(4)/_ _14_(e)./A,
A6150(8)/A, A_453(4-7) tA, A6420(4-7)/A,
A29753(6)/A_ 11190(6)/A (by vendor P/_I___.
_5S3)
F,AILUREMODe8 De-e_ergized - NO kickof£ or no wlthArawal
Kuer_£_ed - Possible premature kickoff
o_ withdrawal
Leakage - Possible pz.emmturekicko_
ozu-_ithdrawal
ANALYS_S
Tkls valve £o_:analysis purposes a¢cor_in_ to Maretta
engineerlag £s s£m_Llarto 75M08825. _he valve is designed for use
with 300(tp_£g.gaseous nitr_gen..or hydraulic £1uid, The valve is
a thzee-way, two positl.on,normally closed valve. MaterLats of
construction _re 300 series stainless s_eel _£_h nylon seats....
The valve has I/2 inch porte with a 0.190 Inc_EgEOD. The
rescinder o£ _hls analysis will be coneldered _he same as for
75._8825.
ALBION
Recommend that this valve conflgura'_ionbe consld_red fo/_test.
.o.
•" .,-,
- 00000005-TSC08
MCR-fig-484
B,-,57
O0_I_ONEt¢_ANALYS:I;S
_9__O.NEN__ Cyl Judger, Hydroul tc
V_, Pnthm_ Mfg. Co.
_oz e!_ 011152
E_ mJ_._!_T_c,0zY A._492(1-a)/A,A54970,-_)/A
gtuckz Possible extend/retract mal£unct£on
LeakagaI Same as stuck
Jd_LYSlS
The hydraulic cylinder contslns s cylinder body, piston,
rod, seals, cartridge assembly, spare port plug assembly, needle
and ball check assembly and _wo end heads. This cylinder has a
bore dlameter of 8 inches, rod diameter of 3.5 inches and stroke
of 14.875 inches.
This cylinder is similar to 75M06506-I and reference is to
be made to that analysis.
AC_Zo_
Refer to-75H06506.
d" .i
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MCR,,fi9-484
B_58
COMPONENT ANALYSIS
,,,._. _ ............. J_
CO_WONENT Regulator, Solenold Operated
,SPECIFICATION NO_ 75MI0090
VENDOR Maro_ta Valve Corp.
_IND N_I__E_,/CATE_ORY A5770(6)/A
_._A_'£LUREMODES OIosQd - No trnF withdrawal
Open - Posslblc premature withdrawal
Leakage - Possible premature wi_h_.wol
ANALYB IS
This regulator is a dome referenced regulator with a pilot
valve and a pilot rQgu_ator. The pilot valve is three way, two
position, solenold valve wlth indlca_.er switch. The pilot regu-
lator is pressure regulatlng val_e with a do.stream teller
designed for dome loading. The 4ome is loaded through the pilot
valve by the pilot regulator. The va_e is designed for use with
gaseous nitrogen. The operating pressure is 3000 pslg. The ports
are 3/4 inch with a flow factor of 1.6 SCFM/PSIA in to out and
2.4 SCFM/PSIA outlet to vent. The outlet of the pilot regulator
has a .020 inch orlflce, but the imlet to the pilot regulator
has 28 x 500 mesh stainless steel screen to protect it. The
sensing passage from the outle_ _o the piston has .060 inch
orifir-. The poppet is nylon coated which could be a contaminant
gene_,_.or if it .could peel off. This is a very complex assembly
although it is made up of more or less standard Marotta components.
.! ACT ION
O0000005-TSCIO
MCR-69-484
I_% ' ' J £1
_OMPONENT"ANALYS%S
" '".... I,MIOXTXsPEc_Fl.A.t,LtkN___9.. "" ' "
V_lJ'_>l.Jl_.)/_. 11,tl10iiil1 Co. /}:l._,il;:l,_ nl Pnrkor|_annifJ-u Go,
FA_IlIRI+', MC_,i,:S C],os_d -No cyl_.nd_r _ct:un_,,mr,.._._,,"_.+. _,_,4_
Err,_lti(: - Posnlbl(] plat form I_mlft,netIon
Regul.etor is a spring lee.dad diaphragm to rc_clucogaseous
n_trogen supply pressure from 250 psi to an outlet pressure _rom
3..125 phi. The unit is designed tar a proo_ pru_+s.re o£ 375 psi
and s b_=s_ pressu%e of 625 psi. Materials used ace corrosion
resistant steel_ Buna N seals, and [(el F 90 groas_. Flow capacity
of the unlt is specified as 197 SOFM gassous nitrogen at sot
pressure o£ 90 psi and flowing _ 8=[_os.here.Th_ designed flow path
is descrlbud by _he vendor catalog as sei£ cleaning as oli flow is
in u directlot_ away from the seat. This regulator is not considered
to, b_,cont_,mln_nt sensitive tO normal gaseous nitrogen system usage.
ACTION
Recommend the regulator not be considered for test.
O0000005-TSC 11
,MCR-69-484
B-60
V_D_ _ho_-,Mf_. Co.
y_o_ P/_ BI0481,BIO48O
;_. _/_o_x AS626(5-7)/B
YA_LURE MODES fl_uck - Ca_tt couple/un¢oupl_ vehicle
L_akage - Possible coupllng.mslfu_tion
A_Ys_,s
The put--tic cylinder, con_ins a cylinder body, piston,
rod_ S_els and two end h_ads. The bore diameter is 2.0 inches,
rod diameter-- I,0 inch and stroke 5.0 i_ches.
This cylinder is similar t_ 75M06506 and reference is to be
nmde _ that analysis.
ACT_
Refer to 751_06506.
O0000005-TSC1
• • M0_9-484
' B-61
COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Filter
SPECIFICATION NO. 75MI0992 (Rev. C)
VEMDO_ Fluid Dynamics
,VENDOR P/N (-I) FL1329-I and (-2) FL1329-2
FIND MlIMBERS/CATEGORY A5388(I-8)/_, A5390(I_8)/B, A5563(4-8)B,
A5613(4)/B, A34748(9)/B, A34749(9)/B
FA/LURE MODES
Clogged - Loss of 750 PSI GN2 Supply
m_xsI_..___s
This filter is a Fluid Dynamics I0 micron nominal filter
similar to 75M06606 (Iten_lO). The difference_ being it is an
in-llne type, 1200 psl differential collapse pressure, 150 square
inches of effective filter area for the -2, and 45 square inches
after the -i. This unit is used in gaseous nitrogen system
rather than hydraulic oil. The -I is a 1/2'* llne size and the
-2 is a 3/4" llne size. It has 316 SS housing with a 304 SS
wire mesh element with teflon seals.
14CTIO_
i) Recommend bubble point test on element after
cleanlng.
2) Investigate using smaller micron rating elements.
Elements of varlousmicron ratings are available
for use in this housing.
00000005-TSD01
B-62 MCR-69-484
COMPONENTA_ALY_IS
COMPONENT Air Moto_---!
S_PECIF!CATION NO. 75M11149
VENDOR Gardner D_nver
yENDOR P/N MRS/F./-
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A6122 (8)/A, A6390 (7)/A
FAILURE MODES Inoperative - (st_lled). - No LEMor
service module carrier withdrawal
ANALYSIS
The air.motor is a rotary vane motor with a 4-bladed
rotor. The air motor is-fully reversible with equal power
in either direction.
_i Operating Preseure - 125 psi (GN2)
Max. Output at 90 psi -.5.5 hp at 247 rpm
Lubrication - KeI-E=90 and SAE 30 motor oll
Cleaning - KSC-C-123_ LeveL-IV, Test Method A
There have not been any reporte_ failures on this air motor.
This type of air motor has widely been used in industrial applications
and has performed well operating on industrial cleaned air systems.
This air motor is not considered contaminant sensitive and any
contamination generated would be vented through a check valve.
ASTION
It is recommended that the air motor not be considered for
test.
2.
00000005-TSD02
¢MCR-69-484
B-63
SPEf,IFI ,A2%ON NO. 75MI 1428
_..__.,0l¢._ Republic Mfg, (],_,
_NDOR P/N N8 0!_'_B,-8AY21_O
m B RS/CAmGORYA.C,12O-n/B
FAILURE MODES Strslght - All _yllnders will not extend
: Crossed - All..cylJ.nd_rs will not retract
Leakage - Possible ___n¢210.n_ ...........................................
ANAL_SlS
This is a 4-way, 2-posltlon, manually operated selector valve.
It is _ Standard Republic Catalog design of their 8000 Series. The -
valve operates on GN2 at 85-100 psi.
Seal Material - Buna-N per MIL-P-25732 or equal
Lubrication - KeI-F-90 Grease
: Leakage:
Internal - None
External - 30 cc per minute at 2000 psi
Cleaning - Clean, protect and inspect to MBFC Spec AIOMOI671,
Level IV, Test Method A, Certification required.
ACTION
: This is a very simple and reliable selector valve and is
not considered contamitmnt sensitive. It is recommended that
this valve not be considered for test.
00000005-TSD03
MCR-69-484
B..64
C01v_ot_l_ ldet:ec:tng VeIre
sPzc_:F_z_ N0. 75MII55B
Robbt_s- Av£atlozt
,VF._tO_;/N C427A-16C-768
F_I_ NLRvI_RS/CATEGORY A6391(7)/A
Pluued. - _o-LgM aart'ier wtt;hd_awal
A_I,_zs
T.h_ is a-Robb£ns meCe_in8 wlve with slmilax',dutSu
£escures mL-Cl_ 75M08414 met:erin$ vs_.ve.,
ACTION
Invesc:f.gaCion a£m£1ac, co aeCion for 75_08414.
" ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' 00000005-TSD04
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B-65
COMPONENTANALYSIS
CO_O_N_. Cylinder, Hydraulic
_P_. 75Ml2157
_ P_thon Mfg. Co.
VENDOR P/N
F_ N_E_/GATE, NOR Y A34825(9)/B, A34827 (9)/B
YA_LURE MODES _tuck - Can't lock arm extended
Leakage - Possible lock malfunction
ANALYSIS
The hydraulic cylinder, contains a cylinder body, pis_o_
rod, adjustable cushion, seals and two end heads. The bore
diameter is 4 inches, rod diameter 1.75 inches and stroke 5 inches.
This cylinder la similar to 75M06506-I and reference is to
be made t_-_hat analysis.
A_ZON
Refer to 75MO6506.
| , , =
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B-66
COMPONENTANALYSIS
COMPONE_ Rotary Actuater
: SPECIFICATION NO. 75M12560-I
VENDOR Flo-Tork Cor poratlom
, NDORP/,N
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY 34840(9)/A, 34845(9>/A
FAIL_+_ MO,I_S S_u_k - No arm+=etract/extend
Leakage - Fo_slble retrac_./_r_L ...
malfunction
_ANALYSIS
The actuator contai_.s 4 hea_ par.ts,.a,p£n/_n, 2 plstons
with integral pinion racks_ 4 cylinder sleeves and a d_a_
cylinder body. When hydraulic pressur_ is app.lled against the--
pistons, the plr_ion racks move ir_opposite directions.. The.
teeth on the rack mesh with the pinioR, turnLDg the pinion ....
either clockwise or counter-clockwlse..
Seal Mate=ial-- Buna-N---
Lubrication - MiI-H-5606 Hydraulic Fluid
Leakage - Internal: .5cc/min. at. 3000 psi 0uax_ Past
actuating meehanism in locked pgslti__
Ex©ernal_' i ch:op..per 25 operatIDg.cycles
Cleaning - Complete assembly "shallbe flushed to co_aln
contaminants not in.excess of tha_ spaclfiect in
par. 2.6.0 of 10425040 or KSC-C-123 Level IV,
Method A
The cylinder sleeve material is manganese bronze (gAE _3)
. and has a 16 RMS finish. The piston and pinion 8ear are made
from hardened steel. The Flo-Tork technical _epres_=tative sai_ ....
• they Just had refurbished several actttgtors, an_ the_e was some
scoring of the cylindelc walls but it was easily remov_ by
polishing. Also, slight corrosion was found on the piston that
was not submerged in hydraulic fluid. The b_onze cylinder may be
- - 000-----------000051SL)Ufd
MCF_-_59_ B-67
con=amiSh= gen_T_or becausQ £t. is a =ela_tvely so£_ ma_r.L_l.-
_ud har_ ¢_ntamin_nt _.art£_les.could,scorQ =hQ cytlnder _tu_sh,
The _._bla_ _tor_.selzur_. i_ _d_e_.by ut, L._ =ha b=o_ze
_yXLuder-whio_would =eud to o_£se_ t_u_.b_d-_£._c_s of con=amlna.
_ion generatlon.
The p_oblem,o£ o_utam£na_iou .g_nerat£o_-is .h_teved. to.be
small -- espacLa_ly due t_ the. few-GTcl_s the. actuator wit1. see-,...
Also, there-ar.eonly a few components downstream ._ro_,the a¢tuator_
and they are v_t regarded as b_Ing contamlna_ion s_ns_Ive, The
actuator is not considered contamination sensitive and is not
recommended for test,
- - 00000005-TSD07
_-68 P._-'_I..,e9-484
S_CA_m_, i_o.,....... 7sm2_5-.
V_NDOR-- Amez-Aca_BuschArrna-Corp., .. _
_I_D. MuMBE_I_/CA_i_3_Y A_.44(9)/A, A624_(9)./A, A6246 (9) /A ,. A6247(9)/A-
_AILUP,E_MQDES,., fl't_ck Piston--1_o hpd_au_ie supply
Leakage- Pos.slblehydrauli=£ailure
ANALYS_S _
The accumula_o_i_ similar.to.75M08814and.c_-fe_enceis t.o.
be made t_--that analyals.
Refer to _5M08814.
00000005-TSD08
I MCR-69-484 B-69
com,ol_i_AI_J.YS_
{_)MPONENT - Regulator
,8__zo_ mr 75m3255
VENDOR Ma_oCCa.Valvo CD_p_,......
, I_AZLXJREMODES Closed - Can't extend, p-la_o_m ¢yli_e_
I_rra_le - Posslble _latfo_m malfunetion
  zszs._
SLmilarto.Martin part no. PD48S012/_..179and co part no,
75M08831. For analys£s:of this _rt see armlvs£s fo_ 75M08831.
ACTION
m_
This resulator is of. the same eon£igura_Lon ae 75_08831.
Reuommend that-e/ther of these valves be in_luded in the tests.
I I I i i m .,,m , . _
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B-70
COMPON_NTANALYSI_
So1_nold Valve
_ugQIFICAX_ONN0._ 75M16990
8toror Englno_ing & Mfg, Co,
gg pog 32 io
gZND NLr_ERS/OATE_O_._ A34755(9)/B, A34758(9)/B, A34759(9)/B,
A34761 (9)/B
 oDzs
#1 deenergiz_d - Can't unlock arm -extend c71inders
#2 deenergized - Can't tock arm-_xtend cylindors
#1 energi_ed - Can't lock arm-extend cylinders
_2 energized - Canlt unlock arm-extend cylinders
Leakage - Possible locking malfunction
ANAI.YSgS
_he solenoid valve is a four-way, three-posltlon double solenoid,
• hydraulic selector valve. The solenoid contains a spool and sleeve assembly
that is operated by energizing the solenoids. The movement of the spool
allows hydra_lle fluid to flow through the ports. The v_Ive is spring
loaded s_ the spool returns to the center closed position when the
valve is not energized.
This valve is the similar to 75M08841-3 and reference should be
made to that analysis. The major difference is that this valve is a
three position spring centered closed and 75M08841-3 is a 2 position
valve mechanically latched in each position to protect against solenoid
failure.
& ..........
I i i I I IIIII III I I I , ....
00000005-TSD10
FMCR-69-484
COMPO]q]_ITI' ()ri_:%C_.,Flow I_,_L_c.t.].i_g
ygNpOR P/_1
, _ 73(4)/^
FAILtIP_MODES Clossed No LR. Line S_ondary Withdrawal
No LO_ Line Secondary Withdrawal
ANALYS_S
The orifice h_s e sh_r.pedse dlemeter of .1406 inch (3570
micron) an_ GHe is _he fluid media. The orifice sc_s ss s
secondary supply in case of s primary failure.
ACTION
Because of _he si_ of the orifice, secondury func_lon_
and fluid med_a used, the orifice _s not considered contaminant-
sensitive and is not recommended for tes_
00000005-TSD11
MCR-69,,484
B-72
COMPONENT AI_ALYSLS
8P_CL_I_A_LON N_, 75M51383
; _'_DOE P/N. 26.1062-56-041, 2_-I063-56-g43
?I_D NUM_R.81CATSGOR,Y K.5459(1-S)/B, A5559(4-&)/B, A.%66(4-7)/B,
A62._(9)/B
_ALLUKE MODES
Closed -.No aacum_lator recharge.
Erratic - Possible .low accumulator, charge.:
T_is ;egulator is.-a-Tescom..1000 series hand operated, regu-
lator, aa _escr_bed in.._he TesQom catalog. It is a spring loaded
piston t.ype coastructed of 316 SS materials with.Kel-F seats.
The.outlet_ preesuEe r=,%_e is 50 to 6000 p.si8 with inlet pressure
to 10,O00 _ig, The unit a_sembly consists of a filter in. the
inle% p_ortion,constituted of b_oaze o_. sr.a/nlems steel, whlch
l_ro_auts i..tse-l_grom-partlal. _oatamlna_es. i_. th% flow, stream..
_es_em s_clfles i_ the£r catal_g a/l regul_to_s are cleaned for
"gaseous oxygen% se1:vlce", Where- special clean_ i_ required
other than their own commercial, the parts are cleaned and.
tested by an _pproved outside facility. MMG. haa had very good
service out of similar Tes_om regulators in the Titan Systems.
This par_ will no_ be. considered as a contaminant sensitive
item as _t does hav_-_ts-own filter for added p=eteetlon.
AOTION
Recommend the regulator not be considered for test,_
..... ' ' .... 00000005-TSD12
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B-73
COMPONENT ANALYSES
COMPONENT Vent Check Valve
SPECIFICKTION NO, 75M5] 6_0
VENDOR Marotta Valve Corp.
VENDOR P/N 232783-634
FIND NDMBEI_S[CATEGOR....YA34939(9)/A, A34944(9)/A, A34954(9)/A,
A34956(9)/A, A34960(9)/B, A34963(9)/B,
A34972(9')/B, A34974(9)/B, A3498I(9)/A
A34984(9)/A
FAILURE MODES Open. - No e_£ect..
Closed - Lose mech, latch ability;
can't extend, retract
Leakage - No effect, APD malfunction
ANALYSIS
This check valve consists only of a-modifled fitting with
vent hol_ drilled into the bottom of an "0" ring groove.
Pressure can flow out by pushing "O" ring out but "O" ring
prevents anything frmm flowing into the fitting. This part is
not conslde_ed contam_t sensitive and will not be considered
for test.
ACTION
Recommend this part not be considered for test.
O0000005-TSE01
I MCK_69--484
B-74
CO ONE rANALYSIS
COMPONENT Pressure Switch
SPECIFTCAT_ON NO. 75M51766 (-2, -6)
VENDOR SiEmS -NetIt8
VENDOR P/N, 704021(-2), (_yd) 704026(6), (_e_.)
F_;) NUMB_ERS/CATEGgRY A34699(9)/B, A34724(9)/B
FAIL.URE MODES Open.- No Hyd Accumulator Recharge
C1_med - Cor_tant Recharge Attempt
ANALYS IS
Pressure switch to control recharge of hydraulic accumulaton.
The switch is actuated by a plston.whlch is mere4 by the_pressure.
agsinst e preset spring load. In additlon _ the.p_uston se_the
switch is protected from the fluid umdis by a dlaphraKm <teflon
or mylar). The -6 is set to deactivate at 2000 +20 psi8 and
the -2 is set.to deactivate .at-50 psiS. As these are a-non flow
device they are not considered sS a cmntaminant sensitive
component.
ACTION
Recoumend the pressure switch not be considered for test.
- O0000005-TSEO ,
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n-75
COMPONF.aTANALYSIS
i J , IH
COMPONENT Solenoid Wlve
S_ECIFICATION NO .... 76K00-187
VENDOR __ Marotta Valve Co_p..
_ND_ P/N _50__
. FIND NUMBERSfCATEGORY A34704(91/B
FAILUK E MODES De-ener_Lzed ....No effect
Energized---_- No accumulator pressurization
Leakage - _o effect
ANALYSIS
This ._aive for analysis purposes accordln E to Marotta
engineering is.similar_to 75M_8825 and 75MQ8821. It is. deslgned
for.3'000 psig nitrogen gas with I/2" ports and 0..20 inch ESEOD.
Materla/s are 300 series stainless steel, nylon seal and.Buna-N .
seals. Remainder of the analysis will be-same as for the
75M0882_ valve ............
A_ION
Kef_r to 75MO8825. -............................................................................................
' ' ................ 00000005-TSE03
: MCR-69-484
B-TC_
A AZ  S.Z
Filter, 200 _H.cron, In-Line
.SPEC_J_Y.CAT:EO]_NO. 76K00188 (-l, -2)
,V_ND_0 Circle Seal Development Co_p.
_0E P!_ 4313G-2"00 CK, 4343G-200 CK
_F_!_ NUMKEES:ICA_EGOK_ A34863 (9)/B, A34864 (9)/B, A34865(9 >/B,
A34866 (9)/B, A34867 (9)/B, A34868 (9)/B
FA_ MODEB Clogged --No Semi-Auto Extend Re,tart
LYs s
This filte¢ la a 200 micron rated in-line filter used in
hydraulic system. Materials in contact with the fluid media are
the 304 SS element, 303 or 304 SS body, and Buns I%se_Is. The
uait is designed for 3000 psig operating pressure, 4500 psig
proof pressure, mlnlmum_ collapse differentia] pressure of 3250
psi, flow capacity of 6.0 CRM with max pressure _rop of i0 psid,
bubble tight leaka_, and has 25 square inches of effective filter
sre&.
AC_ZOR
XnuestiEate use of smaller micron ratine and also use of
_: T-type filter tO eliminate requirements to break into system_
to change element. 200 micron rating doe_nlt appear to be appllcable
to present cleanliness level requi_e_ents___
i H ... , ii ,llii||H
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MCR-69-484
B..77
co_0_z_ _LYS ZS_.
C_O_NT ...... Orifice, Flow Reetricttng (Hydraulic)
SPEC_.FZCAT_ON NO, 76K00189 (-l, -2)
_,_O_ A.U. Sto_e-C_. (Ausco)
: ,vz/s_- _/s ....
_'_'D:,._ru_BZ_/CAZZC;OmrA34762(9>/S,A34Z6S(9)S,
A35730 (_)/B, A35731 (9.)B
FAILURE MODES., Clogged: No Auto Retract (For -2)
No Semi-Auto Extend or Eetrac£ _or -I)
,A_ALYs_s
Th_-I orifice has-a..077 inch (1955 mlc_on) sharp edse
d:f_meter_.and, is used to. control, the rate arm 9 w/IL extend, or
retract. The -1 or£flce is protected by a 200 micron in-llne
filter on both sides.. The -2 orifice has e .043 inch (1092 micron)
sharp edse: diamete_. The orifice controls the rate-whlch the
• pilot operated bell. shut-off valve (75M08820) opens and closes..
The volume of flow through th_ -2 orifice to open or close the-ball
shut-off valve is leas than-one cubic inch.
It is considered-very unlikely that .the -l_or£f.ice would
become c_ogsed because +of _.]:m.20_ micrc_, fitter that: is used in
the system.. The -2 o_ifi_e, does not have L filte_ Jus% upstream,
but the. voluma-of_.flow is very low which _:eduees chances of
., clogg/,ng.
A_C_ZON ..
-. Both the -1 and -2 orifices are not: conaide_ed cont:an_nant
aensltlve_ the -i because of final filtration and -2 because of
low v.lume of flow. It is recommended that the orifice (76K00189-1,-2)
not L__ considered for test.
I II I II I I a ! I
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MCR_69-484
B-_8
AA; YSIs
COI_PONE_br_,- Valye ,,Deceleration
SpECL_ZCA,_ION NO. 76K00251 Make from 75M12561_-1 ......................
yZND.OR. Lt.clu,_ I(ydraullcs
vz oz
_!ND NUI_E__..EGOR_YY A34839 (9)/A,_A34849 (9)/B
F.Azi,mjf_MQgE_. Stitck ,-,Can't -cetract arm
Erratic • Possible retract malfunction
ANALYSIS
Drawing defines rework of 75M12561-I valve to. new .
configuration, Drawing does not speaify any test requirements,
Valve similar to 75M06201-I which was modified to 75M21S42-I,
The only difference between. 76K00251 and 75M21842-1 is that
76K00251 has the relief valve blocked.
Refer to 75M06201-l-fo= analysls,
ACTZO_
Refer to 75M06201 for resultant action.
........... nlmlll i m ii
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B-79
cOMPOI_ ' Orifice, Flow Restricting
S CIF A ZO 76K0 578-I, -9, -12
A._-_. Stone co. (._usco)
VEI_.OR P/N. Ii92C-047, H92C-O93-,_E92C-040
FIND _.E_./CATZ.CO. RY- 34951 (9)/B_.34971(_J_A. 349B9(9)/A
FAILURE MODES Clogged: (I-) No platform exteuslon
on envi_neal chamber
(-9) No adap.t;er posltion/ng ......
: dev_.Qa
(APD) cylinder ext:eusion
(-12) No APD cylinder control
A ALYSlS
The orifice sizes for the 3 dash numbers ar_; -_ .-&47 inch;
-9, .093 inch; -_2,.040 inch. The system is operated on GN9 and
" the flow velocity is ver_f higl_ throaEh the orifice and nesting
of fibers, which would-_end t_ clog the.orifice, i_ very unllkely,
Also pneumatic flow iS bL-di1_ectlonaL which will =end co prevent
contamlnstion from clagEing.en o=Iflce° The.volume flow rate _s
also loW, which reduces" the _ha_ces for._contamlnanta-to clog an
orifice. .....
^czZoN.
Because of the orifice slzes_ fluid media, bl-dlrectlonal
flow and low volume of flow. the orifice is not considered
contamlv_nt sensitive and is hot.recommended, for test.
III I I "' •
O0000005-TSE07
_R-69,-484
C_Ol___ Cylinder, Pneu_ tic
SPECI_CATION_ l_O_.......... !6K..03824_
VEN.__ Miller Fluid Power
VENDOR P/N....
FIND N1r_ml_S/e_,_' ,..,.A3.4952(9)Ia
F_AILUREMODES Stuck Piston - No platform cyl extend or
re_ract
L eakag__Eossible_p Iatform.malfunction ....
ANALYSIS
The pnemRatic pla_..formexten_I/retractcylinder contains a
cylinder.body, 2.heads, a piston, a _od and.a wlpe_ ring. The
bore diameter.is 2.5 inches, stroke 80.0 inche_an&_rod diameter
I_A £nches_
Seal Material ---BunaN Eer-Mil--P-5315or MII-.P.-5516
: Lubrication .- _ype Kel-_-_IO-_ DC 55 (Dow Coming)
Leakage - 5 SCIM Max. (internal)
Cleaning - KSC-C-123 Level VI, Test Method 4, certificatiort
required
The cyllnde_ uses HY_ plS_on cups and HY_ rod seals.
The piston rod is hardened to 50-54 Rockwell "C" and chrome
plated. _he cylinder has a Teflon piston rod dirt wiper and
corrosion resistant surfaces, The operating pressur_ for the
cyllnder is 750 PSI.
ACTION
The pneumatic cyllnde_ is not considered contamlnant
sensitive or a cohtam£nsnt generator and is not recommended for
tes t.
!!..o
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O,O_En3_ ASALYSZS.
,, , ZF.ZCATT.O ,S ,, aos2S
FAILURE l_S .......................S l:.u_k P_-s_m,- No AdapEer Posi_.ioning
Dev-_ee (Ag])) exP_endor retract:
Leakage - Possible APD malfunct_Lo_
•he pneumatic APD extend/_etzac_.cyllnder,contains a_-
cylinder bo_y, 2 heads, a__is_on_ a rod.and a.rod _zipero.The
bore diameter,is 2.5 inches, s_roke-- 21.5 inches and rod
diameter _ 1 inch.
Seal _a_.riaL--Buna-N pe_.Mil-P-5315 or Mil-P---5516
Lubrlc_tlon_..Type Eel-f-f0 on_De 55
Leakage_- 5 S_M-M_. (_ncen_t)
Cleanln8 -ES_-G.123_ Level V£, Test Method A, cer_Iflca-
_£on requ_=ed.
The cylinder heads are made from 2024=T6 a1_ and the
cylinder body, pis_oa and rod are 17-4PH CRES l?erAt_ 5643,
COND.a ....
ACTION
The cylinder is not eonSLdere_ conP.amtuant sens£_£ve o_ a
conl;amlrmfit generator and is. not reco_nnended £ot_ tes_,.
O0000005-TSE09
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___rY: • Solenoid VaLve.
P_ND ,NU_,EES_/OAT_GO._¥A_49.37.(_)/A_.A34938.(g.).IA,__?,.49t_,(9) IB,
A3_.70(9)/,,_ A3497.3(9) IA., .&3.498:3(9)/B,
A34985(9) lB., A34986(9) IB
]_ArLO1LENODES .De-energ.tzed - No cylinder retract o__extend
Energ£zed - No _ylindeX retract or extend
Leakage -. PoSsJ_._e me,function
ASAL S,ZS.
This valve _s a 3-way, 2 pos.it:L_ solenoid-valve si_Llar to
7.5M08825 except" t'he-por'cs: are 3./8."" size and _,he body is 316
stainless steel._.Designed for 3000 psig ni_ro&en .Sas..witha .189
ine_ ESEOD._ The remainder of ehe analys_11 be cozmlderdd
the same.as for 75M08825.....
ACTION
See__7_82_or result'.a_taction.
O0000005-TS E 10
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COMP/_ENT ANALY8 T,B
Chock Va!va
James Pond Clark
,_Do_P/N _279TI-4TT
t
YA,ZLUBE,MODES Same as 75M05365 (Zte. 1)
ANALYSI_ Same as 75M05365 (Ztem l)
ACTYON Recommend the check valve not be considered for test.
I I I H i , ....
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6OMPONEN_ ANALYSIS
_M_NT Ch_ck Valve
James Pond _lax.k-
VE_OR:P/N P27gTI-4TT
_.A.IL,UK_.MQIES Same as 75M05365(Item I)
ANALYSIS S_me as 75M05365 (_tem I)
ACTION Recommend valve not be considered for te_t.
............ -...... O0000005-TSE 1
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COl_Ol_l_ ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Check Valve
SPECIFICATION NO. --
:. VENDOR Marotta Valve Corp.
; V_ND_. _,P/N .... 800262-19(CVM 508)
FIND NUMBERS/CATEGORY A5972(4)/A
FAILURE MODES Closed --No LH 2 Cyl,.withdrawal
Open - No effect
Leakage - No effect
ANALYSIS
This check valve is poppet design check valve similar to
check valves of same design used by Martin. The poppet is well
guided and the flow path is such that any partlcles should tend to
flow right on through the valve, This item is not considered to
be a contaminant sensitive part and will not be considered for test.
ACTION
Recommend this part riot he considered for test.
O0000005-TSF01
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
COMPONENT Check Valve
SPECIFICATION NO t --.
VENDOR .......... Marotta V-!re Corp.
%_NDOR P_' 20K002-19 (CVM-8)
FIND NUMBERS/CATEC_RY A58 63(8)/A, A6153(6)/A
FAI£URE MODES Closed - No secondary system withdrawal,
valve actuation
Open .. - No effect
Leakage - No effect
ANALYSIS
Poppet type check valve similar to Marotta p_rt_aumber 80{)262.
Not considered to be a contaminant.sensitive part and will not be
considered for test.
ACTION
Recommend this part not be considered for test.
O0000005-TSF02
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COMPONENT ANALYSIS
i ,
L"O_ONEI_. So lelto £d_'aLve -
SPECIFICATION..NO_ ---
= __ ,= . --
,VENDOR .]4a_tta Valve.Corp, _ .
vzmxmz/N__ _ss3
,FZ_Dm_mZ_S/CATZCORYItt_O(6)/_....
FAil.loRE 1.ZODES De-energized -. No effect
Ener_g£zed_ _ - -No. effect.
Leakage - Ross£ble premature w£thd_aval
This valve, fo_ analys£s purposes accozdin8 to Ma_otta
tmg£ueerlng £s st_Lla_.to 75M08823._ I_58__1s the same.emdel.
serJ_.l as. the 75M08823 ,_.£ch is HV583-H2A. -.........
ACTION
See 75M08823_.fc¢ resultant act_ton.
...... 00000005-TSF03
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B-S&
CC_MpO_T Orifice_ Flowaestrlctl.g
SPECIP_CATION NO.. Nut Enmen..
_R _-,_ Stone Co.. (_SC_>
_o_ P/N
,FI__x_/CA_._ 5594 (7)/A...............-
FAILURE MODES Clo_.4__._._hydr_u 1ic withdrawa 1
ANALYSIS............
The. o_iflce has. a sharp edge. dlameter of_ .A5 inch--(LI,430.
micron) and is used to_controL_the-rate of hy_raulic-_thdrawa]...
The orifice is too l_rge to be_.couSide_ed co_teminaut
sensitive end la not re_o_nended-go_ test.
.................. TSFO_"' ' 00000005-
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I. Abshire, R. W.: "Technical Considerations in Designing a Hydrau-
lic System for the SST." SAE Conference Proceedings: Aerospace
Fluid Power Ss,stems and EquiDment Conference. pp 57-62, Los An-
geles, California, May 18-20, 1965. 650341.
This paper discusses the high reliability required for commer-
cial, supersonic aircraft hydraulic systems. Contamination
control influences design considerations to the extent that
the systems are designed to eliminate any chance of introduc-
ing foreign contaminants after equipment installation. In this
design the fluid is filtered upon introduction to the system
at all fluid filling points. Fluids were selected for their
resistance to creating contaminants through chemical reaction
with system components.
2. Anthony, H. V., et al.a "Contamination Sensors," AEC/NASA Sympo-
sium. on-Contamination Control, September 1967.
This paper presents in detail a discussion of various particle
counting devices such as in-place counters and automatic coun-
ters, as well as sampling techniques, including isokinetic,
Wyle wedge, etc. Cryogenic liquids, ordinary gases, and liq-
uid fuel and oxidizers are included in the discussion, both
for purity analysis and particulate analysis. Recommendations
are made for the best techniques to be used for the various
fluids.
3. "Atlas 'E' Overhead Doors Design V_lidation and Pr_du_t Improve-
ment Study." Contract AF04(647)-863, Bechtel Corporation, Vernon,
California, January 1962. AD 828734.
Extremely heavy contamination was discovered in overhead door
hydraulic systems. Doors became inoperable or tended to sel-
tle down when left in open position. Pumps were found to hu
clogged and valves were sticking and leaking. The hydrau[£_
systems had never undergone any contaminatlon control whatso-
ever. Initial contamination had evidently been high and when
water base fluid had been replaced by petroleum base fluid,
water became an additional serious contaminant. The suggested
remedy was to flush out contaminated fluid, add filtering proc-
esses, and replace malfunctioning components. Estimated cost
of repairing damage to doors caused by malfunctioning hydrau-
lic system and repairing the hydraulic system itself totaled
$596,000.
J,
( Ii li I | i , ,
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4. Bose, R. E.: "The Effect of Cavitation on Particulate Contamina-
tion Generation." Oklahoma State University, DoctoDaCe-The.sis,
1966.
This paper describes an experimental program conducted to de-
termine the effectiveness of the cavitation phenomenon _ pro- ,.
ducing particulate contamination. T_e £1uld used was dis_illed _
water, and several different materials were investigated to
determine which offered the best resistance to the process ....
Materials were 1100-['8 aluminum, 2024-T351 aluminum_ free-
cutting brass, Monel, 304 stainless steel,_nd Electrolytic
#
Tough-pitch copper.
'It was found that large quantities of particulate could be
generated by this process, with sizes =anging to 280 microns.
The largest particles were generated from the softer aluminum
and copper materials. The largest size generated from the
Monel and stainless specimens, was approximately 40 microns;
however, these harder materla/s generated much larger quanti -
ties of the smaller-sized particles. A correlation was estab-
lished between particle cutoff size and BriDell hardness num-
ber. Empirical relations are promulgated for particle si_e
distribution versus strain energy of various materials.
5. Brittalnj R. C.: 'Titan II: Retractable Work Platform Hydraulic
Systems (HS-2) Test Program." Parsons Company, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, 6 February 1963. AD 828725.
This report gives a detailed description of tests run on a
Titan II retractable work platform hydraulic system. Contam-
ination specif_catlons are outlined. The procedures used to
ensure that the hydraulic system met specifications are de-
tailed. Data used to determine contamination levels before
and aftez flushing is presented. After approximately ninety
cycles, the contamination level of the system stabilized. The
system contamination limit as specified is as shown for I00 ml
at any sampling point:
Particle 26 thru 51 thru I01 thru 201 thru 500 thru
>tOO0
Si_e 50 100 200 500 1000
Maximum
IO_O 250 70 20 3 0Count
, !
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Fiber I00 thru iOO1 thru >2000
Length I000 2000
Maximum 25 5 0
Count
! 6. Connelly, R. F. and Gatzek, L.E.: "Deteriorative Effects of Both
Usage and Long Term Storage on ALrcmaft and MissiL_Kydraulic
Fluids _' Journal of En_ineemln_ fo= lndustmy, May 1963; ASME_.__._
Transactions, Paper 62-AV-13.
This paper presents a comparison of MIL-IL-5606 and M_L-H-6083
hydraulic fluids withrespect to particle ag_omeration, chem-
ical precipitation, crystal growth, and extraction o£elastom-
eter components.. In 5606 fluid_ particles tend to agglomerate,
then decompose when disaurbed, and reprecipitate during inac-
tive periods. The corrosion additive.in 6083 fluid is very
effective in breaking up and preventing fu=ther particle growth.
ILibration, either mechanical or sonic, increases the rate of
particle growth.. The Silting ladex is used to measure this
phenomenon; the following test resulZs are prese.ted:
Storage Period Silting Index
MIL-H-5606
2 days 0.004
9 days 0.,010
2 months 0,016
5 months 0.160
10 months 2,960
12 months 4.000
24 months
MIL-H-6083
2 hours 0.002
42 months 0.035
64 .months 0.098
Also, 5606 fluid tends to react chemically with storage con-
t_ners, partlcularly in the presence of significant amounts
of moisture.
Crystal growth as large as5 x 150 microns has been observed
in 5606 fluld_-these melt at about 350 OF. Constituents of
elastomers can be extracted by hydraulic fluids; these are
mostly in the 25-micron range.
O0000005-TSF08
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7. Connelly, R. F_: "ReLationships between Contamination and System
Failure." American Association for Contamination Control, ¥1£th
A_nual Meeting, March 1966. AEEPL--TR-67-290.
This author maintains that so-called contamination failures in
the vast majority of cases result in loss of performance ra_-
e_ th_n cataStrophy.- The long-term effect is wear resul_ng
from sil_. Effects of metallic _ar_icle silting is m_re
; severe than nonmetallic_ fibers are particularly troublesome
because they tend to "nest" amd thus increase silting tenden-
cies, and because they do n_t settle out as readily as metal_ ...........
lic particles. MIL-H-5606 fluidwith acrylic vlscosityim-
prQvers appeans quite prone to _iltin_ over-along term ol
actLvity. Homogenizing improves this tendency, but is t=an- -
sient in nature. Fl_ids not containing these impEovershave
endured more than f_tue years with no change in silting index.-
The major.recommendation is made tha_ contamination levels not
be selected solely on the basis of blueprint clearances,, be-
cause this results in the imposition of unreallsticaLly low
limlts_ Experimental evidence relative to the system effects
should be obtained, including consideration of fluid compoSi-
tion, particle size, and contamination concentration.- The
statical nature o£ the contamination sample must be remembered
when setting siz_ limits.
8. Deane_ T.N.: "Hydraulic Yluid Particle Growth Halted.!t SAE
Journ_l..._____,,Volume 69, No. 3, March 1961_
The subject of particle growth in MIL-H-5606 hydraulic oil is
discussed in this paper. The cause is pinpointed as agglom-
eration of very small p_rticles (less than 5 micron), the ad-
hesion being provided by the additive viscosity improver, meth-
acrylate_ The following conclusions are stated:
]) The mechanism is one of large particles being formed from
small ones;
2) Vibration accelerates the rate of growth by increasing
the force with which the particles strike each other and
therefore the probability of their sticking together;
3) The precipitate has been redispersed by agitation, the oil
refiltered and repackaged, then after further storage the
precipitate has reformed;
_,, , I I I I I
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4) Precipitate does not form in oils that contain rust pre-
ventative agents, or in oils that do not contain methacry-
late viscosity improvers (such as MIL-H-6083).
It is also stated that the rate of growth is proportional to
the square of the concentration of particles.__ Thus, if by fil-
terilg, the particle count is reduced by a factor of I0, then
i the growth rate will drop by a factor of i00.
9. Deane, T.N.: "The Effect of Contamination on FLuids and the Ef-
fect of the Ingredients of the Fluids on Contamination." SAE Con-
ference Proceedings: Aerospece Fluid Power Systems and ENuipment
Conference, Los Angeles, California, May 18-20, 1965. 650352.
This paper discusses contaminant effects on hydraulic fluid
functions. Contaminants lower temperature at which fluid oxi-
dizes. Submicronic contaminants agglomemate to form Z5 to 200
micron particles. The rust preventative in MIL-H_6083 prevents
agglomeratibn by neutralizing electrolytic properties of fluid.
Moisture causes oxidation and thus speeds wear. Moisture com-
bines with antl-wear agent to plug filters. Water creates
acid in some fluids which causes chemical reactions. It is
considered worthwhile to permanently remove all contaminants
from hydraulic fluid regardless of size or substance.
i0. "Decontamination of Hydraulic Fluids and Dynamic Hose Study."
Oklahoma State University Technical R_port SEG-TR-64-74, January
1965. AD 612907.
This report discusses a new means of upgrading the decontami-
nation capabilities in USAF ground support equipment, a device
known as the hydroclone. This is a centrifugal separating de-
vice which is used in place of a conventional filter. To eval-
uate the performance of the device in hydraulic systems, a
field test program was undertaken. Field studies were conduc-
ted at Edwards AFB, California, and Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.
Particle counts were obtained by a HIAC automatic particle
counter; microscopic examinations were made to determine the
types of contaminant present. Five hundred-milliliter samples
were used. The following results were obtained:
Gravimetric Aralysis (m_/l) -
Sample No. Upstream of Hydroclone Downstream
I (Edwards) 31.6 10.6
2 (Edwards) 33.9 10.9
- ' I I I III I i i ..............
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Sample No, Upstream of Bydr_clone DQwnsLream
3 (Edwards) 15,2 12.5
4 (Edwards) 11,7 11,2
5 (Edwards) 8.6 8,6
6 (Edwards) 12.3 II,2
7 (Edwards) 7._9 II,0
8 (Edw_=ds) I0.2 I0.2
9 (Tinker) 32.8 24.5
I0 (Tinker) 33.0 20_5
II (Tinker) 12.5 13,.1
12 (Tinker). 12..i 13.5
13 (_inke=) Iio8 ICL0
14 (Tinker) I0,6 7.7
15 (Tinker) I0.7 14.0
Particle Counts -
Micron Size
6 (Tinke=) 3523
11 (Tinker) I117
15 (Tinker) 103
20 (Tinker) 47
6 (Edwar.ds) 1591
II (Edwards) 194
15 (Edwards) 52
20 (Edwards) 16
The particulate was analyzed as iron, bronze_ paper, plastic,
cotton, carboa, and aluminum. Maximum size. encounter_;d _as
600 microns. The report concludes that _ne hydroclone is as
efficient as normal filtration techniqu, s, with the added ad-
vantage that it does not load up and r_quire changeout.
In addition, cleaning of high pressure rubber and teflon-lined
hoses was evaluated by dynamic pressure pulsation. It was
found that, compared to normal flushing techniques, the dynam-
ically cleaned hose would generate far fewer and smaller par-
ticles during operational service .....
II. Dwyer, J. L. : Contamination Analysis and Control. Reinhold Pub-
lishing Corporation, New York, 1966.
This book discusses the analysis and contzol of contamination
in aerosols, gases, and liquids. The main points are aerosol
sampling and ir_spectlon; particle sampling of cylinder gases;
errors in probe sampling; liquid dispersions, suspensions, and
I I I III I III I I I m ,,
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emulsions; particle counters; method_ of quantitative and qual-
Itative sample analysis; contaminants on surfaces; clean rooms;
and component cleaning. It is a general survey and state of
the art for theoretical as well as-practical means of contam-
inatloa analysis and control.
12. "Effect of Contamination on Fluid System Compo_%ents: Bulletin
Ab0." "Aircraft Porous Medi_, Inc., Glen C_v_-_ Lo w Island, New
York.--Pall Corporation, 1966 ...........
This paper abstracts and discusses ten articles that were se-
lected after a thorough search of available information con-
cerning contamination, wear, life, and performance of fluid
systems. Filtration.below five microns absolute appears to
improve most hydraulic sygtems ....In no instance x_bserveddfd
finer filtration degrade componen_ _erformance. Finer filtra-
tion improves valve wear., component life, system operation,
and .hydrmnlic fluid periormance and. stahillty. Si/.tinE of
submicronic partlcles.can.be reduced si_nlflcantlyb_fil_t!ilr ..................
tion with three-mlcron .absolute filters ....
13. "Effect of Contaminatlon. on Fluid System Cbmpo,_euts:. Supplement
1 to Bulletin AbO." Aircraft Porous Media, I,,c., Glen Cove, Lung
Island, New York. Pall-Corporatlon, 1967.
This paper abstracts and discusses six articlas which are in-
tended to supplement those covered-_a. Bulleti_.AbO._ _ur.ther
evidence is presented to favor the use of submlcronic filtra-
tion. Wear is reduce_ in piston rin_s _nd valve lifters when
oil is filtered to _iminate suhmicronic contaminants. Tests
show that contaminants severely Increase damage in cavitation-
al zones.. Elimination of particulates, of the five- to ten-
micron range increase pu_p and servo valve life an0 reduce
the frequency of hydraulic system cleaning.
14. Farri, John A.: '_he Meaning of Fluid Filter Ratings.!' FSR #25,
Aircraft Porous Media, Inc., April I.,_1965.
This company bulletin is a comprehensive, readable discussion
of nearly every aspect of filter_ that should be considered
by any design engineer having a need to specify filtration
equipment. The importance of adequate f"!tra_ion to prevent
wear and subsequent leakage of valves is pointed out with ref-
erence to work performed by General Electric. Wear versus
contamination of aircraft piston pumps is discussed with ref-
erence tc Grunt,an work. Experience of ultrafine filtration
- " O0000005-TS F12
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in..eomm_ralal aircraft hydraulic syatems is tabulated, A re-
vJew of existing military filter speclficat_onS is given; in-
ter.estingly enough, no such speci_icatlon exists for _neumatlc
t _icatlons. All aspects of filter _s_.gp are discussed in
detail, in_iudlng nomenclature, efZiclnncy, _nd r_tiBg measure-
ment tschniques, bubble point tests, po_o size versus _atiBgs,
. limlta_tions and Ln_erp;eta-_ions of ratings, fiber r_movJ_-_,di=.t
capacity, cle_nlag techa_ques, collapse pressure, medla mi_a-
: floe, and flow f_higu_.
15, _arris, John A.: "New Approach-to Selectln_ Flui_ System Filtra-
floe." Bulletin FSR-39, Pall Corporation, G1_n Cove, Long ]_sland,
: New York.
This report discusses the vax_ous Qonsi_aratlo_s tha_ should .
be given to selectin_ proper-filters for hyd_aulic Eystems.
Descriptions aze given-o£ typical contamination, failures,
Types of. £il_ratlon media are discussed, for various applica,.
t_ons. Recommendations o5 tilter types are made, considering
flui_ llfe, additive removal,.,fil_er leca.tion, bypass valves,
_Iow, p_essure, and service interval wit.h respect _o area and
dir_ capa=i_y. Dual element, 3-mleron. absolute fil._ration is-
advised. The optlm_m filter a_ran_ement is to usa relatively
coarse (Z_ miero_ filters in the pressure line ahead of each
crltical component to prevent catastre_i¢ failures, and an-
uitraflne fii_er in the return llne to minimize wear by p=e-
ventin_ =eei_ulat/on. or buildup of. ultra fine particles .gener-
ated hy comp.onents..........
16. Fiteh_ E. Q-:'. '_lui_ Con_amlnation Ereject: Study in the Field
of Fluid Contamination." Report N®. 6. Oklahoma $_ate t_nivarslty_
Stillwate=, Oklahoma. August 1963. AD 422550.
This repo_t describes the use o_ the HIAC automatic particle
.,., counter in,de_..:rmini=gc_ntamina.tio_ levels i_I fluids. De*
spite the expense, the auth)r was p_ea_ed with the results, and
simplicity o.f the d_a obtained, using the H/AC eour.ter. Test
falters were cla_ned..ten times with one oE two solvents,_ Af-
ter thEee or ffo_. cleanings the contamination level no--imnger
showed a steady decrease but, instead, became erratic. After
L: . ten claanings with.one fluid, an _dditional cleani(_8 with the
i.,'. other s_Ivent repeatedly showed that one solvent was better• ,/,
, at removing some tyge _f_ contamlnaat in the filters thaa was
the othe_ solvent.
t
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Dimtillatlon of the Solvents proved a satisfactory method of
reclaiming the solvent.s. It was indicated that care is re-
Sulted in the-distillatlon process because under eerta/n con-
_amlnatlon conditions localized heating caused contaminants to
be carried with dla_illaLe.
, 17. "_L=_d FiLters: Ms,is and Contamination." Bendix FilteD-D/vlsion,
Publi_a_i_a-N=o BED_-IA___m__d.
_hls infmrmatlve b_klet descr£bes--_ll conceivab%e a_pects of
the use of. filters in hydraulic systems. No data ar_ presented,
but _ter_ive dlscusslo_s _;e given,on types o_ filto_s, fil-
te_ characteristics, filter cleani_tg a_d drying techniquQs,
analysis procedures, cleaa room fa¢ilitles, packaging tech-
niques and materia.ls, and considerations for writing filter
specifications, All of thls general information would be quite
instructlonal to any pe.Eson working hydraulic system cleanli-
ness problems.
18. Gayle_ J. B. and_Romine, J. O.: "Studies on the ReZiability o£
Particmla_e Contmminetlon Analyses." George C. Mar._hall Space
FLisht Center. MPT-PaVE=M,6a-5. March 6, 1962..
_hereare mamy £_etors that can_iL_Luenee the reliability of
the results of a contamination analysis of a s_ecific system.
Exampies are _iven where wi_e varla=ions in particulate co_-
=amitmt_o_c_aa_a_e experienced d_e to the oper_tlon or non-
o_eratlon.o_ a valve. Gen_r_Lly_ if a ?alve is opened and
clese_ during contamlnatlon.samDling , tke particle count is
greatly lacreased_c_ver that obtained when the valve is not op-
era,ted.
The reproducibility of a pa=tlcle count is a.ffected by the op-
erator. Different operators will vary in their determination
of the parti_le count for the same sample to a greater degree
than the same opena_or will v_ry in several determinations
with the same sample. Reproducibility improves with a-greater
number of particles in a sample, The primary eoncluslon is
the= variations in the sampling method _ave a much greater ef-
fect on reproducibility than variations associated with patti-
} cla--uuuat determination.
!
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19. Hocutg, M. G,: "Establishing ltyd_auli¢ System Opera,Hanoi Contam-
_9_weK Syj_tems and_.Ecu£pmen t Con_erengn, LaB Angal_a, Cal.ifn_nia,
May 18-20, 1965. 650333.---
Hydraulic system con_a_lina_£on ltm£±_ must-be ost_bl_stkec_ sttch-
that they p_ev_nt slgnlfi_ant dc_ada_ia= of aystam pa_f_ma_e
and ye_ a_a ,'rac_£cal enough•_o commsnd..system _l_n_R whan-ox-
coeded, The case hist._r.-y of the YJgI,-C_-3 t,_ plcesented-_a aa.
example of how contamlaatlo_-•/_is, a_e generated for a •hydrau-
lic system.
Thruugh axteuaive testing it was da_er_ulaed _hag thc system
'would continue _o operate with. some degradatlmn o_ p_rfo_man_e
but w/thout failure at con_amlnatlon levels•_n •excess of ¢la_s
12.- The hydzautic functie_ that degraded was- the c_nt_ol S_vo
valves; tker_fo_e, ghe•system contamination l_vels w_l_ h_ve
tO be limited so that _he Serve valves could _ne_i_n satis-
factorily. _t_was determined, that a class 12 leveler con_am-
inatlon produced a..4.3 pound $p¢oi. silting force to move the
valve- _rom nul_. _ha phys£cal charae_eri_tlc_ of tltevalve
were s 0.375-inch spool dlame_er• with a heftiness _quivalen•t
to K 70 or greater and a 0.0006-inch diametrical ¢/eaxance
c
between spool a,:d sleeve.- A valve silting fence g_ea_e= them
3.5 pounds caused u_nsa_isfa_tory control _erforman_e; there-
fore a eor_amination level of c_ss 8 w/_ick would ma_ntai_ the
va/ve silting f_ below 3.5 _Q_o/_S wa_ s'electe@ for the s_s.-
tom.
]_n order to eliminate high _evel_ of p_rtlcl_..c_unts e':perlenced--
during the first few hours of-testin_ due to built-in, contami-
nation, all subsystems were cleaned by flusb£ng to a class 6
level of contamiastion, and auxiliary 3-mlcrnn absolute fiL---••
tration wa_ added during initial system running ho_rs.
Contamination Classes per NAS 1.63,8
Qontrol
Class 5 to 15 15..to 25 25 to 50--..&Oto I00 100..
6 16,000 2,850 506 90 16
8 64,000 _1,400 2,025 360 64
12 I_024_000 182 _40(L..........12_400 5_760 1,024
K--.- ..........
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All filters used wer_ stalnleas steal wire ma_h w_th high tem-
per'slurs and high pressure drop capability, The auxiliary fil-
ter had a 3-micron absaiute element backed up by a 15_micron
absolul:u element. 2he main di_t generators of the system wt_re
the 12 actuators and 14-piston hydraulic pump. 'these-diet gen-
erators, however, vonl-_'ibuted very little of the metallic wear
COlll ;llllJ fiLl|l[ g.
The operat|ng contamillation l_vel sustaitl_d by the J.93 hydras-
lic system l.n equl.v_enL go o_: Dossibly oro_ class loweg, tha_,-
that of M.rcraft hydro,_l.lesystems acco=dlng to SAI_ rcpo_t
i 749D.
Impg_tant conclusions were:
I) "Th_ use of 3-micron abselu_e, a_,_il£ary fLlt:=al;iort,in a_-
dit£on to the normal system filt=atiom lowers-_he contam-
ination level approximately 3 classes.
2) "Th_ use of subsystem flushing _=Imr ao system assembly
plus ultrafine auxiliary £iLtra.t_):%of p_rt _f the system
flow during inltla.l heu=s _f eng_na rumning have proven
vury successful in elimlnat_in_ hJ.gh initial op.era_ing con-
: tamination levels and the wide v_riatlen in contamination
levels during the Li_-of the my4tem.
3) "Serve valve speol silting forces_ w.Lth all othem param-
, eteL's remaining constant,, va-_y La d_ect p_port_om to the
lava1 of contamin&tlen." -.-
" 20, Hollinger, K. H. and Denis, J.N.: "Contamimation Tolerance of
Aircraft Hydraulic Pumps.'" Erank_in Znstit_te K'esearch Lahorato-
ries, Philadelphla, Pennsylvania, _rch 1962. AD 814826.
_his report presents a. very comprehensive analysis of the ef-
fects of particulate density_, size, and hardness on we_r in
hydraulic pumps. Three methods _f measuring conzamination
level .were used to supplement One another; they ware silting
• :? imdax, HIAC counter and gra._imet=_c analysis. Cotton linte=s,
'_ Jewele='s rouge, iron filings, am_ AC fine test dust were gen-
:ii erally used as the contaminants in co_trolled proportions
.¢
_ _areful dlmensional analysis was run on the contamin_ and
: pump componer_ts after each 50-hour and.1000-hour test. The
/
conclusion reached was that some contaminants are more harm-
ful than others and those p=oven to be harmful should be re-
moved.
k_, iiii|iii ii
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21, lioliLnge_,,g. R,.,...o_ el,' "Eva_uat£on o£ Waa_ sad Contaminatlo_
Ge.nerat£o_ of Hydr_lic _mponent,," Ftanklir_ InstLcuta Ra_ea_ch
Labosatories _...._ort _F__B_B2_II___NA_,___£o_-_ X66-14859, Feb-
ruary 1965..
" This _a_oct cov_s ir_w_ig_£_n_ in_ _ho capa_il£ty _f _amm...
pLi_ valves- to g£w _op_asanCatLve h_ul_c samp1_#4. _o_-
ta_nln_tiottSoaa_i_n a_ msl_u_tto_-su_e_p_iS.i_y o£ R-1.
angis_ hydraulic system pu_ps; sa_ as evatuatio_ o_ _ 8-_._
hy4raulic system u_de_ k_own-r.oad_ti_ns of'..flufd.conta_na_
_R_ _ad _alod.¢o were _ompaze_., USiNg A_ coarse _es_ dust and
oolte_tlng l_0 m_ samples, A s_eat amount o£ tabula_ da_a i,s-
p_ese_ted;. _t was eon_lud_ _ha_ the _a_ed_o valve gave sllgkc-
ly I:_coI: a_oemen_ 5e_een llne _nd sample. Rowa_e_, _he _I_
valve had.advantages in size, w_ig_, and ease o£ £nstalla_ion,
The Wyte we4g_ is not recommended for use £n hydraulic sam-
piing,
Viekars and KalloBg hydrattlic p.ua_sware compete4 f_r ..'o.ntam-
Laate- generation, Agaln,_ gre_t amounts, eL tabular d_t#, are
presented. _he Kellogg pump. a_.peare_Lto show m_re variance,
but. no. slgni£ican_ d_£ga_ence in.amounts was. f_und. Fol:..pe_-
_£_les over 190,micr=n in size_ case drain-analysis indicated
q_uan_Sties a_ hlgh-as 178Z o.£-the /np._ £1uict.level., Aft_=
an- i-nLtlal._ear-in perio_ of about 8 hotu_s_ the_e was no- S£g-..
n£f_Laant chan_e in leakage, glow ra_as.. Bronze _ylLr_e_.bAocks
contrJJottted, mor.e_-pa.r_ic_la._ r&an__dd.d, duct.Lie iron.
Systems were cl_aned initially _> SAE/ASTM" Level I._ ba_te_
_" con_mlnetio_ in t_e fer.m,of.AC coe28e test. du_t w_ts then add_d_
in con_r_lled-amoun_s to ac_-leve hi,her ASTM levels. Samp-les
we=e ¢oun_ed-p_r A_E'-598. _.or _" _m_, a. maximum, safe level ..................
I o£ AS_M Level 2 .i_ reeommen4ed if.leakage, is.not to become
excessive i_ reasonable _perating _imes. Leve-_s 3-4-c_used
noticeable de_=adatlon in system performance sad Levels 5-6
caased" unacceptable performance. -
22, Howell, G. W.:- "A.Bib],iograph)_o£ Ae=oS_aue Valve and F1uid.Com_--
ponent Tech_logy." TRW-_ystems_ Red_nd_ Beach___ia, De-
combe_-t965. AD. 485505.
This document contains a llst of 3502 articles that are pet_i.-
nent to fluid component _echnology,. ln_ludec_ i_ an.l_t_odttc-
tion, _Iphabetical source Zist__numatical s)urce list_ and a
• descriptiv_ c_oss-geference llst, Several references are p_-
tinan t--Zx_,_ont_mlna_io_-co ntro I.
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23. Howell_, G. W. and Weathers, T, M.: '%erospace Flu_d Component De-
signer's Handbook." TRW Systems, Redondo Beach, California. March
1967. AD 809183.
FiltratioD and contamination _re two sections in this rather
_tenslv_ desl.g-nhandbook.- P-_aumatie and hydraulic filters of
several typa_ a,:erated rindcompared for a numhe_ of operation-
al environments. Typos of eontamLnatlon are discussed and
classified, ,uch as internally generated metallic contaminants
and _xtorna/ dust _on_amlnant_. Effects of hydraulic sy.tem
contaminants are outli_d. _,Idustr_al cleanliness requirements
are pre_entud fo_ components and £1uids as well as a _uldo for
sol_cCion of cieaa£_g agents. It _s recommended _hat; matorla]s,
uncontrollable contalnination, fluids, and _olerancas be glvon
particular conslderatlon when deslgr,lng fluid systems.
24. ffuggett, H. L.: "Serve Valve _ernal Leakag_ as Affected by Con-
taalnatlo_." .SAECQn_e_enee P_oceedinRs: Aerospace Fluid Power
_$tQms and Eu_Dment Co_Eerence, Los Angeles, California_May
18-20, L965. 65033W.
Serve valves were exte_Ively tested using field launcher fluid
and new £1uld. Keco_ds were kept of viscosity and leakage
_ates. of the fl_id_ dUEing _he testing periods. After about
fou_ hours _he fluid Viscosities were slmila_ but the leakage
I _a_e Increase of the m_r_ h_ghly contaminated fluids stabilized
Ii at 2.8 time_tha_ el the less highly contaminated fluids. Theco_lusic_n wa_ that. ¢on_r_lled-fluld contamln_tlon level _n-
i. ¢r.ea_ed the usef_ life of serve valve a_sembiies by 277%.
i 25. Kinne_ W. L._ Schumann, E. P., and Weiss, P. A.: "Hydraulic Serve
Control Valves, Part VI - Kesearch on Electrehydraullc Serve Valves
Dealing with Oil. Contamlaatio_, Life and Reliability, Nuclear Radi-
orlon and Valve Testing." Cook Research-Laboratories_ Skokle,
llllnols_ November 1958_-_AIL211733.
This _eport d_scusses p_obiems encountere_ by aircraft com-
p_nles in the field of hydraalic components. A comparative
ch_rt of maximum a_lowable contamination levels is shown for
five companleS_ These contamination levels were established
by each company on the ground that they worked consistently
and could be maintained at not too great an expense. The max-
.. imum pa=tlcle size allowed by any of the five companies is
• 300 microns .......
..... ii
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Fa_lures due to contamln&_ion a£ temperatures above 160"F a_e
much move prevalent then those for systems whose opar_ing
temperature is below 160=F. Paper fil_ers tend =o d_a£nte_te
at temperatures above 200_F, General design, consldezatlons
are discussed which if employed result in a lo_s contamina_ion-
sensltlv_ sy,tem, .
A test procedure is presented and the acee_eDallon o£ we_r o_
eontuminat_on generation dma to the addition of _-_ie-la con..
tami.na_s is diacu_sud, Teatega-mua_ be ca_efui-tha_, they
are actually testing aampononts raLh_ than fil_o4:a_ ma,ny.c_om-
ponont fa_iures were du_ to fi_tor clogging rathe_ than Ban-
oral system contamination leveL,
26. Kinney, W. L., Schumann, E, P,, and Wei.ss, _. h,_ "Ryd_aulle
Serve Control Valves, Part 7 - Design for _m_oved Reliabillty,
Tolerable Oil Con_aminatlon Level Standards, a41dNuclear Re_ctog
Irradlation Test _Lts." Cook_esoarah Laboratories, Skokie,
lllznols, November _958 ....../_O 231657, WADC-T.R 55-29"Paxt-7.
This re_e_t is a contlnua_ion of Part 6, which has been pre-
viously abstracted. O_ly the chapte'c on ell conta_alna.tlonis
pertinent to this program. An experimental analysis e£ v_ri_
ous hyd=aullc oils was obt_laed, from selected aircraft at
Wrlgh_-Patte=son and Bergs.tr_m A_B. Using _hls data along
wi_h the results of serve valve tests =eport_ed i_ _rt 6, a=
upper limit for t|_ con_a_ion allowab_ %n aircraft hy-
draullc system saaplas. £S proaeate_..
The results of the field survey were as follows:
Source _ I0 to 20 _ 20 to 40 _,.
F_I00 434_921 21,352 20,058 1,391
F-IOI N_t Countable 3,103 489 139.
F-102 Not Countable 6 _BbO 1,500 435
F-I04. Ek_t_Countable 107,565 1,950 505
F-I05 N_ Countable 3,333 789 179
F-IOI 12,292,950 100,114 13,200 2,050
F-101 822,819 86 _052 33,865 6,050
F-101 1,628 _385 7,300 5,950 505
, F'IO i 728,490 84,348 29,842 4,500
F-lOl I_483,358 61,344 II ,100 3,300
F-IOI 1,427_717 231,318 120,984 13,550
Cook
Stand #I Not Countable 49,927 1,175 77
Cook
Stand #2 Not Countable 60,279 700 70
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The following is the.recommended maximum oontamlnation level
l,,r.airc,:aft serve valve applicatlons, bailed on a I00 ml sam-
•- lo _ 3o__L,:,a_9__ ao to _
Unl Im_ l:od I!_,000 3000 BO
lu arriving at thL_ spoel,fleatLon, cCtl:_ia of oth_r-va].vo
USerS in the JL,_.Ld wore alse considered but; found Lo bo much
more t'onflO_VatJVO th_an tim ceou]A_s of thio anal.yai_ ,Justify,
Th_.,y fc,_l tha_ the n_ajovi_y o_ the cant.amend.ties in e_,_hor
, olrbornt, dtu_t., or _,. Vonelaated by the ny_t:om pump,
Several general rccommondationa poceaining to contamination
test t:eclmiques are also pre_.onted.- Rofomance is made to
Part 6 £o_-_ mote complete de_r£p_Lon.
N_ilotq: The above recommended levOL, is revised in a further
section of this repot, t, Part 8.
k- ii
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27, Kinney, _,.L,; Schumann, E, P., and W_IBB, P, A,; "Hydraulic Serve
Control Valvnn, Pa_¢ 8 _ Invo_t_gatlonB of Oil Contamination Effootn
and. Nuolear. Rad¢ation Tent£ng," Cook Ronnarch. Laboratorl_B, 8kokin,
Illinois, Octobor 1962, AD 464061, WADC TR 55-29, Part 8,
Th_s _por_ _o_a_na a w_alth of Information from varlou_ users
of hydraulic _gvo valvo_._n£ng._h_ QI_[_ of o_1 £_om
ac_ua_ _ns_aII_.ion_, tho _loanllnoss sf_ .flea_on_ f_om va_-
ous companies, and to_t v_ul.t_ of n_w valves to_tod with actual
_lo]d fluid_ hB a _osHlg of tho_o (nvoBtigationB, _ho c_itevia
_o_ommondod hy the _utlmrB _.n Pa_ 7 of _1_ _opor_ i,s _ovtBod
heroin to conaid_xah_ loo_r llml_, _ho revised _ocomm_ndn-
_ion i@ a8 follows, hosed on a 100 m], samp_:
_nlimi_ed 2_,000 S,O00 1,000 200 150
As par_ of _he above i.vo_igation, a qae_Clonalre was seI1t to
mer_ than 20 serve v_lVe u_ers._ and.many o£ _ho_ who _ee-ponch_d
included their.own company cleanllnes_ speci'Iication_ fur fluid
used _nl_ervo systems. The in£orma_ion thus obtained is shown
i', the following Table I. Note: All dimens_ons refer t;o the
larBes_ particle dime_u_:i..on except £or North American which
uses the _maLL_t par_icla dimension.
Al_o as part of the £_vest£gatlen, fi_id samples 0£ hydraulic
ell were _ake= f_m 3-1dlffe_ent aircra_t_ missiles_ and test
sta_d_, all o_ which, were in'e fully operationaL.co_&i_£o_.
The _esults of _hls sampli_ p_ogram a_ sh_n in Table II.
The third effor_ rep_;_e@ on herein involved testing four new_
dlfferen£ serve valves with o£I tha_ was obtalned from opera_
tlonal field sites. Test d_ratlon ranged as hlgh as 40 hours.
None of _h_ four valves demonstrated any a_pect of failure
duping these tests. The con£amlnatlon count is shm_n in Table
l I I |
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28, Kirnb_uer, Erwin A, : "A Method af Der,erml_ting the Degree of Con-
lamination of Sampling Valves." Aircraft Porous MedLa, 1us. AP_--._
FSR-9B
Thie paper was w_£_t_n ae a Rropo_ed ARY for the flAE. I_ pre-
sents detailed, test proced_rem for d.g_el:m.i_i_4_ th_ a_t o_
cou_amiua_ion tI_P.- £s cont_ibu¢_.._ a fluid sample by th_
sampling valve £¢e_lf, under Law-p_e_s_re eondlCions-. G_--.
_na_ts ge_eratad-.wbite mount_,n_ the va_v_ Lu_ the system, that
wh£eh-is bu£At Ln_ the valve its.el_, d_rLng mamu£aiture, ar_-.-
t_t generated by valve operetLon a_e the ma_or so_rces, eon-
sidereA.
Two appendixes are incIude_ ,/hieh pr_se_c the r_s_lte o£, _ests
condue_ec_by AYH--gn_wu dif£ere_tt, types eg eamp.lln_valves r
I) ABHA Drafting.No.,_9410@8.(Dr.#198-59)(Ben_on l_edle _Zelue-
P/N.2000)-;, and 25 Fluid Re_alator._.Gor_ratton.Bleede¢ V_Iv_
P/N.FRC7"_65-0Z..The results o£ both te_ts-indloate that very
little contaminate was generated.by mounting th_ valves_ The
"built-i_" conrmmination of the _luid.Re_ulato¢ Corporatior_
valves was _egligible. Rowever_,the.Benton did,ge_teratedurln8
opening and closing; the c'on_aminatewas-,60t@...657,metallic and
was ef _he following levelsr
Siz.___e Particle Count
5.-25_ 50 ,.000-.
2'5-50_ 75O
SO-tO0_ tO0
tO0_ plus flbers 40
2_. Longyear, D. FL.,Jz:. ,. BlaSter, A.,.and P_r_er, D..: "¢otteehts.to
Extend Serv_sys_em Life and Minimize Performance Degradation."
S,AECo_ference £r._ceedi,Rs.: Aerospace_ Systems. and. Eq_.Lpment Con-
fe_en_, Lo_-AngeZee, _alifornia, May L8-20, 1%5, 6503L6,
This paper discusses design csnsldera_i_ns t_t may reduce
requirements _@r _iltratlor _o oon_rol _on_-amina_ionin
hy_raullc systemS,. P_incLpal wear in eet_o,val_es £s d_e
to cavitation and erosion,, A.means o_ redb_in_ Wear
¢o_temin'an__eneratlo_ is th_ use of,better ma_erlals_ A
,', comparison s_u_ was r_n.o_ matertal.sse1_ec_ed.-_or_harac_er-
isties of macb/neab_lity, s_abillty, strength, and._rdneSs.
Wear-can be considerably reduced by the use of tu_ga_en-carbide
serve valves that are virtually insensitive to normal hydraulic
system co(_tamine_iofl,
I I III I!i O0000006-TSB03
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30, M_Kenzie, G. W. : "Ope_ation and Maintenance Requ£rements for SST
Hydrmul ic.Systems, " _E..._...C_optf___/_9_ P_opegd_in_ ; A_rps_C e F_luid -
ppjyer Systems and EqPipm_nt Con_fe_ance, Los Angeles, California,
• May 18-20. 650343,
This paper discusses th_ minimum filter requirements recom-
mended fom the SST hydraulic symtems. For thi_ system it wa_
_. _'ec_mmended that all. return fluid should be filtered through
I @.ual filter assemblies cQmp.rising a 3-micq:on absolute primary
el@Anent wi_h bypass to a 15-micron absolute secondary filte=--
with no bypass. All other system filters should be at least
15_micron absolute with no bypass. This paper also discusses
desirable properties of a hydraulic fluid to be developed for
SST with prima_y consideration placed on fi_e resistance
properties.
31. MIL-STD-I.246A. 18 Augus_ 1967, Department of Defense, Washlngton ,
D.C. 20301.
This specification descrlbes DO_ contamination control levels.
This revision varies from the revision dated 27 May 1966 by
allowing a Erea_er number of particles above a given size for
the same cleanliness level. Small particles for any level are
controlled by listing a maximum weight• of nonvolatile residue
for eack I00 milliliters of fluid. Examples• of cleanliness
levels with •particles great-er than a given size are listed
i . _low:
Cleanli- Particle Allowable Nonvolatile
: hess Size Quantity of Residue
: ,Level (Microns). Particles _ Ranges
I0 5 3 A.. Lee-. than 1.0 mg
I00 15 280 B. 1.0 to 2.0 mE
" 25 75 C. 2.0 to 3.0 mg
50 II D. 3.0 to 4.0 mg
I00 i E. 4.0 to 5.0 mg
50_ 50 Ii,000 F. 5.0 to 7.0 mg
100 950 O. 7.0 to 10.0 mE
. 250 25 H .... i0.0 to 15.0 mg
500 I J. 15.0 to 25.0 mg
/'_ I ,000 250 I,000
i' .: 500 45
750 7
I000 I
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32, Nei.land, V, K. : "Contami_a_on Effects an4 Controls in Saturn
Launch Vehicle Rydra_lic Syetem,," _/N_A _y_p_lu_ o_ Cpnt_-
£nation Coptrol: Current and AdVanced Co,temptsL_ I.nst_uaca_ta_t£o_
_nd Automation, Albuq_rque, Now Mexieo, Septar_h_._t2-14,_1967.
Contam£natLon tn hydraulic eysea_a ca_.b_ much.more e£fect.£v_ly
dealt-.wi.thwhon £_s so_r_g_ sml ef£e_t.s,ar_ understood. The
con_amima_ion,lave3 of. a glo#ed-system._an hs _on_ide_abLy _e-
d_cod by the operation o£..soma o£ its ¢o_tponentep_ioz,t_>s_-
sembly slng_--theson,eminent._e_er.ation_evel_is _oduced-e_ter
a relatively short-break,in pecLod,
Plots ar_ given o£ expegime_al da_a on cr£tic_a.L el, canaries
i_ somg hydraulic system components, ang-the time required-
for _omponent _lfunct£o_. clue to siLtin_ versus eontamlaat£on
level. _xamp.lesare gLven o_ system f.£1terfail_r_esdue to
resonance; _xces.s_ve reson_¢e may be _revented by proper, sup-
port of filter elements. Vibration-an_t¢o_tamination.tevels
for. Saturn hydraulic ¢omponettts are given as welt as con£ami-
nation speci£ica_ion limits.
33. Parker, James W..: "Hydraulic System gor_amlnetion.!_ _round Sap-
port Equ£pm.en¢, Volume.4, N_. 6 January 196.3..AD 485305.
This arLtcle was extt'actedfrom ALr Eorce Repo¢._ASN-TN 61-143.
_ifteenooperational _irera£t.and two groand-ser.vlcing u_i_s
W_ight Patterson Ai= Eo_ce Base_ Ohio, were surveyed:for uon-
_amln_t/o_.in.hydraulic Eystems. Large cLuartti_esof contain+- -
n:_tlo__ere fou_ci;i_.the-ov_-100._nicrost,range,,as-many"-aa
5100 _.artlcleswere ¢oun_,ed_n the sam_Le_. The malor problem_
source is identified as _ransfer of £1uid-_rom._hlpp.ingeon-
talners and .poor.treatment o£ ground test equipment.. _he com-
plete results of _o_tami_ation _ecels.fotmd during thi_ survey
are-presented in th_ tabulation.
.I
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Contaminant_ in Operational Atrcr_fC l_ydraultc Syetem¢
A/C 5.10 IO-_5 25-50 50-100 100 Weight
T_ Micron Micron Hicron Hicro_ l_c._O.. n _ (m_e/!00 m])
F-lOS _3,840 28,160 I_,480 5_,I0 1,7_A] After Yl_ .......................
F-lOS 12,160 5,170 3,070- 520 370 A_¢._ FI u_,h
MJ'2A 7q,qTO 36,720 20,150 9,380 4,240 Areal= F...LU_. --
F-10-_ -- -3| ,16| 12,261 _860 _,87G | ,2_(1 l_f_ra
F-lO_ 30,220 19)620...12,870- 6,0_0 L,82_ l_fsara
OR_aC Lon
HJ'2^ 101,330 47,150. 24,380 8,3_ 3,590- k_¢e
KC-135 2,750 1,090 1,_O 1,43_ 2,&_O' 1 oi fluid
K(:-135 13,460 q20 720 720 )40
KC-135 10_5lO 1,530 (_30 180 160
B'58 0 .......... 0,2
B-58 ............ ! .8
TE,-58 48 ,¢_00 3,2_0- 1,_00 800 18 -- 8.2 -
T B_58 ........ 200 50 2.8
S-520 ............. 6.8
B-52G ........ 5,.100- -- 8.3
F-lOS -- 33,050 15,840---.- 2,290 1,180 A_idenL- A/¢
B-58 87,000 34,200 6,800 300 10 3 5. • ................
34. Piccone_ M. : "Control c_ _ontaminaClo_...in- R_=keC B_o_e;- Ky_Lrmu/'_e
Systems.-" SA_ Con£a_en=e- _T_,e_i_K_,,: A_r._sp_ue. _._c_ Pow,,e_Sys-
tems and Eq_!_.pment Conference, Los. Angeles-,. California_ _y- L_-20,
L%-5_ 65034.5-
., This paper p_o_ides a comprehemsive dis_usslon on the import-
ance of Contamination control in _ydraallc systems, types o_
:_ contaminants, meams of system contaminatlon_ sizes of particle
_. ¢ontamlna_ts, specificatio_ for kydraulic fluid, eleanilness,
effe=ts of vibration and £1ashing on ulea_ing systems an_ com-
ponents, mecho4..s of ¢oncaminatlon. c_ntro.l_ comp_eri_on of a_to-
matlc to light microscope contamln&n_ counting methods, an4 a
comparison of some aut_me_i¢ pa=ticle couaters. Genera.1 cover-
age is glve_ to ma_ aspects of eontamlnatlon control in hy-
,: dra_llc systems and is liberally sprinkled with e_perlence on
,.. actual systems,
" .... '" 00000006-TSB06
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35_Pino, M. A, and Furby, N, W,-_ "New Gon_ider_tion_-in Hydraulic
_y__ _Bd EquLp_n_ Conference, Loe A_g_l.es,California, _y
18"20, 1965, 650329.
Thfs paper, di_o_se_. _he =oq_L_ea_nts £mpose_ by 8peo4fica_ton_
o_ avtag£o_ hydraulic-fluid. _ being ua._a_Lf£ed_n-ciew of.
a¢t.uaLgo_i_i0ns- to be met .in. applL_aCt_,
gn pr/n_i_l.e, _e a_h_r a-gr_s that ¢_viaLon_ m>-M2L-K-5606
hy_r_li_ £t_£d..were b#ng£Lc£a£, bgt d£eag_aes with. the criteria
0£ (.essentially) a z_r_ pa_ticl_ eoaa_ ga excess- o.f 10O micto na,
Thi_ _per. presents the pcoblem_ £ube.sen_ £n trane£erri.ng fluid
from conca.Lners. _o gh¢ using system withou_ introducing contam-
ination and _ecommcads tha_ all fluid be passe,. _hrough a fil-
tratioa cart prior t¢ filling the hydraulic system.. White =corn
conditions er_ _equi=ed to p.ackag¢ i_yd_auLic o£1 to. this sp¢-
c£££¢.ation w.itk_a high _eJegtion...zete ar_L attendant-costs,
_he a_thor further points, o_t that MIL-R-5606 specifL=ations
are in-excess,of m_,Jor.-airframemanufacturers spec££icm_ions
whoae lim_ts have beertsh_w_...tobe.perfectly adequate foe.b_oad
use-. The table,oomp.ar_ the-si_ecLfications(A, B_ and.C) used.
by major airframe man__ux_ers in-zel'ationto MIL-H-Y_06_
Examples of.Particallate
Contamination Requirementa,
Particle" Pat_cicle....
S_ze l_umbe_. Stze Nnmber
R_nge (Ma.xlmunt) Rang_ (Maximum)
5"I0 L6_O00 5-]:4 I0,000
I0"20 4,800 15-_4 4 ,.0OO
2"0"4._ I,200 2.5-49" _ ,OQO
40-80 240 50"99" 100
80 "1"60. 16 100--299 50
>_0 4 >300
.. ¢_,_amea_ Cla_s 3, /_C-2_ .'..
',.:
| I • i
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F4_amplee of Particulate
ContamSna¢lon Requirements
(_onelu.ded)
lq !
MIL_ff_5606A
Application C Exhlblt A MLL=ff-5606B
Par_iel._
Size Number.- Number Number _
_aase (I_xim.um> (Ma_¢imum). (Icm.zimum>
,ll [
5"15 2,500 20,000 2,500
_5"25 1,500 9,000 1,000
2"5"50 150 2,500 250
51-100 20 150 25
>100 5 OT 0t
i
TOne less than namber--oi-samp_es ao_nted ....
_Filtor rate and total..._elghtof insoluble.s
......requLremencs, al_.
T_e author-also p_i=ts out thet saperelean fluids are not su-
perlor, to normal speei£ica_ion fluids (such as example C in
the tabulation)in terms of oxidation stability and recommends
a requirement o_ 3- or &particles in the largest size counted
instead of a zero par-_iele,count criteria. The ;esults would
be _I).lower fluid costs_ (_> increa_edr sources o_ supply,
62)..5stEer. fl_id,a_ailabili_y, (4) _lai_ q_allty functionally
equal to presen_ fluids.. Nitr_en blanketing that has become
acuept94 p!ac_Ic_ is _seusse4.
36.-"Precision Clasping Mmthods and Cleanlln_ss Requirements for Parts
and Assemhlle& of Apollo El_id Systems." North American _¢iation,
InC°r,,.Downey_CaIiforni_, 19 July 1865. MA_lO-017.
This specification details cleanlng and contamination control
requlreme_ts.ud_d for the ApoIlo program. Filters as fine as
O.45-mlcron ar_ requlred fo_ analysis of a flui4 contamination
leve_, The e_eanllneaa requi_e_ts used are shown In_-the
tabulation on page-C-28.
_'- Inllln I i i i ,,,,,, i , ,
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Partlcl.e A]._oWabl-_ Ma_i-,,m_vola_._ a
_. - 50...75. I0_. I mB
75-100. ID
ABova. ZOO -.0
2 50-L_. %O0 _ rag.
100-175 I0
Above 175 • O
3. 160-200 5. No _4qui_em_n_
200-250 1
Above 250 0
4 175-700 6 2 m_
(partlcles-and fibers.)
Above 700 (paztloLea) 0
700-1500 (fibers) 1
Above 1500 (fibers) 0
37. Reid,. S_anley F._ "How Loe.khee_-Keepe.Contaminates Out of Hy-
d=a_lic Systems Durlag the Manufacture of Large gargo Alrcr_ft. '_
Conta_iaa_i¢_ Co_I:_oI_ _o_ume V.,.MS. 8__Augu_t 1966.....
T-hls article presents a comprehenslve descr-lp._Lo_of th_ pro-
gram--that Lockheed/GeoT4_ia. has imstlturP _-to- ensure cleanli-
ness of hydraulic systems on the.G-Sz. ,.ar{_. aircraft. In-plant
fabrication, of tubln_ and h_se assembl_es is eo_ch_cte_ by n_r-
real proca_ses_ but all su_se_ue=_ ope_atlo=s are-condumted
under contrglled cleanliness conctltlons. Special oleaning amd
capping equipmen_ has been d_signed_..Control of the £1u&d it-
self is considered vital. All test eq_ipmem_t._ks=er_ifled.
Cleanliness clauses are a p_rt gf a/l vendor.p_ocu¢ernent.
Educational. and-tra/nln 8 p{toErams-have bee= inEtitu_sd for.the_.
_ersovmal involved'._ Samplin_ is aceom4)ILs_ied,by the "bomb"
and..vlsua_ ceun¢ing met_o_L_ hut. "in-_laue'* teehnlq_eS and
;, au_omatl¢ sempllng eq_ipmen_ axe being evaluated.
:j
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38, Rohin_on, N, F,: "F]uid Contamirmt£on Survey of 143 Naval Aircraft
Hydraulic Syntoms," Douglem Aixcraf_ Company, Ins., Long Beach,
Californ_a, 13 March 1968, AD 402-_71L,
Thin rnport donnriboa the fluid flamplLng and analyai_-.of 143
naval _ireraft, gmphao_n L8 pla_od _n contamknagion loyal and
_yp_, and numhor of filters employed ta oae_ nyfltom. Tim eon-
clunion reached to _ha¢ i_ ia not un_oanonablo t_o_po_t the
oxio_itig fluid system. _a be a.ble to flufleain a mo._tmum centami-
nation loyal of class 5 with minor modLfLcatLono, and _hat
newly doflignod eyatomM ahou]4_ bo ab£o to maintain a maximum
contamination level of a_aaa 4, T.he means of a_taining these
higher cleanliness l_el_ a_e proper filt_atLon and _lla use of
components that hive boon broken in (passed initial high con-
taminant generating stage), _he cov_amination clasaeo recom-
mended are the tentative iA_, A_M, and AIA hydraulic-fluid
standard contamination levels as ahown:
Size Range Max£mum _attlel_ _zlmum P_rtlcle
(mi_ron_) . ¢oun_ CLass ' ¢ .Co_n_ Class 5
5-10 32,000 87,000
1.0"25 I0 ,YO0 21 _400
25"50 1 ,_ _n-- 3,130
50-I00 2.'- 430
>I00 21 4L .......
39. "SSFL Sampling Instructions." l_a_ke_dyne Oi_is/on_ No_th American
Rochqell Corp¢_ation. FL II-5-I072. I May 1965.
This speeificatlon establishes samplin_ methods and p=aetlces
for use in testing fluids for oontamln_tion a_ Santa Su_ana..
Field Laboratories. The sampling me_hods_for dynamic and
statle sampling are give_ in an expllelt step by step manner
to ensure that there is as li£tle deviation in analysis due
to sampling var£atlon as iS possible.
K_ IIIIII i iiiiii , i i ,,, , ,, .........
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4(], 8t_:hmeyer, J, P, : "Cons_ructlon of a Control].ed Environmental
A_ Util_ing Commercial Construction Materials," SAE Conference
.Prg_ee___4!.pZ_B_L.6erppp_C2_ Fluid- Powa; Syg_om_ @nd Equip[ ant Co nfp. T-
02_,_, Los Angeles, Callfo_nia, May 18-20, 1965, 650344,
Th_ paper dlsoufl_o_ confl_ructlng and malntalD!ng a clean room
for-assembly, te_t, and inspection of critic_l components.
Conol4n_tLoa_aro made for cos_, upkeep, and assembly time,
Floo_, w_ll, and ceil_n_ mn_erials are _on_ldored fo:'appoar-
ante a_,l function, Air conditioning and hou_el<eeping must hn
chocko_ and maintained unifortnly throughout the oporntion el"
tlm cloO_ t_oom. Personnel c]oLhing mqst b(_ Icvpt clean and Jn
good repair, Equipment mtt_t be selected for cleanlJness of
operation and ease of mainLonanc(J. Every clement mus_ be con-
flicted to reduce expense and obtain required cleanliness
level.
4L, Tollier, G. F., Lmeellen, J. W,, and Standke, H.: _trvey of Con-
_amina_ion. in. Ba=ket .PEopuls£on Fl.uid. Systems. Rocketdyne Division,
_o_h Ame_Lcan Rockwell Corporation, GeneRa Park, California.
AFRPL-TR-67-290. AD 82970_.
_hi_ paper discusses fluid contamination. The primary interest
i_ to demonstrate the many diverse aspects of contamination
with which industry Is now face4. Physical characteristics of
particulate an_ chemical contaminants are described as well as
thei_ potentlal detr.e_ental effect in fluid systems, A gen-
eral survey of contamlaatlon level control exercised by various
c_Tporatlobs infllcates a need for a much clearer definition of
contamination problems an_ solutions. A bibliography of artl-
Gl@s an4 absorbed specifications outlines present knowledge
and concern for contamination analysls..-An extensive number
of graphs an_ tables give an indication of data available for
consideration in the design an4 maintenance of fluid systems.
,"
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42, Van Leo., J, K, : "Silting Index - What It _, How £o Find It, What
It Tells," _y@rauli_S__dPp_ma[i_E, VQI, 17, No, 3, March 1964.
This articlQ presents a d@r_v_.!m] of the math_mst_s invoiv_d
in the 811tlng Index and dm_¢;£b_, the _o,_ _o_hnlque _volvsd,
Baflioally, the indo_ is a measure of the _i,0o =o_quired t.o pa_s
_-npo_ific.volumo of hydraulic fLui6, unde_ a flpo_ifkc p_cn-
sure,. _hDough a 0,8 mL_won filter, The highe_ _ho _ndox, the
8_eato_ th_ _ondeney of th_ flu£6 to flLl_, £_ ea_ pr.edio_
failure rate_ o£ hlgh _leramee-m_t-eo velvo_, Tho..detMlad
rust proeo6ur_ is g_ve. in .ARP-788 of the 8/_.
43. Van l,oon, J. K, : "V_lu_ En_i_er£ng of Cat.aslant ion C_ntrol,"
SAE Cen£oret_¢e _Proc@edin_s: AQ_o_oace _luid p_qo-_ Systems and
E_ui_ent Con_erer_, May IS-Z0. 1965. 650331.
Contam_natlen con_roL is mandatory £o.=. good componeu_ rella-
billty,. Zn order-to keep rmllaSili_y high and _ost low, the
customer and supplier sheul_ revfew _hei= contamination con-
tro.lsand specifications to ensure,tha_ they are adequate but
net too seve=e. Care must be taken that the component is not
eon_amlnate_ due te reliability teatin8 at system installa-
tion. T1_ar-lit fXi#lt control serve aotua=or davelopment
is used.to. d_monstra_e the suocess_ul application,of Value
Engineering to Co_taminatlon Co_tr_l. T/xLsis a case of a
"oo_tamlnatlon...COatxolp_:o._ra_ designed for _ spe¢ifl.ccom-
pgneR_ o_ system...._to e._im/mate_he GOLD.PLATE from the
p_odu¢C_" It men.tlonlthat either M_L-R-5606B or R2L-H-6083
hyd=a_lie flu.idis.used-in ces_ing, with a_final flush of
MXL-.H-6083,.The particle specifl.eationused.for the F-Ill
components is presented below.
Micron Over Fibers
too_...&o_oo-_ooo _ _o-]o._..__9.o_ _ s-Is
Component
Number of 0 5 II 55 1,000 4,000 20,000
Particles
Allowable
_- • ii
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44+._Wheeler, H. L., Jr. : Fluid Filters: M_dia and Con_amL_mti0n.
Bendix Filte_ Division, B_ndix Aviation Corporation, Publication
No. BFD 168. 1960
To control the level of cont_mlnatlo_,in hydr_,ullc systsms, a
variety of filt@r types or-=ombinati_e of types may be se-
lected. Eaah hydraulic ¢0mponent generates its ow_ _y_e of
contamlnation and. is also seru_i_Lve to _ eertair_-ran_ o_-c_.-
tami.,ant s_zes ....Zhe two primary filter.,types are eurfaco fil-
ter (single-membrane element). 8nd-depth filter_ each ha_ _d--_
vantag_a and disadvantages that should be =omsidered when
selecting filters for a spealflc system. The surface filter
is more eaaily adaptable to _absolu_e"-par,tiale size filtra-
tion while =he depth, filter ha_ a greater contaminant, holding
capacity., Clean room-facillties are necessary in filter pro-
du_tion_/.o-reduce migrat io_.effect iveLy,
Particl_ counting in _he ranEe smaller than. I0 microns is ex-.
tremeLy unreliable with op.tical technique_ beca_se the particle
sizes are-approaching the w_velength of light.
45. Wiley, John..W,: "Hydraulic Fluid-Contamination." Aerospace Main-
tenance Safe=y, Vol, 19(2)-, February_1964.
This author maintains that the keys to maintaining clean..ai=-
craft hydraulic systems_are (I) strict, filter m_imtenance both
in the aircraft, and, in.ground seru/2_ing unlts_ (2> prefil,_ering
fluid added .to re_e_-voi=s_ and (3->kn_wled'_Le ser_.ie_ng and, --
_in_:enaru_e techniques.. Certain syste,_ funct_io_,_-deserve pa_-
tlcular, attention; for example, plugged, filters may have gone
into t_e bypass m_de and pas_ed contamination on down-into t_e
system_. Spe¢i&l attention should also be given to maintaining
¢leanllness of air reservoirs on test.stands_ since contamina- .,
tion here can be passed on into the hydraulic fluid. Paper ele-
ments should not be used in high-veloelty systems because _e
impact of a larger particle may perforate tb_ fiber-- P_essure
surges can put a filter into momentary bypasS..When a system
is flushed and sampled, the sampllns operation should be re-
peated after an engine r_n or test flight since engine vibra-
tion and system operatlon will often loosen particles _hat will
show up in the filters.
• ,--[."
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Convair Cleanliness Specification 13,07H and 13,17C are pre-
sented; the requirements are as follows:
Ma>_ImumPartlcIo Si_._,_;: O-10 10-25 25-50 50-100 100-200
Maximum Quantity Allowable: Nona 9000 900 90 9
One flbe_ allowed, 40B maximum diameter
Sample vo]ume is i00 ml
Also in this paper, recommended pa_tlcle counts a_e presente4
which are bolieve£4dequa_e to provent silting of serve valves:
Maximum Particle Sizu, ),: 5-]4 15-24 25-59 50=]00 '.'q00
Maximum Quantity Allowable: ]50,000 ]7)000 7)000 1,000 I00
Sample volume is I00 ml
i ..... 00000006-TSC02
